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Unethical behavior in the use of IT may result in significant negative impacts on the productivity, 
profitability, and reputation of the organization. IT exacerbates moral problems through its constant 
evolution, multi-faceted nature and encroachment into our personal and professional lives. People have 
difficulty recognizing moral characteristics, applying moral decision-making heuristics, and anticipating 
consequences of ethical problems when IT is present. These qualities highlight the moral milieu of ethical 
IT problems in organizations. 
The dissertation investigates this phenomenon through three perspectives. First, while moral 
development in childhood and adolescence predispose people toward particular moral reasoning, situational 
and contextual factors of ethical IT dilemmas may unearth other different moral reasoning patterns. The 
deviation of people’s situational moral reasoning from broader moral dispositions is explored. Second, the 
scenario-specific situational moral reasoning is further framed into patterns of decision-making heuristics 
using the domain theory of moral development. Third, research in IT ethics has largely ignored the 
properties and characteristics of IT artifacts in ethical decision-making. Using affordance theory from 
ecological psychology, the dissertation proposes a framework of moral affordances, including ownership, 
anonymity, reproducibility, etc. that shapes ethical IT decision-making, intentions and behaviors. 
The study surveys 321 individuals across three ethical IT dilemmas of varying moral character and 
technology use. Ethical intentions and decisions deviated significantly from when situational moral 
judgments were considered, emphasizing utilitarian and relativist judgments. These decision-making 
models are transformed when ethical IT dilemmas were attributed to different domains of morality, 
exhibiting not only different patterns of moral reasoning but also an entirely different moral character. 
Finally, the salience of IT moral affordances varied between ethical dilemmas and demonstrated some 
influence on ethical IT decisions and intentions; however, these moral affordances lacked predictive 
efficacy within the broader ethical IT decision-making model.
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Highly publicized corporate scandals have significant impact on the perception of ethical 
and unethical behavior in business, shifting the attitudes of public opinion, management and 
academia toward ethical, legal, and socially responsible perspectives and behaviors (Conroy and 
Emerson 2006; Nevins et al. 2007). Corporate ethical issues may also result from the use and 
misuse of information technology (IT) in organizations (Mason 1986). Rashes of viruses and 
worms cripple personal and corporate workstations, not only questioning the morality of hackers 
and virus designers, but also software developers who bear a social or contractual obligation to 
customers to produce secure and stable software (De George 2003; Oz 1994). The pursuit of 
security and privacy policies and legislation as adequate solutions to managing and governing IT 
presupposes an understanding of the problem—one of ethics and morality—a problem that 
suffers from a lack of complex understanding by many professionals and executives (Crane 
1996). The misalignment between legislation and policies with personal ethical beliefs and 
behaviors may reflect our poor understanding of moral values, moral reasoning and ethical 
situations involving information technology and computers (Conger and Loch 1995). The 
perception of a poor understanding of computer ethics issues may stem from a difficulty drawing 
analogies between ethical issues and computer abuses (Conger and Loch 1995). In other words, 
people may lack “moral sense” in ethical decision-making involving IT, possibly resulting from 
poor socialization of moral norms through childhood and adolescent development, education, and 
organizational training (Wren 1990). 
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Unethical IT behavior can lead to severe consequences in the workplace. Organizations 
often fall victim to ethical oversights not due to systemic problem with business processes or a 
culture nurturing amoral values, but due to the immoral behaviors of a select few individuals 
(Vitell and Davis 1990). Inappropriate and unethical use of IT is a prominent concern for 
managers that are accountable for their employee’s workplace behavior, resulting in negative 
impacts for organizations beyond merely a decrease in productivity (Paradice 1990; Paradice and 
Dejoie 1991). Managers and employees with access to IT systems and sensitive information in 
particular are inundated with opportunities to engage in unethical behavior (Vitell and Davis 
1990). IT professionals who are charged with the design and construction of information systems 
must address ethical issues and abide by unspoken duties, as evidenced by Conger and others: 
Everyone who develops applications, designs equipment, performs any kind of 
testing, uses methodologies, analyzes jobs, designs human interfaces, writes 
documentation, or prescribes the use of computers, will face ethical [quandaries] 
on every project; they just might not recognize them. (Conger et al. 1995) 
Consequentially, concerns about unethical IT behavior have drawn the attention of IS researchers 
to continue investigating how people make ethical decision and what factors drive ethical 
decision-making (Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard et al. 2004; Moores and Chang 2006). 
Information Technology and New Ethical Problems 
Information technology affords people the ability to change our surrounding environment 
in numerous ways previously impractical or unattainable. The use of well-established 
technologies is ingrained into the normative practices of a society, culture, or group, and, 
therefore, the use of the technology is governed by the same normative practices (Bijker 1997). 
Normative rules and practices, both explicit (policies and codes) and implicit (social practices and 
patterns of behavior), reflect the moral values of the society, culture or group (Schein 1985). 
However, technological innovation disrupts established norms or engenders new domains of 
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social behavior creating new ethical problems that people must address in the use of the 
newfound technology (Maner 1996; Marshall 1999). For example, on-line communication and 
Internet technologies introduces new moral problems by broadening the scope and speed of 
communication, allowing for anonymous communication and free reign of content distribution, 
and the inability to control the reproduction of data and information (Johnson 2004). The unique 
characteristics of on-line communication, enabled through information technology, create new 
moral hazards that lack the normative and legal precedence of their “real world” corollaries, such 
as the proliferation of identity theft (Berghel 2000; Mercuri 2006). Further exacerbating the 
problem, legislatures lack sufficient understanding of not only the technical issues, but also the 
moral justification for the legislation to create fair, just and effective legislation to govern the 
ethical use of IT. This results in a policy-gap between people’s moral attitudes and beliefs and 
those attitudes and beliefs reflected through technology and technology policy (Maner 1996). 
In many perspectives, technology is considered intrinsically amoral, in other words, no 
technology bears as part of its design a deterministic moral component, neither good nor evil. We 
as social agents construct the moral nature and ethical use of a technology through the use of the 
technology (Bijker 1997). However, some scholars would argue against this hypothesis (De 
George 2003; De George 2006; Spinello 2005). Information systems (IS) and IT are not 
inherently neutral, nor are the decisions to implement a particular system or technology, or 
incorporate a design flaw in the final implementation (Smith and Hasnas 1999). Whether IT is or 
is not inherently moral, research suggests that IT may dull or exacerbate people's attitude toward 
and ability to engage in ethical or unethical behavior (Banerjee et al. 1998; Gattiker and Kelley 
1999a). In other words, an individual's disposition toward ethical or unethical behaviors and 
affordance offered by IT to engage in those behaviors may be dependent on the situational 
presence and use of particular technologies. Indeed, the design and use of information and 
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computer technology affords it’s users with particular abilities beyond the human capacity, such 
as accessing data from geographically disparate locations or reproducing large amounts of data 
with near-instantaneous speeds (Albrechtsen et al. 2001; Gibson 1979). Although the manner we 
use technology for ethical or unethical behaviors dictates our perception of the moral character of 
the technology, different information technologies may promote or deter particular ethical or 
unethical behavior by the manner it is designed (Chatterjee et al. 2009). For example, peer-to-
peer (P2P) technologies provide a platform to transfer and reproduce large amounts of 
information without the need of a centralized server. While we as users are capable of only 
sharing information that is not copyrighted material, the vast majority of information shared 
online via P2P services are copyrighted content (Eining and Christiensen 1991). 
The question remains: does IT introduces new, unique ethical philosophies, or merely 
represents a new context for the application of established ethical philosophy? On one hand, 
Johnson (2004) argues that information and computer technology merely constitutes a new 
domain of moral problems that current moral principles and philosophy are sufficient to derive 
solutions to these moral dilemmas. In other words, information and computer technology 
introduces new ethical problems, but not new ethical theories unique to the domain of 
information and computer technology. On the other hand, Maner (1996) argues that some 
qualities inherent to information and computer technology make existing moral philosophy 
inappropriate and unable to properly address ethical problems in this domain. Groniak-
Koakawska (1996) is particularly optimistic that IT will usher in a new era of global moral 
philosophy. Specifically, the manner people address ethical issues will be judged on a global 
stage, precisely due to the nature of information technology itself—its ability to quickly change 
form, function and connect institutions, groups and people, whom otherwise would be 
disconnected. Is current moral philosophy sufficient to address moral problems involving 
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information and computer technology? While answering this question is a daunting task indeed, 
well beyond the scope of this work, I explore the application of moral reasoning based on 
established moral philosophy and extend the determinants of moral reasoning to incorporate 
information and computer technology effects. 
Nevertheless, technology does create ethical problems or shape the capabilities of the 
decision-maker, creating new alternatives for unethical behavior and increasing the severity of 
consequences. Specific design choices may influence the available and potential ethical choices 
of decision-makers; however, such design choices operate through established normative and 
institutional structures. Technology constrains and extends, dulls and emphasizes the universe of 
potentials for ethical and unethical actions. The manner by which this universe is manipulated is 
shaped by the manner the technology influences our reality. 
Regardless of the implications computer and information technology have on the future 
directions of moral philosophy and discourse, each of the aforementioned theories agree that 
technology by its nature is disruptive to established moral norms and ethical behaviors, even 
requiring reconsideration of our existing moral values and ethical philosophy. Several studies 
investigating the effects of ethical IT behavior on moral attitudes and judgments have supported 
such a conjecture (Banerjee et al. 1998; Cappel and Windsor 1998; Sproull and Kiesler 1991), 
where moral attitudes are feelings and impressions about a ethical situation, while moral 
judgments are conclusions about the ethical nature of the situation based in reason. Sproull and 
Keisler (1991) found that the recognition and identification of potentially harmful activities was 
significantly disrupted when computer technology was introduced, suggesting a difference 
between an individual's assessment of ethical issues due to the presence of information 
technology. Cappel and Windsor (1998) found both IT students and professionals had difficulty 
identifying ethical issues and acting accordingly, and even more difficulty achieving consensus 
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with student and professional groups on any ethical IT issue. Indeed, Banerjee and others (1998) 
provide further support for this premise, suggesting that ethical IT behavior is highly contextual, 
dependent largely upon the immediate organizational environment and ethical scenario. In other 
words, one's ethical or unethical behavior is more dependent upon presence of an IT artifact in an 
ethical dilemma, or the environment surrounding the individual, instead of the individual's 
attitudes and beliefs toward the ethical dilemma itself. Therefore, ethical behaviors are not always 
consistent across situations and contexts, as the ethical content of the situation and environmental 
factors change so does the efficacy of ethical decision-making models (Haines and Leonard 
2007b; Haines et al. 2008; Leonard and Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 2004).  
Research Motivation and Development 
Even though situation and artifact of an ethical IT dilemma are salient factors in ethical 
decision-making, strong individual differences are present in how the artifact and situation are 
morally perceived. People may employ particular moral reasoning schema, or patterns of moral 
reasoning and ethical decision-making, more often than others across a variety of scenarios as 
part of a dispositional propensity (Rest 1986b; Rest et al. 2000a). Nevertheless, variation remains 
in the type of moral reasoning evoked during a particular scenario despite of or in conflict with 
individual dispositions toward moral reasoning. This study proposes that there are situational 
influences or factors in ethical IT decision-making that change how people reason through a 
moral problem. Moreover, individuals may employ situation-specific moral reasoning capacities 
that are significantly different from their dispositional moral reasoning schema. 
Individuals and managers may employ different and various ethical philosophies based 
on the situation (Fraedrick and Ferrell 1992; Grover and Hui 1994), becoming more unethical as 
the perceived risks and consequences of unethical action decrease. This suggests that although 
people may be predisposed to a particular level of cognitive moral development, people may 
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deviate from this disposition due to situational factors. Researchers in ethics ought to expand their 
conception of moral reasoning and judgments, acknowledging the limitations of purely 
dispositional measures of cognitive moral development. Therefore, the first research question is 
as follows: Does situational moral reasoning and judgments differ from dispositional moral 
reasoning and judgments when faced with an ethical IT dilemma? Moreover, if so, in what 
manner does situational and dispositional moral reasoning and judgments differ? 1 In order to 
address this question, this study proposes that by measuring an individual’s disposition towards 
moral reasoning through cognitive moral development (Rest 1986b; Rest et al. 1974; Rest et al. 
2000a) and the application of ethical philosophies towards situation-specific contexts 
(Reidenbach and Robin 1988; Reidenbach and Robin 1990) we can determine the presence of a 
divergence and the manner and extent of this divergence between dispositional and situational 
moral reasoning. For example, a person may be strongly predisposed toward conventional moral 
reasoning, relying heavily on social norms and authority for moral guidance; however, the person 
may exhibit strong egoistic or selfish behaviors depending on the ethical IT dilemma faced, such 
as when pirating software or other media. By separating the dispositional and situational decision-
making patterns, we as researchers are more equipped to understand how the context itself plays a 
role in shaping not only how we behave in moral dilemmas, but how we think about them. 
Ethical dilemmas create situational influence on the moral reasoning and judgments of 
individuals making ethical IT decisions; however, solid theoretical explanations on how we 
organize moral thought in light of these situational influences are few and far between (Ford and 
Richardson 1994; Trevino et al. 2006). One theoretical explanation of the situational effects of 
ethical IT decision-making comes from development psychology, specifically the Domain theory 
of Moral Development (DTMD) (Turiel 1983; Turiel et al. 1987). To understand that moral 
                                                 
1 Research question is addressed in the first study in Chapter 3. 
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reasoning varies in different ethical situations is one matter; understanding why moral reasoning 
differs is another entirely. In order to address this inquiry, scenario specific moral reasoning, 
attitudes and intentions are assessed through the DTMD. The DTMD postulates that people 
organize moral attitudes, judgments, and subsequent ethical behaviors in response to ethical 
dilemmas based upon perceived, governing social norms and consequences of the behavior 
(Gattiker and Kelley 1999a; Turiel 1983; Turiel et al. 1987). DTMD creates bounded contextual 
factors by organizing a person’s attitudes and judgments of an ethical dilemma into various 
domains of morality. People categorize ethical dilemmas (and their corresponding judgments and 
behavioral responses) into three different domains of morality: (1) personal (matters of taste and 
preference), (2) conventional (matters of social or cultural concern), and (3) principled (matters of 
moral principle)2. Depending on the perceived normative and consequential factors, a person may 
“attribute” an ethical problem to one of the three domains, thus evoking a corresponding set of 
moral attitudes and judgments as a reasonably appropriate moral response. Gattiker and Kelley 
(1999a) briefly explore the application of DTMD in an IT context and find that people have 
markedly different moral attitudes to ethical dilemmas involving IT depending on how people 
attribute ethical IT dilemmas to domains of morality. Similarly, this study hypothesizes 
significant differences in not only the moral attitudes of the participants, but also the formation of 
situational moral judgments and ethical IT behavior intentions based on a person’s attribution of 
ethical IT dilemmas to one of the three moral domains. In addition, it is suspect that DTMD 
provides sufficient explanation for the lack of support of the theory of planned behavior (TPB) in 
the context of ethical IT dilemmas (Banerjee et al. 1998), which has been a consistently well 
                                                 
2 In order to reduce future confusion and draw more effective parallels, the conventional knowledge domain 
will hereafter be referred to as the conventional domain, while the moral domain will be referred to as the 
principled domain. This makes the names of each domain of morality (a) consistent with naming 
conventions from other moral theories, such as cognitive moral development, and (b) removes the 
confusing distinction with “domains of morality” and “moral domain.” 
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supported theory in other contexts (Ajzen 1985; Ajzen 1991; Armitage and Christian 2004; 
Armitage and Conner 2001). Furthermore, Leonard and others (2004) also find that ethical 
decision-making (EDM) changes significantly based on the scenario, where in some scenarios all 
factors considered (e.g. moral attitudes, judgments, etc.) were predictive of ethical IT behavior, 
while in other scenarios only a few of the factors predicted ethical IT behavior. This suggests that 
EDM models do not hold in some IT-related situations. Applying STMD to the context, it is 
suspected that moral attitudes and judgment become more predictive of ethical IT intention and 
behaviors in the principled domain, but are less salient in the conventional and even more so in 
the personal domain. Therefore, the second research question follows: Does the attribution of 
different domains of morality to an ethical IT dilemma influence the manner people make ethical 
decisions involving information technology? 3 To address this question, three scenarios are 
proposed. To avoid the same pitfall as Gattiker and Kelley (1999a) who attributed scenarios a 
priori to the three domains of morality, the study will validate the attribution of the scenarios to 
particular domains of morality by assessing responses to attitudes, judgments and intentions, and 
the explicit attribution and confidence of attribution by a small subset of the population. The 
study will explore the effects of how people attribute scenarios to moral domains on the EDM 
model, proposing that moral domain attribution will significantly influence the efficacy of the 
EDM model. 
As suggested by some ethical theorists, IT introduces new ethical problems (Johnson 
2004; Maner 1996), but the manner IT shapes our moral decisions is unclear. IT and the manner 
by which it is designed afford users certain actions and abilities beyond our human capacity. In 
some cases, the actions afforded may engender new unethical behaviors or even extend the reach 
and impact of existing unethical behaviors. Understanding whether these affordances encourages 
                                                 
3 Research question is addressed in the second study in Chapter 4. 
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or discourages ethical or unethical behavior in the constantly evolving landscape of IT proves 
difficult. Nevertheless, many IS researchers have sought to open the proverbial “black box” that 
characterizes the intersection of information technology and ethical problems. Richard Mason 
(1986) was one of the first IS researchers who sought to encapsulate landscape of IT ethics 
through four dimensions, namely privacy, access, property and accuracy (PAPA, for short). 
Although largely a review of the future ethical problems of the coming information age, these 
ethical IT problems truly underscore much of the research and discourse in IT ethics (Banerjee et 
al. 1998; Conger et al. 1995; Leonard and Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 2004). Indeed, Conger and 
others (1995) continued the work by determining the ethical problems that commonly arise from 
IT by empirically surveying IT professionals and conducting an extensive factor analysis. The 
authors determined that five salient dimensions of ethical IT dilemmas are salient: (1) access, (2) 
ownership, (3) privacy, (4) motivation, and (5) responsibility. The latter two dimensions, 
motivation and responsibility, are not specific to IT itself and have been well researched in other 
fields. Johnson (2004) also review the importance of technology and online communication as it 
relates to the resurgence of new ethical problems. Johnson identifies three dimensions that IT 
exacerbates ethical IT issues: (1) through access to private or protected information, (2) through 
the speed that information can travel and the reach or number of people affected, and (3) through 
the ease that digital information can be duplicated. Surprisingly, however, few researchers have 
continued the work to understand precisely how IT influences the ethical problem, buried under 
the sheer multitude of situational factors (Ford and Richardson 1994; Jones 1991; Ross and 
Robertson 2003). Therefore, this work seeks to address a third and final research question: How 
do dimensions of IT ethics (e.g. access, ownership, speed, reach, etc.) influence ethical IT 
decision-making? In addition, does the presence of different information technology artifacts vary 
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the importance and salience of each dimension of IT ethics? 4 This work makes several 
contributions by addressing these questions. First, it is theorized that ethical dimensions of IT are 
salient through the affordances, specifically moral affordances, perceived by the actor that uses an 
IT artifact in a particular ethical IT dilemma. Second, no instrument measures have been properly 
developed to assess the salience of different dimensions of IT on ethical decision-making. In 
order to develop such an instrument, a series of questions are developed from the aforementioned 
dimensions of ethical IT problems from Mason (1986), Conger and others (1995), and Johnson 
(2004). Finally, respondents assess this instrument across several different scenarios, each 
depicting different IT artifacts and ethical IT dilemmas, namely a phishing, software piracy, and 
hacking ethical problems. It is suspected that different dimensions of ethical IT issues will 
become more or less salient on ethical IT decision-making with the presence of different IT 
artifacts across multiple ethical IT situations. 
Contributions to Theory 
The first contribution to theory is exploring the divergence of moral reasoning and 
judgments from a person’s current cognitive moral development, or, in other words, the 
situationality of moral reasoning. Although previous research has investigated the application of 
ethical philosophies in situation-specific contexts, such as ethical predispositions or deontological 
and consequentialist philosophies (Reynolds 2002; Reynolds 2006), the divergence of 
dispositional and situational moral reasoning is not explored thoroughly, even outside the IT 
context. Much previous research has established that moral recognition and importance are highly 
dependent on the ethical situation (Banerjee et al. 1998; Gattiker and Kelley 1999a; Jones 1991); 
and, in addition, that ethical behaviors and intentions vary widely from situation to situation 
(Banerjee et al. 1998; Gattiker and Kelley 1999a). Despite the existence of theory (Turiel 1983; 
                                                 
4 Research question is addressed in the third study in Chapter 5. 
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Turiel et al. 1987) and measures (McMahon and Harvey 2007; Reidenbach and Robin 1988; 
Reidenbach and Robin 1990) that support the situationality of moral reasoning, how it compares 
to the broader constructs of moral reasoning, namely cognitive moral development (Rest 1986b; 
Rest et al. 1974) remains particularly elusive in an IT context. 
The second contribution is to explain the aforementioned situational and contextual 
nature that is common of EDM models through the DTMD (Turiel 1983; Turiel et al. 1987). 
Research in IT ethics have shown mixed results in affirming well established theories in moral 
psychology, finding significant results by often increasing power through larger sample sizes or 
lower significance levels (Banerjee et al. 1998; Leonard and Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 2004). 
While more advanced and robust statistical techniques have improved the study of ethical IT 
behavior (Haines and Leonard 2007a; Haines and Leonard 2007b; Haines et al. 2008), IS 
researchers have not addressed the theoretical foundations for the highly situational and 
contextual nature of IT ethics, and the mixed results for traditional EDM models by extension. 
DTMD also isolates the confounding effects of multiple ethical IT scenarios by creating bounded 
situational factors. By investigating IT ethics within a domain theory context, we are better able 
to understand how employees and managers make ethical decisions, not only based upon the type 
of ethical scenario, but more importantly how the individual organizes ethical dilemmas into 
domains of morality based on past experiences. 
This study explores how individuals classify ethical dilemmas into moral domains, and 
how such classification influences EDM and behavior. Previous research in IT ethics 
investigating the effects of domain categorization on EDM only investigated moral attitudes, 
forgoing the remainder of the EDM model (Gattiker and Kelley 1999a). In addition, literature in 
DTMD has attributed ethical dilemmas a priori on behalf of the researchers, as opposed to 
measuring the attribution of EDM models by a sample of possible respondents. Therefore, this 
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study seeks to expand the literature on DTMD by (1) how the domains of morality influence the 
entire EDM process, and (2) measuring how individuals classify ethical dilemmas into the various 
domains of morality. 
Finally, by isolating the dimensions of IT ethical issues that influence moral judgments 
and ethical behavior, we can begin to unravel the complex intersection of situational ethics and 
information and computer technology. Previous research have investigated the different ethical 
dimensions of IT only from a nomological standpoint, attempting to create a sense of the ethical 
IT issues and problems that concern managers and organizations (Conger et al. 1995; Mason 
1986). The field, however, is silent on how the IT artifact itself influences our ethical behaviors 
and decisions. Therefore, by applying affordance theory (Gibson 1979; Heft 1989; Heft 2001) to 
ethical IT decision-making through a series of vignettes, this work isolates the effects of the IT 
artifact on ethical decision-making. In addition, the work contributes a set of measurement items 
to assess the dimensions of IT design that affords particular ethical or unethical behavior. These 
measures are an extension of previous work exploring the ethical dimensions of information 
(Conger et al. 1995) and communication (Johnson 2004) technology. 
Contributions to Practice 
Business ethics is a murky field, with many personal, situational, and environmental 
factors affecting the decision-making of managers and employees (Ford and Richardson 1994; 
Ross and Robertson 2003). IT contributes to this complexity, by its constant evolution and 
unyielding encroachment into our personal and professional lives and all aspects of the business 
enterprise. However, our understanding of the moral problems that arise from the use of IT in 
business cannot evolve fast enough, and from this lagging understanding of ethical IT issues 
comes poorly established ethical norms and practices, ill-conceived legislation and corporate 
policy, and ineffective codes of conduct (Harrington 1996). Therefore, by understanding the 
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conditions employees recognize the important moral characteristics and consequences of ethical 
IT problems, we further our ability to address these issues through directed effects to notify or 
educated employees. Using the study by Moores and Chang (2006) as an example, we find a 
fairly significant social group (young university students in Hong Kong) who have an alarmingly 
high rate of acceptance of software piracy behavior—at least by some standards on this issue. 
Herein lays the practical significance of this research: that not only does the situation effect 
(software piracy) shape moral attitudes and ethical behaviors in the use of IT, but as do the 
surrounding cultural, legal and social environment (university students in Hong Kong). 
By understanding the situational factors that lead to ethical decision-making or even the 
factors that do not, managers are more capable of devising effective policies and procedures that 
require little enforcement, but nevertheless meet legal and organizational ends for ethical IT 
behavior and conduct. Managers are then able to design policies that incorporate the ethical 
norms that exist within the organization, instead of enforcing an alienating normative framework. 
By incorporating our understanding of individual’s beliefs on IT issues within the organization, 
management may construct effective codes of conduct based on the moral attitudes and beliefs of 
employees, potentially increasing the acknowledgement and acceptance of a company’s code of 
conduct.  
Finally, by assessing the impacts of the IT artifact on ethical decision-making a 
connection is drawn between the manner IT is designed, the behaviors the technology affords, 
and the ethical decision-making and behaviors of the individual. This is an important contribution 
for two reasons. First, by establishing a connection between specific situation and the IT artifacts 
involved with ethical IT decision-making and behavior, a groundwork is established for 
continued work that enables managers and policy makers to determine the antecedents that lead to 
particular ethical (or unethical) behaviors. For example, by isolating the effects of situation and 
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technology, managers and policy makers may be more (or less) justified in regulating the use and 
implementation of particular technologies. Second, the contribution of bridging information 
technology design, through affordance theory, to ethical IT decision-making and behavior has 
implications for software and hardware designers and developers. Previous research has agreed 
that IT is not amoral (De George 2003; De George 2006) and it is not only the users 
responsibility, but that of the designers and developers of IT to consider the unethical applications 
of the technology consideration. This research seeks to establish this claim of moral reasonability 
on a cognitive and behavioral level by demonstrating a connection between the IT artifact and 
EDM behaviors. 
Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the applicable and 
important literature on ethical philosophy, business and IT ethics, and the psychology of ethical 
decision-making. Chapter 3 addresses the first research question by assessing the differences 
between dispositional and situational moral reasoning across multiple ethical IT dilemmas. This 
is in order to establish a difference of moral reasoning by the situational application of ethical 
philosophies. Chapter 4 introduces the domain theory of moral development as an explanation for 
the situation specific differences in order to establish a causal, developmental link with past moral 
experiences and current moral attitudes, judgments and behaviors. DTMD also provides a 
platform to suggest that teachers, managers, professionals, and peers play an important role in 
shaping moral perceptions toward IT. In Chapter 5, I continue the emphasis on situational moral 
reasoning, but extend current EDM models by incorporating aspects of information and computer 
technology design.  Specifically, these design aspects are operationalized through a set of moral 
affordance dimensions of IT, capturing the extraordinary uses that IT affords, which shape the 




Introduction & Organization of Literature Review 
Disciplines approach ethics in different manners. For example, psychology may approach 
the question of morality in terms of experience (“How is morality experienced?”) while 
philosophy approaches moral questions for the perspective of nature and being (“What is morality 
like?”) (Wren 1990). Despite the constant pursuit of universal ethical theory in western ethical 
philosophy for several millennia, many contemporary ethical philosophers and scholars from a 
variety of disciplines have proposed non-universalistic ethical theories. 
The Foundations of Ethical Philosophy 
In the following sections, I will briefly review the foundation of ethical and moral 
philosophy not only to inform readers on the progression of moral thought, but also to reveal the 
complex considerations of ethical decision-making that is informed by ethical philosophy. Ethical 
and moral philosophy forms the basis for moral reasoning, judgments and ethical decision-
making; and, therefore, situational moral reasoning (Brady and Wheeler 1996; Reidenbach and 
Robin 1988; Reidenbach and Robin 1990). This study posits that people either explicitly through 
some understanding of ethical philosophies, or implicitly through normative influences or 
emotional affect, evolve ethical and moral philosophies to reason through ethical problems or 
validate moral judgments. The problem with ethical philosophy in the past is that human 
decision-making about moral problems either (a) does not completely understand and employ 
particular ethical philosophies in a rational, directed manner, or (b) ethical decision-making is 
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highly complex and humans employ a broad spectrum of ethical philosophies where not a single 
philosophy is sufficient to fully explain or justify the range of ethical behaviors of people. 
A Tradition of Universalism 
The history and tradition of ethical thought, particularly philosophical ethical thought, is 
subsumed predominantly by a single aim: to define a universal theory of “goodness” and 
“rightness,” or, in other words, a universal theory of ethics. The two dominant act-based 
traditions of universal ethical theories are deontological and consequentialist. Deontological 
moral principles hold the manner of action justifies the ethical or unethical nature of the action, 
such as whether all parties are equally represented, or the individual believes such an action as a 
universal maxim and are generally process-oriented. Teleological moral principles, on the other 
hand, emphasize the consequences of the moral action as the determining factor of an ethical or 
unethical behavior. Commonly, utilitarianism is evoked here, wherein the ethical criteria are 
measured by doing the “greatest good for the greatest number.” Teleological moral principles 
emphasize the ends over the means, and are therefore goal-oriented. Virtue ethics may be 
considered a separate tradition, focusing not on moral actions as with act-based traditions like 
deontological and consequentialist, but on moral persons and characters.  
Deontological Ethics 
Deontological ethics relies on “correct method” and “correct thinking” to arrive at valid 
moral action. Different philosophers rely on different methods to achieve the same aim, such as 
reason, rational thinking or duty (Kant 1785/2002; Kant 1797/1991; Rawls 1971). Immanuel 
Kant’s seminal work Ethical Philosophy: Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1785/2002; Kant 
1797/1991) is singlehandedly the strongest proponent of a long line of deontological ethical 
thought based on rational, a priori conclusions. Immanuel Kant characterizes moral action as 
18 
those behaviors possessing a moral motive, duty or ‘a sense of moral obligation’ as opposed to 
motivations of behavior from instinct, inclination or desire. In other words, a moral action is one 
when a person may necessarily act against their instincts and inclinations for the sake of duty. 
Kant’s formulations of the categorical imperative form the basis for many ideas in business 
ethics, including arguments for the rights of employees, customers, and stakeholders. Similarly, 
other notions of ethical behaviors and principles, such as justice, fairness, dignity, and rights are 
based on such deontological arguments. 
The crucial junction of all moral action rests on the question: What should I do? The 
question, however, is not that simple, resulting in two different formulations: (1) What should I 
do to fulfill my inclinations?; (2) What should I do, no if, ands, or buts? Kant refers to the 
answers to these questions as rules or imperatives. All practical judgments (judgments about what 
one ought to do) are imperatives. 
All hypothetical imperatives are known as qualified oughts, such moral judgments based 
upon utility or a person’s designs or inclinations. For qualified oughts, goodness is defined by the 
prudence by which the goal is accomplished. In other words, good is defined by the amount and 
distribution of harm caused by one's actions, regardless of the underlying motivation behind the 
act itself. By extension, an imprudent act would be inefficient and result in undue harm to 
unnecessary recipients. Unqualified oughts, on the other hand, are known as categorical 
imperatives. The oughts are unqualified as no other external justification is necessary to perform 
a particular action justly. An action is moral in and of itself, defined by one’s duty based on 
rational thinking and deduction. Categorical imperatives are the basis for unequivocal ethical 
judgments and behaviors, and ought to be the basis for all ethical rules. By a rule assuming each 
of the three categorical imperatives, the action is therefore “objectively necessary in itself, 
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without reference to another end.” It is therefore an individual’s duty to follow the rule. The three 
categorical imperatives are as follows. 
The first formulation of the categorical imperative states that one ought to "Act as you 
can will the maxim of your actions to become a universal law" (Kant 1797/1991). A maxim is 
defined as a person’s reason for acting, e.g. "don't repay debts (keep promises) if it’s inconvenient 
to do so." One must will the maxim as a universal law. While willing the maxim as universal 
would indeed result in unforeseeable results for society (a utilitarian response), the will also has a 
practical reason—as a universal law to will such a maxim as deception is a logical contradiction. 
If promise breaking was universal, there will be no trust (A) and trust is required for promises 
(B), one can therefore deduce that A cannot lead to the negation of B. In other words, universal 
promise breaking would lead to the negation of promises through the reduction and elimination of 
trust. The same contradiction holds for other immoral activities, including stealing, lying, 
cheating and adultery. The second formulation of the categorical imperative is that humans are 
free and autonomous, and are therefore "ends in themselves." Specifically, one should “act in 
such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, 
always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (Kant 1797/1991). In other 
words, humans are able to determine their moral life, and are therefore autonomous and self-
regulating. The third and final formulation of the categorical imperative states that “every 
rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating member of the 
universal kingdom of ends5” (Kant 1797/1991). All are morally equal and should be treated with 
dignity and respect. The third formulation addresses the utilitarian problem of illicit means as one 
cannot use or harm another for the sake of society or the greater good. Exploitation of employees 
                                                 
5 The universal kingdom of ends is the “system of rational human beings united by common laws were 
human dignity is paramount.” Chatterjee, S., Sarker, S., and Fuller, M.A. 2009. "A Deontological 
Approach to Designing Ethical Collaboration," Journal of the Association for Information Systems (10), pp. 
138-169. 
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by their employers for the sake of increased profits, businesses that deceive customers for 
increase in sales and other benefits through false advertising, and breaking promises and contracts 
(which leads to the basis for contractualism, social contract, and much of modern business ethics) 
all count as business examples of illicit means. 
Using both Kant’s categorical imperative, deontological ethics maintains that the means 
one reaches moral action is more important than the end of the action. Thusly, deontological 
ethics may be construed as process-oriented decision making of ethical problems. Deontological 
ethics, however, is not without problems. The problems with deontological ethics are as follows: 
Why be virtuous? Answers to why one ought to be dutiful or virtuous are often reduced to 
utilitarian arguments that defeat the purpose of deontological ethics. What if duties conflict? How 
do we handle this conflict? Observance of duties can create conflict between multiple moral 
obligations. How do you choose which duty to uphold? – Utilitarians claim that one must look 
toward the consequences of actions to decide. There is an argument between deontological 
egoists and utilitarians that ethics is something to be known, in other words, ethical knowledge is 
possible. However, others disagree that objectively valid reasons to justify action may be reached. 
Consequentialist Ethics 
Consequentialist ethical theories, on the other hand, affirm that the most ethical action is 
that which results in the “greatest good for the greatest number.” The focus on results of the 
actions, the consequences situate consequentialist and utilitarian ethics as ends-based (and not 
means-based unlike deontological ethics). Since for every situation a set of possible actions may 
result in another set of possible consequences, each having different people affected at different 
degrees, the process of making ethical decisions using consequentialist ethics is often overbearing 
and impractical. Few people would disagree that one should act in the best interest of all 
concerned, therefore, the discourse between consequentialist theorists revolve around defining 
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what the “greatest good” actually is, and how one determines the amount of good from a 
particular action. Utilitarianism employs a form of moral decision-making aptly named utilitarian 
calculus (Bentham 1781/1970). Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation (Bentham 1781/1970) introductions the notion of utilitarian calculus, or that 
people may systematically calculate the utility gained form a particular action. Or, for non-
hedonistic considerations, John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism (Mill 1861/1998) frames the concept 
in terms of the Greatest-Happiness principle, which holds that actions are moral that promote the 
greatest happiness, but not only for the individual actor, but promotes the greatest happiness 
overall, including others directly and indirectly involved.. Modern consequentialist ethics takes a 
more pragmatic approach, focusing on the legitimacy of ethical arguments and claims. For 
example, Moore’s Principia Ethica (Moore 1903/1993) buttresses the argument against 
deontological and non-consequentialist ethics by introducing the naturalist fallacy, that 
arguments supporting or proving a claim based on “natural” qualities such as being “good” or 
“reasonable” is insufficient and fallacious. 
As with deontological ethics, utilitarianism has several fundamental problems as a 
universal, consequentialist ethic. The problems with utilitarianism are as follows: (1) Formulation 
problem – Should one always maximize utilitarian calculus (and the expense of effort in finding 
the maximum solution) or should one settle for the most reasonable, generally beneficial 
solution? (2) Distribution problem – Should one favor more happiness for fewer people, or less 
happiness for more people (assuming that the distribution of an equal number of "units" of 
happiness)? (3) Problems of deciding what is good – How can people decide what precisely is 
‘good’? If multiple people are affected, how can one person define morality for another? (4) 
Problem predicting the future – How can one account for and predict externalities, side effects, 
and future possible worlds in relation to ‘goodness’ and ‘utility’? and (5) Problem of illicit means 
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– Are immoral actions that lead to good outcomes justified? Or, in other words, do the ends 
justify the means? 
Justice and Virtue Ethics 
Inspired by standards and principles of democratic governments, John Rawl’s Theory of 
Distributive Justice (1971) holds that fairness ought to form the basis for all sociopolitical 
systems, and that justice be conceived as fairness. The theory of distributive justice consists of 
three fundamental ideas. First, the veil of ignorance must be maintained, or that policy makers 
should not be cognizant, or at least not consider their position in society relative to the position of 
others. In other words, policy makers ought to be unbiased lacking preconceived notions. Second, 
“each person is to have an equal access to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a 
similar liberty for others “ (Rawls 1971)—also known as the principle of equal liberty. Finally, 
the principle of fair equality of opportunity, also known as the “difference principle,” states that 
society’s opportunities should be equally available to all, especially to those that are 
disadvantaged.  
Virtue ethics “concentrates its attention on the moral nature and development of the 
individual agent who performs the action. It can therefore be properly described as an action-
oriented, ‘subjective’ ethics” (Floridi 1999). In other words, people not actions are judged as 
ethical or unethical. Virtue ethics is also intrinsically individualistic and anthropocentric; in other 
words, the theory is often not extended to explain the actions of organizations, political parties, 
and other institutions. However, much of the work in justice and virtue ethics is universalistic, 
seeking abstracted rights of people and character of person, others view justice and virtue ethics 
as situated within social movements and historical perspectives (O'Neil 1996).  
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Ethical Philosophy and Ethical Decision-Making 
The discourse on moral philosophy will focus on two issues: (1) moral philosophy is 
unable to account for the wide range of moral action and justification; however, (2) moral 
philosophy remains important in informing social, psychological, and organizational theories on 
ethics. Therefore, in light of the second issue and to address the first issue, moral philosophies 
may be employed in a contextual and situational manner to address specific moral problems, 
instead of a singular moral philosophy to address all moral problems. Reidenbach and Robin 
(1990) succinctly outline five moral principles offered by philosophical and psychological 
literature that support ethical decision-making, specifically (1) deontological, (2) utilitarian, (3) 
relativist, (4) egoist, and (5) justice. People rely on a broad set of moral principles and values in 
the formation of moral judgments and action, and as such, people do not to rely solely on 
idealistic teleological principles, such as utilitarianism (Reidenbach and Robin 1990). Instead, a 
combination of deontological and teleological principles is used depending on the situation, the 
individual's personal moral values, and the cultural and ethical norms comprising the situation's 
environment. This smorgasbord of ethical philosophies and our haphazard application of those 
philosophies underscore the importance of exploring situational moral reasoning further, 
particular in the context of business and information technology. 
In the following sections, business and information technology ethics is investigated from 
two perspectives. First, the broad ethical theories applied in business and information technology 
ethics are reviewed. Second, we investigate the situational and contextual factors of both business 
and information technology ethics as they related to ethical decision-making and moral action. 
Philosophy of Business Ethics 
Business ethics is murky field as strong ethical theories and overarching frameworks 
remain elusive (Lewis 1985). Despite the vast array of ethical philosophies in existence, ethical 
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philosophy only selectively and/or partially informs the ethical behavior and research of 
organizations. Some authors not only have observed the poor understanding and application of 
ethical philosophy in business practice and research, but also suggested that ethical philosophy 
may not have sufficient application to business activities to warrant its consideration by managers 
(Smith and Hasnas 1999). Smith and Hasnas lament: “Unfortunately, the doctrine of 
philosophical ethics are highly abstract and are essentially meaningless to one with little or no 
philosophical training” (Smith and Hasnas 1999). In addition, although a particular initiative or 
action may make good ‘business sense’ the absence of ethical philosophy informing management 
practice and academic research necessitates that such initiatives and actions are veiled in ethical 
ignorance (Smith and Hasnas 1999). 
Walsham (1996) echoes the lamentation that the business community and academic 
business researchers have avoided of ethical philosophy, and fervently argues that ethical 
philosophy is necessary, particularly when developing ethical codes of conduct. Smith and 
Hasnas (1999) echo Walsham’s lament and call for more ethical philosophy in IS research; 
however, the practical significance to IT ethics research and IT management is questionable. 
However, theories borne of the business ethics domain may be more acceptable and appropriate 
to business activities. Prominent theories of business ethics would include stakeholder theory, 
stockholder theory, and contractualism. However, theories of business ethics are rarely applied in 
IS research, and are often oriented toward firm-level initiatives instead of individual-level 
behaviors (Bull 2008). “Disappointingly, almost all of the authors are moving beyond Smith and 
Hasnas’ dimension of philosophical ethics approach and by-passing ethical theories completely” 
(Bull 2008). If, as proposed by Bull (2008), IS research lacks the direction of philosophical and 
business ethical theories, researchers are relying heavily on only a small, normative 
understanding of ethical IT behavior. 
25 
Social Responsibility of the Firm 
Arthur Carrol's (1991) formulation of the corporate social responsibility pyramid 
provides a counter example. Carrol clearly separates the responsibility of business to make profit 
from the three, higher-level social responsibilities: legal, ethical, and philanthropic. Overlap 
clearly exists among these four dimensions; for example, ethical and philanthropic actions may be 
the most profitable, legal actions may be simultaneously ethical and profitable. However, while 
the distinction is by no means necessary, the combination is not either: legal actions may not be 
ethical, ethical actions may not be legal. Others consider the social responsibility of the firm 
much narrower, while still maintaining an ethical component that is less pro-social than Carrol’s 
conception: "There is one and only one social responsibility of business: to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, 
which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud." (Friedman 
1970). 
Stakeholder and Stockholder Theories 
An excellent example of the explicit commingling between moral norms and legal 
systems comes from Smith's (2004) formulation of stockholder and stakeholder theories on 
ethics. As formulated earlier in their argumentation for a normative business ethic, what one 
ought is by all means governed by economic, legal, and regulatory forces common in the business 
environment. One must consider the legal ramifications an action has on the business (such as 
with stockholder ethics) or the social and organizational customs in conducting proper business 
(as with stakeholder ethics). However, such forces are by no means deterministic of the moral 
behaviors of individuals or business.  
Stockholder theory “… holds that executives should resolve ethical quandaries by taking 
actions that maximize the long-term profits to stockholders without violating the law or engaging 
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in fraud or deception” (Smith 2004). Stemming from managerial disciplines come the notion of 
stockholder theory as an ethical perspective. Within this perspective, ethical behaviors are those 
which benefit the company overall and the stockholder's in particular, insofar that the firm's 
greatest moral obligation is to that of the stockholders. 
Another managerial perspective that has become particularly prevalent in ethics literature 
is stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984). “Stakeholder theory claims that executives should resolve 
ethical quandaries by balancing stakeholder interests without violating the rights of any 
stakeholder” (Smith and Hasnas 1999). Although stakeholder theory is broadly defined as the 
consideration of all parties affecting or effected by an organization's decision or behavior, 
stakeholder theory when applied to ethics requires ethical decision making to consider not only 
the effects on the firm and its stockholders, but also others who may be involved or effected by 
the decision, whether invested in the success of the company or not. Stakeholder theory attempts 
to address three questions regarding the relationship between firms and their stakeholders 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995):  
1. Normative – How should the firm handle stakeholders? 
2. Instrumental – What happens when the firm relates to stakeholders? 
3. Descriptive – How does the firm relate to stakeholders? 
 
Ultimately, while stakeholder and stockholder theory may influence our understanding of firm’s 
ethical behavior and indirectly the ethical behavior of employees, such theories have similar 
deficiency in explaining the individual moral actions of people. Ethical theories of business 
ethics, however, are often more reflective of the motivations for ethical or unethical behavior of 
firms and individuals. Nevertheless, we must further consider the situational factors that may 
influence how people make ethical decisions, and the ethical theories that people draw from. 
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Ethics and Information Technology 
Problems of information technology ethics stem not only from human action using 
information technology, and the moral imperatives surrounding ethical IT behavior, but also from 
the information technology itself (Floridi 1999). In other words, the many ethical problems 
originate from the manner by which the information technology is designed and implemented, 
creating a moral imperative for the designers and creators of information technology tools. De 
George (2003) in particular supported an anthropomorphic view of information technology ethics. 
The information technology artifact itself may be designed to explicitly support unethical 
behaviors and actions; or the artifact may be designed to prevent unethical behavior and actions, 
though sufficient safeguards to protect privacy, security, and quality control, etc. 
Research in information technology and information systems ethics is also not without its 
own problems (Chatterjee et al. 2009; Laudon 1995). First, much of the research is not grounded 
in classical or contemporary theories and philosophies on morality and ethics; instead addressing 
moral and ethical problems as merely issues in managing employee and customer behavior. 
Second, IS/IT ethics research as a whole represents a “disorganized topology” (Chatterjee et al. 
2009) of ethical problems, addressed in an ad hoc manner without a clear guiding research 
purpose or stream. Finally, much of the literature offers neither normative nor prescriptive 
“solutions” to ethical problems addressed in the research. Few studies in computer and 
information technology ethics address the primary question of “what should or ought I do?” 
Although this problem may seem to clash with the first issue, it is apparent that much prescriptive 
and normative research in this domain is problematic if it lacks a strong foundation in ethical 
philosophy.  
Broadly speaking, however, certain ethical philosophies are more appropriate when 
applied in information technology and systems ethics (Floridi 1999). Deontological ethical 
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theories are often poor choices in supporting moral claims for normative and ethical behavior as 
the technology itself changes often introducing new moral problems. However, some researchers 
have been successful in applying deontological ethics to human processes and collaboration in 
designing and developing information technology solutions (Chatterjee et al. 2009). Utilitarian 
and consequentialist theories, on the other hand, are much more common and effectively applied 
in developing moral claims for ethical IT behaviors. Ultimately, however, “when consistently 
applied, both Consequentialism, Contractualism and Deontologism show themselves unable to 
accommodate CE-problems (computer ethics problems) easily, and in the end may well be 
inadequate” (Floridi 1999). Therefore, ethical IT problems are likely best addressed by a set of 
moral philosophies and reasoning that is highly situational. 
Modeling Ethical Decision-Making for Information Technology 
Interestingly, many of the situational and environmental factors had more impact on 
predicting ethical IT behavior than the EDM model itself. Leonard and others (2001) replicated 
the Banerjee and others (1998) study of the EDM model in an IT context, but with a much larger 
sample size and several other variables. Banerjee and others (1998) noted that a small sample size 
may have explained the lack of support for EDM model, but strong support for contextual and 
environmental variables, such as organizational ethical climate (or ethical work climate), personal 
normative beliefs, and organization-scenario interaction variable. Other variables previously 
unsupported were found significant due to the significantly larger sample size as theorized. These 
variables include moral attitudes (a person’s perception of acceptability of the action), personal 
normative beliefs (a person’s moral obligation to perform or not perform an act), and ego strength 
(or a person’s strength of conviction to successfully turn attitudes and intentions and behaviors). 
Moral judgments, particularly those consistent with the post-conventional (principled) over and 
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above the pre-conventional (egoist) and conventional (social) judgments, were also a significant 
predictor of ethical IT behavior intention. 
Moores and Chang (2006) investigated the effects of software piracy vignettes with 
varied degrees of availability of software, on the four-component model of ethical decision-
making, i.e. recognition, judgment, intention, and use or buy behavior. Although the authors find 
significant support for the effects of moral judgments on intentions (and ultimately use or buy 
behavior), under no scenario was the recognition of moral components a significant predictor of 
moral judgments. Several explanations are given, including the pervasiveness and general 
acceptance of software piracy in the sample. The vast majority of respondents (over 87%) were 
common users of illegally copied software and other intellectual property, suggesting that 
respondents may not have considered the software piracy dilemma important, or were even 
desensitized to the problem. 
Haines and Leonard (2007b) continue the tradition of exploring the situational influences 
of different vignettes on EDM involving IT use, again collecting data from student’s perceptions 
of five different ethical vignettes. One must note that these vignettes differ not in their moral 
intensity or domain of morality, as proposed by this study and others (Gattiker and Kelley 1999a; 
Jones 1991), but vary by the ethical issue, such as privacy, software piracy, etc. Nevertheless, 
these findings corroborate those of previous studies that the EDM process changes significantly 
depending on the vignette (Gattiker and Kelley 1999a; Leonard and Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 
2004), concluding that ethical studies in IT use cannot rely on a single vignette for reliable 
results. 
When these studies are taken together, one of the common themes among the ethical IT 
decision-making studies is the highly contextual and situational effect of different ethical 
decision-making construct, such as moral recognition, attitudes, and judgments. However, few 
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studies seek to explain how these contextual and situational factors influence ethical decision-
making, and even fewer provide a sound theoretical basis for the manner by which situational 
factors shape ethical IT decision-making. 
The Situational Ethics of Information Technology 
Many information technology ethics studies have explored the concept of “situational 
ethics,” or ethical considerations made highly dependent on the immediate ethical IT dilemma or 
surrounding environmental or social contexts (Banerjee et al. 1998; Haines and Leonard 2007b; 
Leonard and Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 2004). Banerjee and others (1998) investigate the 
effects of some of these situational factors using ethical dilemmas involving IT, finding that the 
organizational ethical climate and more importantly the interaction between organizational 
environment and scenario to be more salient than common ethical decision-making factors. 
Continuing in the tradition of situational IT ethics, Leonard and others (2004) find that some 
factors consistently predict ethical IT behavior across all types of scenarios, while other factors 
are only predictive in a few scenarios. Only moral attitudes and personal normative beliefs were 
consistently supported across all scenarios, while ego strength, perceived importance, and sex 
were significant in all but one. These findings give credence to the proposition that ethical IT 
behavior is not only situation specific, but also the relationship between moral beliefs, intentions 
and ethical IT behavior is situational as well. Combining the results with the findings from 
Moores and Chang (2006), researchers cannot use either a single vignette, or a single type (e.g. 
software piracy, privacy, or intellectual property) of vignette for reliable results. Haines and 
Leonard (2007b) also refine their findings on the effects of perceived importance on EDM, 
finding that while perceived importance was an influential factor, it did not influence the entire 
EDM model. However, across all five vignettes, moral judgments were a significant positive 
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indicator of ethical IT behavior and perceived importance a significant positive indicator of moral 
judgments. 
There is a long tradition of IS research exploring ethical decision-making, specifically the 
situational effects of different IT dilemmas on ethical IT decision-making models. However, 
these models have shown inconsistent results across a variety of scenarios, and the models rely 
heavily on highly contextual and situational factors. Furthermore, contextuality may play an 
important role, such as organizational climate, or the interaction between organization 
environment and the scenario (Banerjee et al. 1998). Few studies have investigated the 
surrounding organizational environment and how it influences ethical IT decision-making. 
However, the specific and infinitely numerous situational effects resulting for contextual 
differences surrounding the ethical IT dilemma are presently beyond the intended scope of the 
study. 
Moral Domain Theory and Information Technology 
Theories of ethical IT decision-making and behavior are few and far between, but some 
theories from psychology, sociology and ecology may be fruitful. A few authors have applied the 
domain theory of moral development (Turiel 1983; Turiel et al. 1987) to an ethical IT decision-
making context, finding an association between application and attribution of particular moral 
domains to changes in moral attitude, judgments and intentions (Gattiker and Kelley 1999a). 
First, even concerning moral dilemmas involving IT, people are able to distinguish 
between scenarios and, by extension, different domains of morality, which is in contradiction 
with the findings of Sproull and Keisler (1991) who suggest that people may not be able to 
identify moral characteristics and consequences of ethical dilemmas involving IT.6 Furthermore, 
                                                 
6 Although people are able to distinguish between scenarios of different domains of morality even in an IT 
context, bringing question to the findings of Sproull and Keilser (1991), one must be wary that ethical 
32 
people have different moral judgments toward ethical dilemmas involving computer technology 
including the degree of harm, whether the person should be stopped or punished, or whether the 
practice should be universally applied when respondents classify ethical dilemmas into different 
domains of morality (Gattiker and Kelley 1999a). However, broad support for the effects of moral 
attitudes on ethical behavior intentions was not supported. Only propositions relating to the 
effects of age and gender on an individual's moral judgments of an ethical dilemma were 
supported, and even then the relationship was found only in the moral domain, further supporting 
the importance of situationality driven by moral domains. 
The domain theory of moral development provides a theoretical explanation for the 
mixed, highly situational findings of previous studies in situational IT ethics and ethical decision-
making. The second study predicts that domain theory sufficiently explains the situational effects 
of ethical IT dilemmas on moral recognition, attitudes and judgments and how they influence 
ethical IT behaviors. More specifically, ethical IT dilemmas attributed to the personal or 
conventional knowledge domains will be insufficient to elicit moral recognition, attitudes, and 
judgments strong enough to predict ethical IT behavior intention. However, ethical IT dilemmas 
attributed to the moral domain will generate stronger moral recognition, attitudes and judgments 
sufficient to predict moral intent and ethical IT behavior. 
Psychology of Ethics 
Theory of Reason Action and Planned Behavior 
The basis for the vast majority of studies in ethical decision-making behavior relies on 
the application of the Theory of Reason Action (TRA) (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) and the Theory 
of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen 1985; Ajzen 1989; Ajzen 1991) in the realm of moral thought 
                                                                                                                                                 
dilemmas in the personal domain have relatively low ratings in terms of moral attitudes and judgments. 
Ethical IT dilemmas in the personal domain may therefore be difficult to detect if moral attitudes and 
judgments are used to measure the identification of moral characteristics and consequences involving IT. 
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and ethical intent and behaviors.  Early attitude-behavior research in psychology has shown little 
evidence and effect.7 Wicker (1969), in particular, is highly critical of the direct attitude-behavior 
relationship, as people’s attitudes have been consistently far removed from their actual behaviors. 
To address these problems, the TRA (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) was developed to address the 
discrepancy in attitude-behavior relationship (Figure 1). TRA is a behavioral model explaining 
that motivational norms, attitudes and intentions lead to voluntary behavior and explains how the 
influence on attitude and behavior are mediated by the intention of the individual (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1975). 
 
Figure 1. The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA)  
The foundation of the TRA (and attitude-behavior research in general) begins with 
behavioral and normative beliefs. Salient behavioral and normative beliefs lead to the formation 
of attitudes and subjective norms, respectively, which in turn predicts an individual’s behavioral 
intent. Behavioral beliefs are a combination of beliefs regarding the likelihood a particular 
outcome will result from an action, and the evaluation of the outcome as positive or negative. The 
evaluation of the outcome (as moderated by its likelihood of occurring) contributes to the 
formation of attitudes about the action, and ultimately the individual’s intention to act. Normative 
beliefs, similar to behavioral beliefs, are the combined effect of two components, namely referent 
                                                 
7 Correlations between attitude and behavior only as high as 0.33, but often much lower, below 0.10 for the 
vast majority of contexts (Armitage and Christian, 2004). 
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beliefs and the motivation to comply. Referent belief is the source of the normative pressure, such 
as a manager or a coworker, while one’s motivation to comply, or the desire to consider the 
wishes of another, moderates the influence of the referent person or group in the formation of 
subjective norms. However, it is critical that the behavior itself is voluntary, as many researchers 
investigating mandatory or coerced behaviors, such as the mandatory adoption of information 
technology, have found TRA models lacking in explanatory power.  
 
Figure 2. The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB)  
To address the issues of mandatory and particularly semi-voluntary behavior, researchers 
investigated individual’s beliefs about the control they have over their own behavior. Perceived 
behavioral control (PBC) was added to TRA (Figure 2), and the overarching theory was thusly 
named the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1985; Ajzen 1989; Ajzen 1991). While one’s 
attitudes, norms, and intentions remain constant, an increase in a person’s perception of their 
control over a situation should increase not only their intention to behave (an indirect effect 
through intention), but also their ability to perform the behavior (a direct effect on behavior). 
Control beliefs about the individual’s ability to act in the context forms the foundation for PBC. 
More specifically, like behavioral and normative beliefs, control beliefs are a combination of the 
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probability of “facilitating or inhibiting factors” (Armitage and Christian 2004) occurring 
multiplied by the power of the or force of the factors to facilitate or inhibit one’s behavior.  
Rest’s Four Component Model 
The ethical decision-making (EDM) model is a four-component, or four-stage cognitive 
process (Rest 1983; Rest 1986b; Rest et al. 1974), from which the vast majority of EDM models 
originate (Figure 3). Although the EDM model is indeed process oriented (one component 
contributes to the formation of another), the EDM model is not explicitly causal. In other words, 
moral judgments are not a necessary component to form or create moral intentions, but moral 
judgments contribute to the formation of particular moral intentions. 
 
Figure 3. Four-component model for ethical decision-making  
The first stage involves sensitivity to the moral characteristics and consequences of 
possible ethical actions, in other words, the ability to determine cause and affect relationships on 
how actions will affect the welfare others. Moral sensitivity, therefore, regards the recognition of 
the relationship between moral characteristics and consequences of the situation. During the 
second stage, moral actors use decision-making heuristics to form judgments of the relative 
morality of possible behaviors. Moral judgment is the capacity to apply moral principles and 
reasoning to an ethical dilemma, and make a conclusion about the morality (rightness or 
wrongness) of the dilemma (Rest 1986b). In other words, it is a person’s capacity for moral 
thought and as such is indiscriminately linked to formations of moral reasoning. By engaging in 
moral reasoning about the “rightness” of possible actions, we are able to form judgments (or 
conclusions) about all actions within the realm of perceived possibility of human action in the 
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particular context.8 Moral judgment is a cognitive attribute that is developed through repeated 
social interactions with others, structures, and institutions in the development of broader, long-
term moral reasoning (Kohlberg 1976; Kohlberg 1984). The association of moral judgments as a 
predictor of ethical (or even unethical) behavior has been consistently supported in literature, 
across multiple professional associations (Rest and Narvaez 1994). The third (intention) and 
fourth (behavior) stages resemble a standard attitude-intention-behavior model similar to 
TRA/TPB. Therefore, based upon the similarities, attitudes about the ethical dilemma along-side 
moral judgments form intentions to behave ethically (moral motivation) or unethically and likely 
fulfill that behavior (moral character) (See Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Combination of four-component model for ethical decision-making and theory of planned 
behavior 
Immoral behavior can result from deficiencies in any of the four stages of morality 
(Moores and Chang 2006). Moral sensitivity can suffer from ambiguous ethical situations or 
simply a lack of concern or forethought to how behaviors can affect others. Moral judgments can 
suffer from incomplete reasoning regarding the consequences of ethical behaviors. Outside 
forces, such as situational or environmental factors such as an inability to realize ethical action or 
                                                 
8 Such thinking evokes the problem of the idealized “rational man” and avoids non-rational (not necessarily 
irrational) moral reasoning and ethical behavior based upon emotion, intuitions, etc.  The “rational man” 
problem will be addressed in further sections on Kohlbergian rational moral psychology. 
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strong normative and authoritative pressures to behave unethically, can compromise moral 
motivation or intention. 
Moral Awareness and Recognition 
One explanation of the contextual nature of ethical IT behavior proposed by this study is 
that the respondents may not have been cognizant that an ethical dilemma embodied in the moral 
characteristics or moral consequences was even present (Reynolds 2006). Moral awareness is the 
recognition that a person’s decision or behavior will have consequences affecting the interests 
and welfare of the self or others (Reynolds 2006). Moral awareness is not necessarily the 
recognition of the act as immoral, but the recognition of the act as being of moral nature, whether 
moral or immoral, ethical or unethical. Rest (1986b) viewed moral awareness as the recognition 
of an individual that some ethical standard or principle applies. Previous research has assumed 
that respondents understood a scenario was at the very least an ethical quandary, but much more 
likely as assumption regarding identifying all salient moral characteristics and consequences 
(Banerjee et al. 1998; Gattiker and Kelley 1999a; Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard et al. 
2004). By controlling for those who do not perceive the salient moral characteristics and 
consequences of the scenario, or even the scenario itself as an ethical dilemma, a more accurate 
picture of a person’s moral judgments, attitudes, and intentions may be found. 
Moral awareness is critical not only in managerial decision-making and the design and 
use of information systems, but also in the formation of future moral beliefs and ethical norms. 
Moral awareness is the first step in confirming the observation of decisions and behaviors 
carrying moral and ethical components. A person cannot judge or act on a decision or behavior 
from an ethical standpoint if one does not observe the ethical component (Rest 1986b; Rest et al. 
2000b). Interestingly, the presence of a social norm governing the ethical or unethical behavior 
(i.e. code of ethics, policies, etc.) may not be sufficient to raise awareness of an ethical dilemma; 
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however, a visible consequence of such a behavior is more salient (Jones 1991; Schwartz 2005). 
Additionally, if a particular moral component is not perceived or recognized then an entire range 
of moral thought and possible moral actions may not enter into the decision-making process. 
Therefore, even an explicit notification whether each vignette contains an ethical dilemma may 
not be sufficient to raise awareness of the moral implications of the scenario. 
In either case, formalist moral awareness suggesting people may be predisposed toward 
more moral sensitivity (and therefore moral awareness). Reynolds (2006) investigates the effects 
of ethical predispositions, specifically utilitarianism and formalism, on the moral awareness of 
ethical dilemmas, and responses to characteristics of a moral issue. Although both ethical 
predispositions influenced moral awareness, the formalist predisposition had a greater influence 
on moral awareness than utilitarianism, due to the emphasis on preventing harm under all 
circumstances. This finding is interesting as it suggest that moral reasoning dispositions may have 
influence on moral awareness, which is inconsistent with the well-established four-component 
model (Rest et al. 1974) mentioned previously. Moral awareness may depend on the (1) situation 
or (2) demographic. The awareness and recognition of moral characteristics and consequences is 
not universal among different groups and cultures. Moores and Chang (2006), for example, find 
that moral recognition is not a significant predictor of moral judgments, even though the 
remainder of the EDM model remains intact. By studying the morality of software privacy 
behavior with students in Hong Kong, an overwhelming (over 87%) number were common users 
of pirated software, which may explain the lack of significant effects of moral awareness on 
judgments. These findings have broader implications as it suggests that moral awareness (and 
possibly other moral components) varies significantly by the group or sub-group, as well as the 
type of ethical IT dilemma. 
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Other researchers investigating ethical IT behavior have explored the effects of perceived 
importance, a theoretically and operationally similar construct to moral awareness, on moral 
attitudes, judgments and ethical IT behavior (Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard et al. 2004; 
Robin et al. 1996). Perceived importance is defined as the “perceived personal relevance or 
importance of an ethical issue to an individual.” The authors find the perceived importance of a 
moral behavior influences ethical IT behavior across several scenarios; however, support for the 
effects of perceived importance on moral attitudes and judgments only in select scenarios (Haines 
and Leonard 2007b; Leonard et al. 2004). Again, this suggests the salience of moral sensitivity 
varies with the scenario in question. 
Kohlberg’s Six Stages of Moral Reasoning 
Moral psychology has been dominated by research into the moral reasoning capacity of 
people in a variety of backgrounds and situations. Lawrence Kohlberg is one of the most notable 
researchers in the field of moral psychology, developing a six-stage model of moral reasoning 
(Table 1) that forms the basis for cognitive moral development research (Kohlberg 1981; 
Kohlberg 1984; Kohlberg et al. 1983). Cognitive moral development is defined as “”. These 
stages represent a progressive development of moral reasoning capabilities, extending from 
punishment avoidance and egoism to principled morality and moral justice. The six-stages of 
moral reasoning can be consolidated into three broader perspectives of moral reasoning in 
relation to “conventional” or “common morality”: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-
conventional. 
The pre-conventional level represents moral reasoning based on direct consequences of 
our actions from our environment and other people (Kohlberg 1976; Kohlberg 1981; Kohlberg et 
al. 1983). Pre-conventional morality is common in young children and adolescence, although 
adults occasionally exhibit consequentialist moral reasoning. Pre-conventional moral reasoning is 
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inherently egoistic—focused on the welfare of the individual over and above the welfare of 
others. Stage 1 emphasizes the importance of obedience in the most primitive form: the avoidance 
of punishment. Actions are deemed bad or wrong (and therefore unethical) relative to the 
likelihood of being caught and the severity of the punishment. In Stage 2, individuals judge 
actions morally based solely on self-interest, akin to the concept of egoism. Compared with Stage 
1, which is decidedly passive in the judgment of moral action, in Stage 2 people actively consider 
the morality of action in terms of “what’s in it for me?” Any concern about the welfare of others 








Figure 5. Cognitive moral development, or dispositional moral reasoning, increases over time 
The conventional level represents morality determined by its relation to the perspectives, 
values, and judgments of social groups and society. A large majority of adolescents and adults 
commonly employ this level of moral reasoning. Stages 3 and 4 constitute this level of moral 
reasoning, although they vary by the scope of the referent group9. People consider broader, more 
abstract social norms beginning with close relationships, extending into social groups and 
immediate institutions, and ultimately based on society and culture. Stage 3 represents morality 
                                                 
9 A referent group is a group to which an individual or another group compares himself or herself or is 
compared by others. In the context of moral development, an individual may refer their judgment to that of 
another group, thus incorporating or internalizing the morality of a group. 

















couched in the favorable (or unfavorable) perceptions of actions in interpersonal, social 
relationships. Established social norms and the pressure to conform in close relationships and 
social groups form the basis of morality, and “good” and “bad” behavior is directly related to 
your ability to adhere to clearly defined social roles. Stage 4 extends the boundaries of “norm 
maintaining” morality from interpersonal relationships and social groups to society in general. 
The maintenance of authority and social order is of utmost moral concern, and therefore, morality 
is determined by one’s conformance with established laws, rules and conventions replicated by 
the institutions of society, such as religion, education, and of course organizations. 
 
Figure 6. Use of different moral schema over time or personal development 
The post-conventional or principled level represents morality based on universal moral 
principles that transcend inter-personal relationships, groups and society as a whole.10 People 
employing this level of moral reasoning believe that morality extends beyond social norms, laws, 
codes and conventions; and, in other words, is universally applied to a set of moral actions and 
behaviors. Principles (often of the universal and deontological kind) drive the morality of people 
                                                 
10 Another moment on the word “universal.” Cultural anthropology has shown that some culture may 
develop moral norms that most “Western culture” considers depraved and immoral. The distinction then 
must operational, one of practical significance to the given referent group and not absolute, pervasive 
acceptance (or non-acceptance) of all people. 



























to ignore institutional authority and the consequences of violating ethical norms. Post-
conventional reasoning may drive a business owner to develop open-source, copy-left software to 
the detriment to the bottom-line (ignoring pre-conventional moral reasoning) or disregard 
software patents and copyright regulations as a form of civil disobedience (ignoring conventional 
moral reasoning). Stage 5 represents the first indication of post-conventional moral reasoning, 
where morality is rooted in social contracts, not oppressive social norms and institutions. People 
are regarded as having different, but equally valid, values, perspectives and opinions that may 
conflict with the prevailing social institutions maintaining ethical norms and standards. Therefore, 
while people have a general obligation to consider the welfare of society and others, society must 
respect and consider the values, perspectives and opinions of the person. Ethical norms and 
standards are established through a process of compromise and majority rule, in other words, 
morality is established that best reflects the perception of the “greatest good” to the “greatest 
number” through a process of democratic discourse. Stage 6 represents abstract moral reasoning 
relying on universal ethical principles. Concepts such as rights and social contracts are irrelevant, 
as ethics and morality is based on a priori, deontological reasoning. In other words, decisions are 
made categorically, not hypothetically, thus representing categorical imperatives as conceived by 
Immanuel Kant (Kant 1785/2002; Kant 1797/1991). Similarly, moral actions are not merely a 
means to an end, but an end in and of itself. However, empirical evidence of the sixth stage of 
morality is tenuous at best (Colby et al. 1983). 
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Table 1. Kohlberg's six stages of moral reasoning 
Stage Level Moral Perspective Social Perspective 
(1) Obedience 
orientation 
Pre-conventional Punishment avoidance Blind Egoism 
(2) Self-interest 
orientation 
Pre-conventional Self-interest Instrumental Egoism 
(3) Interpersonal accord 
and social 
conformity 
Conventional Social norms Social relationships 
perspective 
(4) Authority and social 
order maintaining 
orientation 
Conventional Law and order Social systems 
perspective 
(5) Social contract 
orientation 
Post-Conventional Voluntary association Contractual perspective 






Several criticisms, however, are levied against the six-stage model of moral reasoning as 
developed by Kohlberg. First, there has been little evidence in support of higher levels of moral 
reasoning (Wren 1990), suggesting that post-conventional moral thinking is only salient for some 
individuals under particular circumstances, which may suggest that stages of moral reasoning 
vary significantly not only from individual to individual, but also from the ethical dilemma in 
question.11 Second, the Kohlbergian six-stage model of cognitive moral development relies on 
rational thought, logic and reason, which generally favors males and is evident in the original 
research that sampled almost exclusively men (Kohlberg 1976). Gilligan offers a strong rebuttal 
in the Ethics of Care against the absolutist developmental stages of morality, suggesting that for 
women post-conventional stages of morality are more akin to pre-conventional stages of morality 
due to the focus on friends, family and relationships (Gilligan 1982; Gilligan 1987). However, the 
relative importance of friends, family and relationships has little relationships to the intent of the 
                                                 
11 Since the moral development stages are dispositional, they represent a general predisposition toward 
particular moral reasoning patterns and by extension judgments. By general I mean average, so on can 
deduce a person may engage in more egoist (pre-conventional) or principled (post-conventional) moral 
reasoning, depending on the situation and context in question. Therefore, moral reasoning is situational, 
and can fly in the face of one’s broad moral dispositions. 
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actions, as pre-conventional moral reasoning assumes an egoist, “clan-like” mentality, where the 
interest of the individual, friends, family, etc. are fulfilled at the expense of the other. 
Neo- Kohlbergian Schemas of Moral Reasoning 
Neo- Kohlbergian theory consolidates the six-stages of moral reasoning into three moral 
reasoning schema: personal intent, monitoring norms, and post-conventional (Rest et al. 2000a; 
Rest et al. 2000b), which correspond to the level of moral reasoning. A comparison of the original 
six stages of moral reasoning and the three moral reasoning schemas can be found in Table 2. 
Schema are representations of prior stimulus phenomenon used to interpret new information, and 
they are evoked or actuated by current stimulus and facilitates information processing and moral 
understanding. Ethical dilemmas, like those contained in the DIT, activate moral schemas by 
using moral dilemma vignettes, wherein each item represents fragments of moral reasoning 
schemas. The reasoning fragments, often in the form of questions, do not advocate one form of 
moral reasoning over another, although easily attributable toward different moral reasoning 
schemas. Neo-Kohlbergian schemas offer several theoretical advantages over and above 
Kohlbergian stages; first, schemas are broader than individual stages and centered on empirically 
observed moral development predispositions; second, individuals moral development are centered 
on a specific moral reasoning schema for most moral actions, however, the specific moral 
reasoning and judgments employed are allowed to vary across situations. In other words, 
although an individual may be classified as having a particular moral reasoning disposition 
according to the schemas of moral reasoning, the strong situational effects may influence a 
decision-maker to employ either more ethical (‘up-schema’) or more unethical (‘down-schema’) 
behaviors. 
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Table 2. A comparison between moral reasoning stages and schema 
Kohlbergian (DIT) Neo-Kohlbergian (DIT2) 
Levels Stage Stage Schema 
Pre-Conventional S1 & S2 S2 & S3 Personal Interest 
Conventional S3 & S4 S4 Maintaining Norms 
Post-Conventional S5 & S6 S5 & S6 Post-Conventional 
In the personal interest schema, a person justifies a decision as morally right by 
appealing to the stake of the actor and the consequences of the action for the actor. The personal 
intent schema therefore combines Stage 2 and Stage 3 from the six stages into a more egocentric 
form of moral reasoning, similar to the pre-conventional level. People employing personal 
interest moral reasoning are not socio-centric or principle-centric in their decision-making, but 
are only concerned with relevant actors and personal consequences in the ethical dilemma. In the 
maintaining norms schema, morality is defined by the maintenance of social norms and social 
order. Individuals employing the maintaining norms schema identify with established practice, 
such as existing rules, norms, and ideas, and the de-facto authority figures, in other words, they 
exhibit a general acceptance of the authority and social norms as ethical standards. Although the 
monitoring norms schema is based heavily on the social context, where governing rules and 
authority figures have domain, ethical rules and norms are observed by all society. A clear and 
categorical set of rules and laws along with an established hierarchical structure of authority and 
duty is critical. In the post-conventional schema, one’s moral obligations and duty are based on 
three components: (1) shared ideals, (2) full reciprocity, and (3) open to scrutiny. In other words, 
an ethical norm or standard must be logically consistent, accepted by the community, and 
consistent with current ethical norms and standards. Moral obligations are therefore based on 
shared moral ideals, such as utilitarianism, virtue, religious, or social contracts, which are subject 
to open debate by the community. 
46 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed the common literature forming the theoretical foundation to 
address the three research questions introduced in Chapter 1. First, important ethical philosophies 
for ethical IT decision-making were introduced, underscoring the multitude of potential 
perspectives individuals may employ in making ethical decisions. Specific ethical philosophies 
however do not account for the broad range of individual, contextual and situational factors that 
may sway moral actions. Second, the salient literature on business and information technology 
ethics was reviewed emphasizing the underlying ethical theories as well as the important factors 
that may influence ethical IT decision-making. Both business and information technology ethics 
are burdened with countless situational factors that underscore the complexity of ethical 
decisions, and, particularly for information technology ethics, this burden is carried without the 
support of strong foundation in ethical philosophies and theory (Bull 2008). Finally, moral 
psychology literature is introduced in order to understand how these situational factors influence 
ethical IT decision-making. Ethical decision-making models in moral psychology, however, 
suffer from some shortcomings in explaining ethical IT decision-making, specifically information 
technology creates new ethical problems that current decision-making models may not account 
for, and individual dispositional assessments of moral development are unsuitable for explaining 
and predicting complex decisions in organizational environments involving information 
technology. By combing the multitude of ethical philosophies with ethical decision-making 
models from more psychology, we are better equipped to understand how the situational and 
contextual factors from business and information technology ethical dilemmas shape ethical IT 
decision-making. The application of situational ethical philosophies with other theoretical 
foundations, such as domain theory of moral development and affordance theory, helps address a 




SITUATIONAL MORAL REASONING 
Introduction 
Previous research investigating the ethical IT decision-making have investigated 
situational factors using broad based conceptualizations of moral reasoning dispositions that are 
unable to assess the unique effects the context and technology itself on the moral reasoning of 
individuals (Banerjee et al. 1998; Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard and Cronan 2001; Leonard 
et al. 2004; Moores and Chang 2006). Individual characteristics, such as moral reasoning 
dispositions (as conceived through Kohlberg’s six stages (Kohlberg 1976; Kohlberg 1984), locus 
of control and ego strength, are theoretically applied independent of the situation, the context and 
environment surrounding the situation, and the  characteristics of the information technology used 
in the scenario. However, this may not always be the case with moral reasoning and judgments in 
particular. To establish differences in moral reasoning based on the specific IT ethical dilemmas, 
we must first compare the situational moral reasoning and judgments as measured by the Multi-
Dimensional Ethics Scale (MES) (Flory et al. 1993b; Reidenbach and Robin 1988; Reidenbach 
and Robin 1990) to the often utilized dispositional moral reasoning and judgments as 
conceptualized using cognitive moral development (Kohlberg 1976; Kohlberg 1984; Rest et al. 
2000a; Rest et al. 1999) measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT/DIT2) (Rest et al. 1999). 
Therefore, the first study will address: 
1. Do situational and dispositional moral judgments influence the ethical or unethical IT 
behavior intentions of people? 
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2. Do situational moral judgments have more influence on ethical IT intentions and 
behaviors than their dispositional moral judgments, or moral development stage? 
In order to address these questions, we must first address what constitutes situational 
effects and situational moral reasoning, and the effects they have on ethical IT decision-making. 
Situational Effects and Moral Reasoning 
Although some may argue that universal factors are indeed important, such 
factors may be overwhelmed by particular factors. The question remains: which 
particular factors are important to which individual under what circumstances. 
(Ross and Robertson 2003) 
Although cognitive moral development displays a generalized propensity for particular 
schemas of moral judgments and behaviors, people struggle to maintain consistent application of 
these schema across a variety of context and situations, such as between work and non-work 
environments (Fraedrick and Ferrell 1992). Therefore, some have questioned whether cognitive 
moral development schema are indeed properties of the object itself (i.e. the person) or a 
theoretical construction to efficiently segment populations in a generalized fashion (Flavell 1982; 
Keil 1981). 
Situational factors are defined as factors “particular to a time and place of observation, 
which do not follow from a knowledge of personal (intra-individual) and stimulus (choice 
alternative) that have demonstrable and systematic effect on current behavior” (Belk 1975). Many 
situational factors that influence organizational ethical behavior have been identified, including 
organizational rewards and sanctions, codes of conduct, types of conflict, opportunity for 
unethical behaviors, culture and climate, and competitiveness of the business or industry as 
factors that influence the ethical behavior of employees (Ford and Richardson 1994; Loe et al. 
2000). However, few researchers have investigated the nature of technology-specific situational 
factors on ethical decision. Exceptions include the effects of computer literacy on ethical behavior 
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(Loch and Conger 1996) and enforcement and cost of software piracy (Moores and Chang 2006). 
Nevertheless, these factors are highly specific and only graze the surface of possible situational 
and technological effects in ethical IT decision-making. 
Extending the EDM to include situation factors of the ethical dilemma, the Issue-
Contingent Model (ICM) proposes strong situational factors that influence the ethical intentions 
and behaviors of individuals in a variety of scenarios (Jones 1991), and has become a dominant 
framework for understanding ethical decision-making in business (Haines et al. 2008). Jones 
identifies six situational characteristics involved in an ethical decision-making scenario, namely: 
(1) magnitude of consequences; (2) social consensus; (3) probability of effect; (4) temporal 
immediacy; (5) proximity; and (6) concentration of effect. The level of moral intensity increases 
monotonically, or in other words, an increase in one factor increases the overall level of moral 
intensity. The ICM situational factors, however, are largely dependent on the content of the 
ethical dilemma itself, and not on broad environmental factors such as normative pressures and 
resource constraints. As a derivative of the four-component model, the ICM theorizes that the 
sequential ethical decision-making model relationships are moderated by the above situational 
factors, specifically a subset of these that comprise the moral intensity construct, namely (1) 
probable magnitude of consequences, (2) proximity, and (3) social consequences. 
Ross and Robertson (2003) further explore on the differential impact of situational factors 
over individual, dispositional factors. Situational variables may also be defined “as characteristics 
of the decision setting [versus characteristics of the decision-maker of the decision] that 
influences the decision-making process and outcome.” (Ross and Robertson 2003). Situational 
factors are defined into four factors along two dimensions. The factors include: universal factors 
are defined as “factors in the decision-making environment that have a constant, on-going effect 
on the decision that the decision-maker focuses [e.g. organizations structure and culture]”; 
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particular factors “are specifically related to the decision under consideration [e.g. risks, 
likelihood of consequences, severity of consequences]”; direct factors “elicit ethical 
consideration, causing one or more alternatives to be considered in the decision process” (Ross 
and Robertson 2003); and indirect factors “[do] not elicit consideration of the alternative’s 
ethics” (Ross and Robertson 2003). 
Table 3. Two dimensions of situational factors for ethical decision-making 
 Universal Particular 
Direct 
Code of ethics 
Ethical climate 
Who gets hurt 
How great is the harm 
Indirect 
Organizational structure 
Industry and company climate 
Control system and opportunity 
Performance pressure 
Conduct of referent others 
Compensation 
Probability of getting caught 
Categorizing situational factors in ethical decisions making is important for several 
reasons (Ross and Robertson 2003). First, by understanding the characteristics of specific 
categories of situational factors, we may better understand the pressures that direct decision-
makers toward unethical behaviors, and therefore explore the policy and management decisions 
that help decision-makers respond to such pressures. Second, since situational factors are 
‘ubiquitous and diverse,’ one may extrapolate the characteristics and effects of new and relatively 
unknown factors on decision-makers by assigning the factor a priori to a specific category. 
Several other practical benefits can be found as well. For example, researchers can more 
appropriately choose methodologies and levels of analysis appropriate to the category, e.g. firm 
level for universal factors, scenario-level for particular factors. In addition, managers may choose 
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to ‘legislate’ universal factors through the organization, and educate employee’s to make ‘good 
decision’ when faced with pressures from particular factors. 
Many researchers IS researchers acknowledge the situationality of ethical IT dilemmas as 
well (Banerjee et al. 1998; Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard and Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 
2004). However, few researchers have investigated the nature of technology-specific situational 
factors on ethical decision expressly and directly. Exceptions include the effects of computer 
literacy on ethical behavior (Loch and Conger 1996) and enforcement and cost of software piracy 
(Moores and Chang 2006). This is of great importance to businesses and managers as “managers 
are less interested in individual dispositions than in situational factors because they can do little to 
alter dispositions [once hired]” (Ross and Robertson 2003). In fact, individual disposition such as 
cognitive moral development slowly evolve over time; the vast majority of development 
occurring during childhood and adolescence (Turiel 1983; Turiel et al. 1987), and secondarily 
through higher education and professional work experience (Rest 1986a; Rest et al. 2000a). 
Therefore, it is important to investigate how situational factors influence ethical behavior, 
particular how situational decision-making factors, specifically moral reasoning and judgments, 
shape our ethical IT intentions and behaviors. 
Situational moral reasoning and judgments stem from these broad moral philosophies that 
have been defined in previous sections, and specifically include (1) deontological, (2) utilitarian, 
(3) relativist, (4) egoist, and (5) justice (McMahon and Harvey 2007; Reidenbach and Robin 
1988; Reidenbach and Robin 1990). The deontological dimension consists of moral judgments 
relating to moral ‘rightness’ and violations of moral principles, such as fairness and social 
contracts. The utilitarian dimension consists of moral judgments relating to maximizing 
efficiency, pleasure, utility, and the ‘greatest good’ while minimizing cost and harm. The 
relativist dimension consists of moral judgments relating to the acceptability of actions by the 
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individual, other individual, family, culture, or tradition. The egoist dimension consists of moral 
judgments relating to selfishness, personal interests, and lack of moral obligation toward others. 
Finally, the justice dimension consists of moral judgments relating to perceptions of fairness, 
justice and results, or equal distribution of goods. 
Table 4. Situational effects on ethical decision-making as organized by study 
 Direct Indirect 
Particular Situational Moral Reasoning 
(Study 1 & 2) 
Technical Dimensions 
(Study 3) 
Universal Dispositional Moral Reasoning 
(Study 1 & 2) 
 
A well-established theory of ethical decision-making that incorporates the relative 
importance of individual disposition and situational factors can be found in Trevino’s person-
situation interactionist (PSI) model (Trevino 1986). The PSI model states that individual 
dispositions change how situational factors are perceived which, in turn, influences ethical 
decision-making (Ross and Robertson 2003). In other words, dispositional factors moderate the 
effects of situational factors on ethical decision-making; however, each factor maintains their 
direct effects on ethical behavior. This study explores the manner dispositional moral reasoning 
correlates with situational moral reasoning in ethical IT dilemmas. Consistent with the person-
situation interactionist model, although individuals may be biased toward a particular line of 
moral reasoning as defined by the person’s cognitive moral development, situational factors may 
direct the person toward particular ethical principles and moral reasoning. Individual, 




Research Design & Hypothesis Development 
The basis for the research design is a combination of the theory of reasoned action (TRA) 
(Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), the theory of planned behavior (TPB) (Ajzen 1985; Ajzen 1991), and 
the four-component model of ethical decision making (Rest 1986b). Each of the component 
factors, moral recognition, moral judgments, attitude towards ethical behaviors, and personal 
normative beliefs, influences one's intention to behave ethically in a situation. Intention to behave 
ethically is commonly used in prior research as a surrogate to an individual's actual behavior in 
the scenario, and therefore ethical behavior is not explicitly shown in the model (Armitage and 
Christian 2004; Armitage and Conner 2001). 
In the following sections, the original research model and relevant modifications are 
outlined. Throughout this discourse, hypotheses are developed based on the relevant literature. A 
summary of all hypotheses proposed in Study 1 may be found in Appendix X. The research 
model is based on previous research in IT ethics with several modifications, particularly 
situational moral judgments (Reidenbach and Robin 1988; Reidenbach and Robin 1990), moral 





Figure 7. Research model on situational IT ethics 
The model suggests that the ethical IT dilemma itself will have significant impact on 
moral judgment, attitude toward ethics behavior (i.e. moral attitudes) and personal normative 
beliefs. Moral attitudes and moral judgments both concern the individual’s perception of ethical 
behaviors. Moral attitudes are the positive or negative impression an individual harbors toward a 
given ethical scenario (Haidt et al. 1993). Moral judgments are the individual’s rationalization 
and justification, and corresponding conclusion whether a scenario is ethical or unethical 
(Banerjee et al. 1998; Rest 1986b). Personal normative beliefs are an individual’s perception of 
the normative pressures that influence their decision in the context of ethical IT dilemmas (Ajzen 
1985; Ajzen 1991; Banerjee et al. 1998). Moral attitudes, judgments, and personal normative 
beliefs each influence an individual’s intention to behave ethically or unethically. However, 
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support for the effect of moral judgments and attitudes toward the ethical behavior (i.e. moral 
attitudes) is inconsistent. Preliminary studies of the ethical decision-making model in an IT 
context are non-significant (Banerjee et al. 1998), while subsequent studies directly addressing 
this problem12 find support, albeit weak support, for the salience of moral attitudes and judgments 
on ethical IT intention and behavior (Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard and Cronan 2001; 
Leonard et al. 2004). Personal normative belief, on the other hand, has been supported as a 
predictor of ethical behavior intentions across several studies (Banerjee et al. 1998; Leonard and 
Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 2004). 
Research Model and Design 
The proposed research model is as follows. In the subsequent sections, each of the four 
research questions will be addressed by additions to the aforementioned EDM model. Hypotheses 
will be developed from previous literature supporting the possible theoretical relations described 
in the research model. The research model and hypothesis development is organized into four 
subsections consistent with the proposed research questions. The subsections are as follows: (1) 
dispositional moral judgments and individual level characteristics, (2) moral recognition, (3) 
moral attitude, and finally (4) situational moral judgments. 
                                                 
12 A long stream of research follows this study addressing the non-significance of the results by expanding 





Figure 8. Research model for the effects of situational moral reasoning in an IT context 
Moral Judgments on Ethical IT Behavior Intention 
To operationalize the moral judgment construct for the research design effectively, it is 
critical to examine how moral judgments have been measured. Moral judgments have been 
measured using an individual-level dispositional scale measured by the Defining Issues Test 
(DIT) (Rest 1986b; Rest et al. 1974). The DIT results in three scores (P-score, D-score, and 
U-score) calculated from an individual’s response of six different scenarios. Three types of 
assessments accompany each scenario: (1) whether the actor in the scenario should perform the 
action, (2) rating how important various statements about the scenario are to the decision, and (3) 
ranking the importance of each statement in relation to the other statements. 
The P-score measures the “individual’s stand with respect to principled morality” 
(Leonard et al. 2004). In other words, the P-score measures an individual’s level of moral 
development, whether pre-conventional, conventional, or post-conventional, and is 
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operationalized by the percentage of response to post-conventional reasoning statements. The D-
score measures the “individual’s rating of specific questions with regard to their importance in 
defining the situation in the context of a particular ethical dilemma.” The U-score measure “the 
degree to which moral judgments operate in determining a decision on a particular ethical 
dilemma.” Therefore, although the P-score may determine the level or moral judgments the 
individuals operates, the moral reasoning determined by the P-score may not be a salient 
determinant of moral judgments, and the U-score determines the degree that moral reasoning is 
applicable in the ethical decision. 
For reasons of measurement improvement including better psychometrics and length, the 
DIT has been updated to the DIT2 (Rest 1986a; Rest 1986b; Rest et al. 1999). While including 
the aforementioned measurement advantages, the DIT2 also has a stronger theoretical foundation 
and a strong correlation with the original DIT. With the updated DIT2 comes a new score or 
index measuring aspects of moral reasoning and judgments, specifically the N2 index. The N2 
index accounts for the individual’s preference for post-conventional moral schemas and 
subsequent rejection of personal interest schemas (Rest et al. 1999; Rest et al. 1997a). The N2 
index incorporates new calculations that result in improved reliability, correlations with other 
moral constructs such as moral comprehension (Rest et al. 2000a; Rest et al. 1997a; Rest et al. 
1997b). The N2 index represents a combination of the aforementioned P-score (a measure of 
individual disposition toward post-conventional moral thinking), and the “STAGE23” score 
(disposition toward pre-conventional moral reasoning, or the personal interest schema) and 
“STAGE4P” score (disposition toward conventional moral reasoning, or the maintaining norms 
schema).” Since the N2 index represents an individual’s disposition towards post-conventional 
moral reasoning over pre-conventional moral reasoning (or favoring the post-conventional 
schema over the personal intent schema), the N2 index is expected to be associated with levels of 
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ethical IT behavior intention and more ethical decision outcomes (Banerjee et al. 1998; Rest et al. 
1999; Rest et al. 1997a). Therefore, the following is hypothesized: 
H1 Higher levels of dispositional moral judgments (N2 score) will increase 
an individual’s intention to engage in ethical IT behavior.  
Furthermore, dispositional moral judgments representing an individual level of cognitive 
moral development is expected to influence the situational moral judgments employed in a 
particular scenario. Individuals more predisposed towards higher levels of moral reasoning (such 
as the maintaining norms or post-conventional moral schemas) ought to be associated with some 
situational moral judgments, but disassociated with others. Based on the ethical philosophies 
supporting each dimension of situational moral reasoning, the N2 index will have varied effects 
(or lack of effects) on situational moral judgments directly. Therefore, this study hypothesizes the 
following: 
H2 Higher levels of dispositional moral judgments (N2 score) will be 
positively associated with deontological situational moral judgments. 
H3 Higher levels of dispositional moral judgments (N2 score) will be 
unassociated with utilitarian situational moral judgments. 
H4 Higher levels of dispositional moral judgments (N2 score) will be 
unassociated with relativist situational moral judgments. 
H5 Higher levels of dispositional moral judgments (N2 score) will be 
negatively associated with egoist situational moral judgments. 
H6 Higher levels of dispositional moral judgments (N2 score) will be 




Some individuals may not be cognizant of the moral components of a particular ethical 
dilemma or scenario. Previous research has shown that the mere presence of IT in an ethical issue 
may cause confusion, changing the manner people make ethical decisions, and ultimately the 
ethical behavior of individuals (Loch and Conger 1996; Sproull and Kiesler 1991). The 
recognition of the situation as an important or critical ethical issues is important in the formation 
moral attitudes and judgments (Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard et al. 2004). Therefore, the 
moral awareness of people in each ethical situation must be considered when dealing with ethical 
decision-making in information technology. In a literature review of ethical decision-making 
literature, the authors acknowledge a lack of research relating awareness of ethical issues and 
codes of conduct to ethical behavior in organizations (Loe et al. 2000). 
Moral recognition is the awareness that a person’s decision or behavior will have 
consequences affecting the interests and welfare of the self or others (Reynolds 2006). Moral 
recognition has been measured by other researchers using a variety of different terms including 
moral sensitivity (Rest 1986b; Rest et al. 1974) and moral recognition (Moores and Chang 2006); 
however, each conceptualization shares common measures and a common theoretical basis: the 
awareness of important moral characteristics and consequences.  
Reynolds (2006) found that different ethical predisposition (formalist and utilitarian) 
influenced the level of moral recognition of ethical situations. People who were predisposed to 
formalist ethics exhibited higher moral recognition than those predisposed to utilitarian ethics. 
These ethical predispositions reflect deep-seated moral reasoning dispositions; and therefore, the 
influence of ethical predispositions may be akin to that of moral judgments. Then, in other words, 
people who were more predisposed to higher levels of moral reasoning were more likely to be 
aware of salient moral characteristics and consequences, and therefore higher moral recognition. 
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In the context of ethical IT dilemmas, researchers have found mixed support for the 
effects of moral recognition on ethical decision-making, particularly moral judgments and 
attitudes. Other authors exploring the effects of perceived importance found significant effects on 
moral attitudes and judgments; however, the effects on moral attitudes and judgments varied 
significantly between scenarios (Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard et al. 2004) suggesting that 
moral recognition is context dependent. Finally, Moores and Chang (2006) explored the effects of 
moral recognition in the context of ethical decision-making on software piracy, finding no 
support for the effects of moral recognition on ethical decision-making. However, the authors 
explained the lack of support for moral recognition in the form of broad acceptance and support 
of software piracy by the sample population (college students). 
H7 Higher levels of moral recognition will increase an individual’s moral 
attitudes toward an ethical IT dilemma. 
H8 Higher levels of moral recognition will be positively associated with 
deontological situational moral judgments. 
H9 Higher levels of moral recognition will be positively associated with 
utilitarian situational moral judgments. 
H10 Higher levels of moral recognition will be negatively associated with 
relativist situational moral judgments. 
H11 Higher levels of moral recognition will be negatively associated with 
egoist situational moral judgments. 
H12 Higher levels of moral recognition will be positively associated with 
justice situational moral judgments. 
Moral Attitudes on Ethical IT Behavior Intention 
Moral attitudes are the impression of salient characteristics of the ethical dilemma (Haidt 
et al. 1993). Moral attitudes are measured based upon a series of single-item questions involving 
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the action in the scenario… (Banerjee et al. 1998; Haidt et al. 1993). Attitudes can be a strong 
predictor of individual intentions and actions; however, whether attitudes are predictive and how 
predictive varies significantly across contexts and domains (Armitage and Conner 2001). 
Although early studies in IT ethics and ethical decision-making found no support for the effects 
of moral attitudes on ethical behavior intention (Banerjee et al. 1998), subsequent studies have 
using similar methods only with larger sample sizes (Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard and 
Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 2004). Each of these studies used a combined analysis of multiple 
scenarios, with many different situational factors including the type of issue, severity of issue, 
proximity of the action and consequences to the reader, etc. Some explanations for the 
inconsistent findings for moral attitudes, both within and outside the IT ethics domain, include 
lack of sample size and statistical power (Leonard and Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 2004), lack of 
perceived importance (Haines and Leonard 2007b), and strong situational effects on moral 
attitudes and intentions (Banerjee et al. 1998; Haines and Leonard 2007b). 
Despite the inconsistent findings within the IT ethics context, this study will remain 
consistent with previous TPB (Ajzen 1985; Ajzen 1989; Ajzen 1991; Armitage and Christian 
2004; Armitage and Conner 2001) and IT ethics literature (Banerjee et al. 1998; Gattiker and 
Kelley 1999a; Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard and Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 2004). 
Therefore, this study predicts that moral attitudes will significantly contribute to the formation of 
ethical IT behavior intentions regardless of the scenario in question. Therefore, a similar 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H13 Stronger moral attitudes toward the ethical dilemma will increase an 
individual’s intention to behave ethically. 
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Situational Moral Judgments 
Moral judgments are the underlying moral principles and decision-making schemas used 
to rationalize and justify ethical or unethical behaviors. Common moral judgments include 
Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning (Kohlberg 1984), Neo-Kohlbergian moral reasoning 
schemas (Rest et al. 2000a; Rest et al. 1999) and broad ethical philosophies such as egoism, 
utilitarianism, and justice, etc. (McMahon and Harvey 2007; Reidenbach and Robin 1988; 
Reidenbach and Robin 1990). Based on these aforementioned ethical philosophies that comprise 
our understanding of situational moral judgments, it is suggested that these situation-specific 
judgments have a strong impact on our intentions to behave ethically. Different behavioral 
intentions are predicted depending on the moral judgments arrived at by the individual 
considering the ethical IT dilemma. 
H14 Higher levels of deontological situational moral judgments will be 
positively associated with ethical IT behavior intentions. 
H15 Higher levels of utilitarian situational moral judgments will be positively 
associated with ethical IT behavior intentions. 
H16 Higher levels of relativist situational moral judgments will be positively 
associated with ethical IT behavior intentions. 
H17 Higher levels of egoist situational moral judgments will be positively 
associated with ethical IT behavior intentions. 
H18 Higher levels of justice situational moral judgments will be positively 
associated with ethical IT behavior intentions. 
Methodology 
Organizational ethics research has used a variety of methodologies to explore ethical 
decision-making and behavior, including theoretical essays, to model building, to experimental 
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research using interviews, surveys, case studies, etc. (Collins 2000). Collins (2000) reports that 
while theoretical essays have been dominant in the business ethics literature, consistently 
accounting for over 50% of the methodologies between 1982 and 2000, survey methodologies has 
remained the second most common methodology (about 30 and 35%) and the most common 
experimental method. Other methods common in the business ethics literature include case 
studies, model building and interviews. However, despite the proliferation of survey research in 
the business and IT ethics research, some authors are critical of the overuse of survey research 
arguing that ethical discourse is too complex to fully operationalize ethical decision-making and 
other moral phenomenon and qualitative methods such as interviews, action research and other 
methods are more appropriate (Crane 1996; Lewis 1985). Nevertheless, previous research 
conducted in IT ethics has used survey methodologies containing scenarios depicting ethical 
dilemmas to elicit moral responses from participants (Banerjee et al. 1998; Gattiker and Kelley 
1999a; Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard and Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 2004; Parker 1988). 
Since this research seeks to continue and expand upon the tradition of ethical IT decision-making 
models, a survey approach is used wherein vignettes involving ethical IT dilemmas are 
accompanied by a set of questionnaires. Each vignette is followed by several questions 
concerning the moral recognition, moral domain, attitude, judgment and intention of the 
respondent. Following the scenario-based questions, the respondents will complete scenario-
independent measures of the individual’s cognitive moral development. 
Sampling in IT Ethics Research 
Before selecting an appropriate sample, we must consider the previous research in IT 
ethics using survey research to explore the effects of sample demographics, sample sizes, and the 
theoretical implications of each on relevant empirical findings. The vast majority of studies 
utilizing survey methodologies have used relatively large student populations (over 250 
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respondents, even more when multiple scenarios are accounted for) (Haines and Leonard 2007a; 
Haines and Leonard 2007b; Haines et al. 2008; Leonard and Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 2004; 
Moores and Chang 2006). Similar studies have pulled from more appropriate, but not 
significantly different, populations of IT professionals (Banerjee et al. 1998; Banerjee and Jones 
1996), finding few differences in ethical decision-making processes from subsequent studies. In 
many of these studies, the large sample size coupled with a equally large level of statistical 
confidence (α = 0.10) resulted in the not-so-surprising broad support for the EDM model. Other 
studies particularly interested in differences between students and professional populations used a 
more diverse, stratified sample (Cappel and Windsor 1998; Paradice 1990; Paradice and Dejoie 
1991). Other researchers used arguably more generalized sampling procedures by pulling from 
listserves, mailing lists, or other broad distribution media (Gattiker and Kelley 1995; Gattiker and 
Kelley 1999a), although one can argue that such environments may have disproportionally high 
levels of computer and information technology knowledge compared with a generalized 
population. 
Student subjects have been found to be acceptable surrogates for business managers and 
decision makers particularly concerning psychological processes including ethical decision-
making (Greenberg and Eskew 1993). Student populations have not significantly affected the 
generalizability of the findings of ethical decision-making research (Randall and Gibsom 1990). 
Wyld and Jones (1997) corroborated these assertions demonstrating no difference between 
student and managerial respondents. These findings are consistent with research on 
methodological issues between students and managers that find few differences when 
investigating cognitive processes, such as decision-making behavior, but significant differences 
when investigating actual behaviors using a predictive model (Greenberg and Eskew 1993). 
Concerning ethical differences between students and professionals in information systems, a high 
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correlations of attitudes toward ethical IT behaviors have been found concerning ethical and 
unethical behaviors in both normal and IT-related ethical issues (Paradice 1990; Paradice and 
Dejoie 1991). 
Vignettes in Ethics and IT Ethics Research 
Vignettes are a useful tool in creating sustained stimulus of a real-life decision-making 
environment, enabling the researcher to focus the respondent on important research-related 
factors, as opposed to factors impulsively read-into the abstract question (Alexander and Becker 
1978). Vignettes are systematically elaborated descriptions of concrete situations used to create 
more valid and reliable measure responses than abstract questions, and allow the researcher to 
vary characteristics of the situation description systematically to analyze the effects of the 
respondent’s judgments. More concretely, vignettes represent “short descriptions of a person of 
social situation which contain precise references to what are through to be the most important 
factors in the decision-making or judgment-making process of respondents” (Alexander and 
Becker 1978). To accommodate for a large number of dichotomous variables in vignettes, one 
can create a single vignette that correspondents to the scenario or environment at large, and then 
varying specific words and phrases to correspond to specific characteristics. 
Previous research is plentiful with scenarios involving various IT issues (Banerjee et al. 
1998; Gattiker and Kelley 1999a; Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard and Cronan 2001; 
Leonard et al. 2004; Moores and Chang 2006), including such issues as security, privacy, 
software piracy, viruses, hackers, etc. Banerjee and others (1998) distributed questionnaires to 
eight companies, were each questionnaire consisted of two of a total of five scenarios. In testing 
the structural model, the scenarios were aggregated regardless of the type of situation, with the 
exception of the organization-scenario control variable. The scenarios themselves ranged from a 
variety of topics, including the use of marketing data, electronic mail, voting machines, etc.; 
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however, the scenarios suffer from being overly long and complicated, which may explain why 
the authors only sent two or the five scenarios in the survey. Similarly, Leonard and others (2004) 
developed a questionnaire and used a survey methodology to replicate the Banerjee and others 
(1998) using a larger sample size, and exploring several other variables (such as perceived 
importance). The authors, however, used markedly different scenarios stemming from Dejoie and 
others (1991) and each respondent was given all five scenarios, as opposed to a small sample of 
them. The five scenarios included (1) a programmer hacking bank software, (2) receiving an extra 
software package with an order, (3) using company resources for a computer hobby, (4) using 
software without paying licensing fees, and (5) copying and using sensitive data for commercial 
use, and can be found in more detail in (Haines and Leonard 2007b). Scenario 1 (a programmer 
hacking bank software) and scenario 3 (using company resources for a computer hobby) will be 
slightly modified for this study. 
Moores and Chang (2006) continues the tradition of using scenarios and survey 
methodologies in IT ethics research by exploring ethical decision-making with respect to software 
piracy in particular. However, unlike previous research that used a variety of scenario types, 
including hacking, privacy, etc., Moores and Chang focus on a single type of IT ethics: software 
piracy. By zeroing in on a specific scenario type, the researchers are afforded a more complete 
deconstruction of the salient situational factors in software piracy (availability, cost, and legality) 
each from two different perspectives (positive and negative viewpoints). The results, however, 
are difficult to capture due to the highly skewed perception of the survey respondents, as the vast 
majority of respondents, all being undergraduate students, considered software piracy an 
acceptable way to acquire computer software. 
Scenario length limited to 50 to 100 words to reduce response bias due to scenario length 
(McMahon and Harvey 2006). In addition, to reduce the potential for social desirability response 
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bias, actors such as friends, coworkers, students, etc. were used instead of the participant 
specifically (Butterfield et al. 2000). Respondents choose the most ethically appropriate decision, 
and based on the decision judged various qualities (such as moral attitude, judgment, etc.). 
Measures 
Moral Attitudes 
A single measure of moral attitude found in the IT ethics literature is used. The measure 
of moral attitude is operationalized by Banerjee and others (1998) and consists of three questions 
regarding the evaluation of the actor’s behavior anchored on helpful / hurtful, good / bad, pleasant 
/ unpleasant. The measure is similar to other measure of moral attitude (Haidt et al. 1993; Miller 
et al. 1990; Turiel et al. 1987) used in other IT ethics research (Gattiker and Kelley 1999a). 
However, the moral attitude measures utilized in Banerjee and others (1998) are more consistent 
with other bi-polar measures used in the study, particular the MES-10. 
Since moral attitudes and judgments both act as behavioral beliefs that lead to the 
formation of behavior intention and action, one may deduce that moral attitudes and judgments 
are similar or at least highly correlated. However, as Rest (1986b) found in controlled 
experiments of moral actions, moral attitudes were not significantly correlated with moral 
judgments, although each contributed to the formation of ethical behavior intentions. 
Moral Judgments and Reasoning 
To differentiate between situational moral judgments (those dependent on the situation) 
we refer to the moral reasoning capabilities as measured by the DIT/DIT2 as dispositional moral 
judgments (those independent of the situation). Dispositional moral reasoning is measured 
through the Defining Issues Test (DIT/DIT2) (Rest et al. 1974; Rest et al. 2000a; Rest et al. 
1999), while situational moral reasoning is measured through the Multi-dimensional Ethics Scale 
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(MES) (Flory et al. 1993a; Flory et al. 1993b; Reidenbach and Robin 1988; Reidenbach and 
Robin 1990).  
The DIT has a staggering long tradition in measuring moral reasoning capabilities and 
dispositional moral judgments (Kohlberg 1984; Rest 1986b; Rest et al. 1974; Rest and Narvaez 
1994). The DIT measures an individual's moral judgments, producing three scores: P-score, D-
score, and U-score.13 Previous research has used a combination of P-score and D-score to assess 
an overall measure of an individual's moral judgment and ethical behavior under various 
circumstances (Banerjee et al. 1998). The P-score measures the “individual’s stand with respect 
to principled morality.” The D-score measures the “individual’s rating of specific questions with 
regard to their importance in defining the situation in the context of a particular ethical dilemma.” 
Finally, the U-score measure “the degree to which moral judgments operate in determining a 
decision on a particular ethical dilemma.” Subsequent measurement analysis has resulted in an 
updated version of the DIT, aptly name the Definition Issues Test 2 (DIT2) (Rest et al. 2000a; 
Rest et al. 1999). The DIT2 has also been used in many current studies (Haines and Leonard 
2007b; Hren et al. 2006; Rest et al. 1999), and with the extensive validation and construction 
procedures (Rest et al. 2000a; 1999) the  more advanced DIT2 will be used in this study.  The 
DIT2 consists of a small battery of five scenarios where respondents first rank-order 10-12 
statements relating to moral reasoning characteristics in the scenarios. The respondent’s level of 
moral reasoning capabilities are assessed based on the rank of individual moral statements across 
all of the five scenarios. 
In choosing a distribution method for the survey instrument, and the DIT2 in particular, 
no significant differences have been found between administering the DIT2 online versus pen-
and-paper (Xu et al. 2007). The composite reliabilities and discriminant validity of the pen-and-
                                                 
13 Each of the individual scores has been defined in the previous chapter. 
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paper and online versions of the DIT2 had no significant differences attributable to the method of 
test taking. In addition, no differences were found between either version in regards to the 
student’s satisfaction and ease of use. The only reported difference between the two tests was 
some variability in terms of per-item difficulty. 
The DIT2 suffers from issues of non-contextuality; in other words, moral reasoning is 
measured as an individual, trait-based construct, and not a trait- and state-based construct. Each 
of the three resultant scores, P, U, and N (DIT2 only), are measured using a single questionnaire. 
Although the measure consists of different scenarios and items whose responses correlate with 
each schema of moral reasoning, the specific moral reasoning or schema used by the individual is 
not influenced by the salient, context-specific characteristics of the researcher’s interest. The 
context-specific scenarios, in this case, have characteristics that embody the IT domain and the 
three domains of morality. Therefore, DIT2 is unable to capture the effects of salient, context-
specific characteristics on the stage or schema of moral reasoning used by the individual, and 
thusly the subsequent moral attitudes and judgments these characteristics may elicit. 
The Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) is “situation-specific, temporal, and process-
oriented,” whereas the DIT (and DIT2) is “general (not situation-specific), enduring, and trait-
oriented” (Flory, et al 1993). A situation-specific instrument, the Multi-dimensional Ethics Scale 
(MES), accesses the application of different normative ethical philosophies (Brady and Wheeler 
1996; Flory et al. 1993b; McMahon and Harvey 2007; Reidenbach and Robin 1988; Reidenbach 
and Robin 1990). Traditionally, the evaluation of ethical issues by individuals has been measured 
through a single-item scale judging the degree to which the individual considered the issue ethical 
or unethical (Reidenbach and Robin 1990). Such evaluations used Likert scales anchored on 
“very ethical” and “very unethical.” The single-item scale used to evaluate ethical issues is 
known as the Single-dimensional Ethics Scale (SES), as it only measures ethicalness in terms of a 
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single dimension (ethical-unethical). In response, Reidenbach and Robin (1988; Reidenbach and 
Robin 1990) develop the Multi-dimensional Ethics Scale (MES) that evaluates an ethical situation 
using several dimensions of ethical reasoning and judgment. The original measure weighed-in at 
a lofty 33-items (Reidenbach and Robin 1988). Using a factor analysis of the original 33-item 
measure across 54 scenarios (three versions of 18 unique scenarios), the MES was scaled down to 
only 10 items (Reidenbach and Robin 1990) with no significant loss of explanatory power (Jones 
1991; McMahon and Harvey 2007). Barnett (2001) tested and validated MES with moral 
intensity as an antecedent, demonstrating that not only was moral intensity (a common antecedent 
for moral judgment and moral reasoning constructs) a significant predictor of moral judgments, 
but also that the MES measure demonstrated sufficient reliability and construct validity.  
Since no single ethical principle can adequately explain the moral reasoning used in the 
formation of moral judgments (Reidenbach and Robin 1990), the MES may be more appropriate 
to measure moral judgments and reasoning as it takes into account the situational variables that 
influence ethical decision-making and the multi-faceted application of moral principles to even a 
single situation. In other words, although the scales measure the same theoretical construct (moral 
reasoning), the two measures have sufficient discriminant validity to suggest that under specific 
scenarios individuals may employ different, situation-specific moral reasoning (as measured by 
the MES) that conflicts with their general moral reasoning disposition (as measured by the DIT2). 
Since the DIT2 represents the individual’s disposition to particular moral reasoning capacities, 
one could suspect that the dispositional moral reasoning capacity of an individual would 
influence the situational-specific moral reasoning employed in a particular scenario, even though 
the two moral reasoning capacities may be different or even in conflict. 
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Analysis and Results 
The results of the study were analyzed using a combination of SPSS 17.0 and SmartPLS 
2.0 M3 (Ringle et al. 2005). SPSS 17.0 is used primarily to determine descriptive statistics (mean, 
standard deviation, skewness, etc.), construct reliability, factory analyses, and Pearson correlation 
matrices. Smart PLS 2.0 M3 is primarily used to assess the average variance explained, 
composite reliability, and most importantly the structural models path coefficients and 
significance tests. Significance of path coefficients were tested using the bootstrap sampling 
technique (500 subsamples) as used in similar ethical-decision making studies (Haines and 
Leonard 2007a; Haines and Leonard 2007b) and as recommended by other authors (Marcoulides 
et al. 2009; Marcoulides and Saunders 2006). 
Construct Reliability 
Reliability is an assessment of the internal consistency of construct items within a 
particular construct, testing whether the items “move” in the same direction and are therefore 
highly correlated (Nunnally 1967). Reliability as a measure of internal consistency also 
determines how certain the researcher is about the responses and the effects of those responses. 
The statistical comparisons and tests involving construct measures with low reliability scores 
(such as those with Cronbach’s alpha below 0.7) are highly suspect since the research is unable to 
determine whether an effect or lack of effect is attributable to actual effects, or simply poor 
internal consistency. Suitable reliabilities scores differ significantly based on the purpose of the 
study and current development of measures (Bearden et al. 1993; Nunnally 1967; Yi and Davis 
2003). Cronbach’s alpha of 0.6 or more is sufficient for measurement development, while 0.7 or 
more is suitable for exploratory studies. However, if construct measures are mature and well 
defined, or the study is confirmatory in nature, higher reliabilities are necessary. For confirmatory 
studies, reliability scores of 0.8 or higher are expected, whereas if the study were to be used for 
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decision-making purposes, reliabilities of 0.9 or 0.95 are expected. Respondents assessed many of 
the constructs, such as moral recognition, attitude, situational moral reasoning, etc. across 
multiple vignettes. For these constructs, each vignette response was considered in the assessment 
of construct reliability (and other measures of reliability and validity for that matter). 
The reliability for the N2 Score is computed by calculating the Cronbach’s alpha for the 
calculated N2 scores for each of the five stories (Bebeau and Thoma 2003). The N2 score for 
each story is determined by comparing the decision with the weighted rank of each statement; 
where statements consistent with the decision are heavily contribute to the N2 score, while 
irrelevant or contrary statements lower the N2 score for each story. 
Table 5. Construct means, standard deviations, and reliabilities 
Construct Mean SD α α std CR 
Moral Recognition 9.018 4.418 0.947 0.947 0.931 
Moral Attitude 10.606 2.884 0.888 0.889 0.955 
Moral Reasoning - Deontological 7.600 2.083 0.849 0.851 0.931 
Moral Reasoning - Utilitarian 7.670 1.898 0.871 0.871 0.940 
Moral Reasoning - Relativism 7.332 4.421 0.835 0.835 0.923 
Moral Reasoning - Egoism 6.857 1.652 0.011 0.011 0.444 
Moral Reasoning - Justice 4.230 2.057 0.920 0.920 0.962 
Ethical Behavior Intent 7.976 2.216 0.934 0.934 0.968 
For the purposes of this study, a reliability of 0.8 is deemed sufficient given that all 
measures considered above have undergone significant measurement development, and have 
achieved similar reliabilities in other studies. Table 5 outlines the construct reliabilities (along 
with the means and standard deviations of composite scores) of all major latent constructs for the 
current study. All latent construct measures, with two exceptions, surpass the 0.8 alpha standard 
set forth. On average, the latent constructs associated with situational moral reasoning are slightly 
lower than other constructs since these constructs only consist of two measurement items. 
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Based on this calculation, the Cronbach’s alpha for the DIT2 instrument in this study is 
very low (α = 0.38, n = 321), which is considerably lower than demonstrated reliabilities for the 
DIT (0.78 < α < 0.82) (Rest et al. 1999) and much lower for the DIT instrument in similar studies 
(α = 0.81, n = 192) (Bebeau and Thoma 2003; Rest et al. 1999). The reliability is negatively 
affected by the homogeneity of the sample, since the sample did not consist of the entire range of 
age and education groups (junior high through graduate students). However, similar studies report 
that the absence of such age and education groups, the loss in reliability only accounts for a 0.1 
decrease. Furthermore, other studies have evaluated the difference between online and 
pen-and-paper versions of the DIT2 instrument concluding that there is no loss of reliability or 
validity based on delivery mode (Xu et al. 2007). The administrators of the DIT2 at the Center for 
the Study of Ethical Development cautioned that the N2 scores were quite low for the age and 
education levels of the sample demographic; and furthermore, that these low N2 scores may be 
attributed to measurement error and poor implementation. However, the implementation of the 
instrument online was double-checked against a sanctioned online version from which it was 
drawn verbatim, and further double-checked during the analysis of the pilot study. In addition, 
several colleagues reviewed the consistency between online versions prior to the final data 
collection. 
The dismal reliability of the egoism construct is unsettling (α = 0.011, n = 321). 
Measurement pretests in the pilot study revealed similarly low reliabilities for this latent 
construct. Despite improvements to the measurement items to improve reliability, such as 
wording improvements and non-reversed coded items, reliability did not improve. This suggests 
that either (a) the egoism construct is unintelligible in the current context or in light of these 
particular scenarios (an assessment of egoism reliability within scenarios revealed low but 
different reliabilities for each scenario), (b) the egoism construct represents facets of two other 
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constructs given that the two items are essentially uncorrelated, or (c) respondents did not 
differentiate between the egoism and other constructs in the instrument. In either case, all results 
from the egoism construct ought to be considered highly suspect.  
Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
Convergent validity occurs when reflective items within the same construct are highly 
correlated in the presence of other reflective items from other constructs (Campbell and Fiske 
1959). Discriminant validity is the compliment of convergent validity, and ensures that if 
measurement items from other latent constructs are included in another latent construct that those 
measurement items do not move in the same direction, or do not highly correlate (Campbell and 
Fiske 1959). Convergent and discriminant validity differs from reliability insofar as reliability is 
concerned with internal consistency between items within construct whereas convergent validity 
is concerned with internal consistency between constructs. Convergent/discriminant validity is 
assessed in several ways. Assessing convergent validity through factor analysis can be 
accomplished by ensuring the factory loadings of construct items are loaded on the same factor, 
and not cross-loaded with other factors. Recommendations for assessing factor analysis differ 
substantially. Shorthand cut-offs consider factor loadings of 0.5 or great sufficient, whereas cross-
loadings of 0.3 or more are troublesome. Alternatively, convergent validity can be assessed by 
comparing the relative different of factor loadings on cross-loadings, where the different of factor 
loadings for construct items should be at least 0.3 greater than the cross-loadings of the same 
item on other factors. 
In PLS structural modeling, convergent and discriminant validity is assessed in two ways. 
First, convergent and discriminant validity is assessed by comparing the loading of measurement 
items assigned to a latent construct to the loadings of all other measurement items on that 
construct (Gefen and Straub 2005; Gefen et al. 2000). If the loadings of measurement items for 
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the assigned latent construct are greater than one order of magnitude than the loadings of other 
constructs. This is essentially the same as assessing the convergent and discriminant validity in 
factor analysis using other modeling techniques. Investigating the cross-loadings between 
measurement items and latent constructs in Table 6, we find that the factor loadings of assigned 
measurement items satisfy standards for convergent validity using PLS, specifically the factor 
loadings are all at least one order of magnitude larger than other cross-loadings. Some 
measurement items cross-loadings are quite high (greater than 0.7), which is evident between 
situational moral reasoning constructs, particularly deontological and justice. 
Second, discriminant validity is assessed by comparing the square roots of average 
variance extracted (SAVE) of each construct with the correlations between the construct and all 
other constructs in the model. Discriminant validity is confirmed when all SAVEs (shown in the 
diagonal) are greater than the values of the correlations between the construct and all other 
constructs (Chin 1998; Chin et al. 2003). A more stringent test of discriminant validity is to 
compare the cross-correlations between constructs with the AVE instead of the SAVE (Gefen et 
al. 2000). The Pearson correlation matrix in Table 7 reveals significant cross-correlations between 
ethical decision-making constructs such as moral recognition, attitude, situational judgments, and 
ethical behavior intention. However, since the SAVE along the diagonal is larger than any of the 
cross-correlations between the latent construct and any other construct, the measurement model 




Table 6. Measurement indicators, cross-loadings for convergent and discriminant validity 
Measurement Items Cross-Loadings for Convergent/Discriminant Validity 
Indicator MA MR SMRD SMRU SMRR SMRE SMRJ BI 
MA_01 0.918 0.309 0.533 0.608 0.539 0.396 0.530 0.517 
MA_02 0.878 0.247 0.494 0.532 0.502 0.399 0.519 0.405 
MA_03 0.916 0.281 0.521 0.619 0.534 0.405 0.561 0.474 
MR_01 0.244 0.914 0.214 0.283 0.300 0.122 0.211 0.347 
MR_02 0.259 0.916 0.245 0.294 0.322 0.160 0.249 0.358 
MR_03 0.329 0.929 0.286 0.376 0.368 0.161 0.293 0.425 
MR_04 0.297 0.913 0.278 0.319 0.352 0.153 0.272 0.378 
SMR_01 0.546 0.240 0.930 0.635 0.661 0.641 0.746 0.489 
SMR_02 0.521 0.285 0.936 0.636 0.677 0.663 0.774 0.490 
SMR_03 0.627 0.317 0.670 0.942 0.719 0.501 0.682 0.608 
SMR_04 0.599 0.342 0.612 0.940 0.708 0.466 0.649 0.582 
SMR_05 0.487 0.292 0.626 0.649 0.907 0.537 0.642 0.514 
SMR_06 0.580 0.380 0.696 0.746 0.944 0.555 0.699 0.649 
SMR_07 0.444 0.168 0.701 0.523 0.592 0.994 0.715 0.386 
SMR_08 -0.001 0.033 -0.023 0.063 -0.006 -0.101 0.045 -0.063 
SMR_09 0.573 0.256 0.786 0.669 0.686 0.683 0.960 0.501 
SMR_10 0.569 0.287 0.782 0.691 0.712 0.677 0.965 0.525 
BI_01 0.515 0.396 0.504 0.624 0.627 0.380 0.513 0.970 
BI_02 0.490 0.405 0.513 0.600 0.603 0.378 0.520 0.967 
Table 7. Pearson correlation matrix with SAVE to assess convergent and discriminant validity 
Pearson Correlation Matrix with Cronbach's Alpha and Composite Reliability 
Construct  α CR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
MA 1 0.89 0.93 0.90         
MR 2 0.84 0.96 0.32 0.92        
SMRD 3 0.87 0.93 0.57 0.31 0.93       
SMRU 4 0.89 0.94 0.65 0.37 0.68 0.94      
SMRR 5 0.87 0.92 0.58 0.39 0.72 0.78 0.93     
SMRE 6 0.50 0.44 0.30 0.14 0.45 0.36 0.39 0.71    
SMRJ 7 0.93 0.96 0.59 0.30 0.82 0.71 0.73 0.51 0.96   
BI 8 0.94 0.97 0.52 0.44 0.53 0.63 0.63 0.21 0.53 0.97  
N2SCORE 9 n/a n/a -0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 1.00 
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Sample Issues and Control Variables 
 In order to determine whether there are any systematic confounding effects of control 
variables that underscores a difference within the sample between a set of demographics, a series 
of analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedures were performed using the primary dependent 
variable: ethical IT behavior intention. The demographics for the sample used as control variables 
in this analysis include: gender, age, education, number of IT courses, programming experience 
and employment status (see Table 8 for distribution). Despite the skewed distribution in some 
instances (such as age, education, and the number of IT courses), the ANOVA results should no 
significant differences between the demographic groups listed in Table 8. 
Table 8. Sample demographics 
Demographic Category Frequency (n) Percentage 
Gender Male 117 36.4% 
 Female 204 63.6% 
Age 18-25 173 53.9% 
 26-35 79 24.6% 
 36-45 39 12.1% 
 46-55 21 6.5% 
 55+ 9 2.8% 
Education High School 5 1.6% 
 Some College 172 53.6% 
 Bachelors' 77 24.0% 
 Master's 58 18.1% 
 Doctorate 9 2.8% 
IT Courses 1-2 206 64.2% 
 3-5 65 20.2% 
 6-10 15 4.7% 
 10 or more 17 5.3% 
 None 18 5.6% 
Programming Experience Much experience 42 13.1% 
 Experienced 132 41.1% 
 Some experience 116 36.1% 
 Little experience 28 8.7% 
 No experience 3 0.9% 
Employment Status Full-time employee 63 19.6% 
 Part-time employee 50 15.6% 
 Self-employed 7 2.2% 
 Student 196 61.1% 




Hypothesis H1 states that dispositional moral reasoning (or cognitive moral development 
as measured through the DIT2 N2-score) will be positively associated with ethical behavior 
intention. N2-score represents the propensity of individuals to favor post-conventional moral 
reasoning over pre-conventional, or personal intent, moral reasoning. Based on Table 9, we find a 
negative but insignificant association (β = −0.025, p < 0.463) of the N2 score with ethical 
behavior intention, therefore rejecting H1. The other calculated scores associated with the DIT2 
are also included in Table 9, but corroborate the insignificant effects of dispositional moral 
reasoning on ethical IT behavior intention. 
Table 9. Effects of dispositional moral reasoning scores on ethical behavior intention 
Path β T-Stat P-Value 1 
n/a Stage 2/3 Ethical Behavior Intent -0.048 1.233 0.218  
n/a Stage 4 Ethical Behavior Intent -0.050 1.303 0.193  
n/a P-Score Ethical Behavior Intent -0.001 0.027 0.978  
H1 N2-Score Ethical Behavior Intent -0.025 0.735 0.463  
(1) * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Hypotheses H2 through H5 states that dispositional moral reasoning also influences 
ethical behavior intention indirectly through situational moral judgments (deontological, 
utilitarian, etc.), or our disposition toward a schema of moral reasoning drives out situational 
application of moral reasoning. Based on Table 9 and Figure 9, dispositional moral judgments 
have no significant effect on any form of situational moral reasoning. Therefore, hypothesis H2 
through H5 is unsupported. 
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Table 10. Effects of dispositional moral reasoning scores on situational moral reasoning 
Path β T-Stat P-Value 
H2 N2-Score Deontological -0.026 0.781 0.435  
H3 N2-Score Utilitarian 0.008 0.259 0.796  
H4 N2-Score Relativist 0.010 0.316 0.752  
H5 N2-Score Egoism -0.017 0.486 0.627  
H6 N2-Score Justice -0.007 0.209 0.835  
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Hypotheses H7 through H12 concern the relative effects of moral recognition on the rest 
of the ethical decision-making model, specifically moral attitudes and situational moral reasoning 
(see Table 11). H7 states that higher levels of moral recognition will be related to higher levels of 
moral attitudes, which is strongly supported by the structural analysis (β = 0.311, p < 0.000). H8 
states that higher levels of moral recognition will be associated with higher levels of 
deontological situational judgments, which shows significant evidence of a strong effect (β = 
0.282, p < 0.000). Similarly, H9 states that higher levels of moral recognition will be associated 
with higher levels of utilitarian situational judgments, with substantial evidence support a strong 
effect on utilitarian moral judgments (β = 0.350, p < 0.000). H10 similarly states that higher 
levels moral recognition will be associated with higher levels of relativist situational judgments, 
showing again substantial evidence of a strong effect (β = 0.368, p < 0.000). Hypothesis H11, on 
the other hand, states that higher levels of moral recognition will be related to lower levels of 
egoist moral judgments, or moral recognition on egoism will be negatively associated. Although 
the effects of recognition on egoism are indeed a strongly supported relationship (β = 0.164, p < 
0.000); however, H11 must be rejected since the relationship between moral recognition on 
egoism and relativism is positively correlated, not negatively correlated as expected. H12 is 
strongly supported for the effects of moral recognition on justice situational moral reasoning (β = 
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0.282, p < 0.000). Overall, the effects of moral recognition are significant and broadly well 
supported on various dimensions of situational moral reasoning. 
Table 11. Effects of moral recognition on attitude and situational moral reasoning 
Path β T-Stat P-Value 
H7 Recognition Attitude 0.311 9.209 0.000 *** 
H8 Recognition Deontological 0.282 8.303 0.000 *** 
H9 Recognition Utilitarian 0.350 10.499 0.000 *** 
H10 Recognition Relativist 0.368 11.185 0.000 *** 
H11 Recognition Egoism 0.164 4.835 0.000  
H12 Recognition Justice 0.282 8.480 0.000 *** 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Hypothesis H13 states that high levels of moral attitudes (impressions of an action being 
“bad” or “hurtful”) will be positively associated with ethical behavior intention (refer to Table 12 
and Figure 10). The effect of moral attitude on ethical behavior intention is moderately strong (β 
= 0.311) and well supported by the model (p < 0.000). These results are unsurprising as they are 
well established in recent IT ethics literature (Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard and Cronan 
2001; Leonard et al. 2004). 
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Table 12. Effects of moral attitude, situational moral reasoning on behavior intention 
Path β T-Stat P-Value 
H13 Attitude Ethical Behavior Intent 0.133 4.259 0.000 *** 
H14 Deontological Ethical Behavior Intent 0.041 0.753 0.452  
H15 Utilitarian Ethical Behavior Intent 0.272 5.824 0.000 *** 
H16 Relativist Ethical Behavior Intent 0.340 6.853 0.000 *** 
H17 Egoism Ethical Behavior Intent -0.046 1.169 0.243  
H18 Justice Ethical Behavior Intent 0.015 0.301 0.763  
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Hypotheses H14 through H18 concern the effects of situational moral reasoning on 
ethical behavior intention. Since, in the current model, the scenarios are combined into a single 
model, we are presently unable to ascertain precisely which ethical philosophy is being employed 
as the primary mode of moral reasoning. However, this model provides the most generalized view 
of ethical philosophies commonly applied across multiple ethical IT dilemmas. In other words, 
well supported situational moral reasoning constructs are employed by people across a wide 
range of scenarios, whereas unsupported situational moral reasoning effects suggest that these 
ethical philosophies are selectively applied to a handful of ethical IT dilemmas. Hypothesis H14 
states that deontological moral judgments will increase ethical IT behavior intentions. Based on 
the Table 12, H14 is unsupported as there is no evidence of an effect of deontological moral 
judgments on ethical IT intentions. Hypothesis H15 states that utilitarian moral judgments will 
have a positive effect on ethical IT behavior intention, and the results show substantial evidence 
supporting this hypothesis (β = 0.272, p < 0.000). Hypothesis H16 states that relativistic moral 
judgments will have a positive effect on ethical IT behavior intention, and the results show 
substantial evidence supporting this hypothesis (β = 0.340, p < 0.000). Hypothesis H17 states 
that the egoist will have negative effect on ethical IT behavior intention. Given that the effects of 
egoist moral judgments are weak and non-significant (β = −0.046, p < 0. 243), H17 is therefore 
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unsupported. Finally, hypothesis H18 suggests that justice moral judgments will increase ethical 
IT intentions, which the results suggest is unsupported as there is no evidence of this effect (β = 








Figure 10. Effects of moral attitude, dispositional and situational moral judgments on ethical behavior 
intention 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The highly unexpected rejection of H1 has many potential implications, but some 
plausible explanations. First, the rejection of H1 would suggest that within the context of ethical 
IT decision-making, dispositional moral reasoning and cognitive moral development have little or 
no effect on the ethical intentions (and by extension behaviors) of individuals when faced with 
ethical IT dilemmas. This implication would highly support either (a) information technology is a 
unique domain that current theories of moral development are unable to account for at the 
individual level, or (b) the significant variation in the character of the ethical IT dilemmas in 
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terms of moral recognition, attitude, intensity, etc. clouds a situational or contextual relationship 
between cognitive moral development and ethical behavior intentions. The first consideration 
cannot be addressed until specific dimensions of the technology itself are taking into account in 
the third study. The second consideration as to be addressed in the second study, on the other 
hand, may be entertained at this point. By creating a set of scenarios that engender a broad range 
of moral judgments, attitudes and intentions, the survey experiment creates a large variation of 
ethical behavior intentions by cognitive moral development is compared. Without isolating the 
situational and contextual effects of the ethical IT dilemma, the effects of cognitive moral 
development on ethical behavior intention cannot be fully ascertained. In other words, cognitive 
moral development only becomes salient as a predictor of ethical IT intention and behavior under 
particular situations and contexts, and those situations and contexts are framed and filtered 
through internal, implicit heuristics. As conjectured in the following study, the domain theory of 
moral development (Gattiker and Kelley 1999a; Glassman and Zan 1995; Turiel 1983; Turiel et 
al. 1987) informs the development and application of such moral heuristics, and how the effects 
of cognitive moral development on ethical decision-making is highly situational and contextual. 
The negligible and insignificant effects of dispositional moral judgments on situational 
moral judgments are also surprising and unexpected; however, several explanations are 
applicable. First, the significant variation of moral character and intensity of the scenarios 
contribute to the volatility of situational moral judgments used. This volatility in situational moral 
judgments not only affects the relationships between individual moral judgments (deontological, 
utilitarian, etc.) but also the effects of dispositional moral judgments on situational moral 
judgments, as only a few moral judgments (relativist and utilitarian) are salient across all 
scenarios and all moral judgments have significant variance when all scenarios are considers. 
Second, moral attitude, moral judgments, moral intensity and other measures of situational moral 
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reasoning (including the MES) are likely not only to vary between people, but vary significantly 
for individual people between times and contexts (Robin et al. 1996).Nevertheless, these results 
taken together imply that dispositional moral judgments do not direct our situational moral 
judgments consistently across ethical IT dilemmas. This implication is inconsistent with previous 
models on situational factors in ethical decision-making, specifically the person-situation 
interactionist model (Trevino 1986). However, this does not imply there are no dispositional 
effects on situational moral judgments, especially in light of the unexpectedly low reliability of 
the N2 score. Instead, the scenario may engender particular situational moral judgments 
consistent with an individual’s dispositional moral reasoning. 
The unexpected effect of egoism is likely related to the poor reliability of the 
measurement items on the latent construct, whereas the significance of the effects attributed to the 
considerable sample size. The results for the effects on relativism is surprising, but may be 
explained by moral consistency and social desirability. Moral consistency is the concept that 
people maintain consistency moral thought, feeling, and action across a variety of different 
scenarios, and those people with higher levels of cognitive moral development actually have 
lower moral consistencies, and vice versa. A person’s relativism score will only likely deviate 
from other forms of situational moral reasoning, particularly deontological and utilitarian, only in 
instances of low moral consistency, which in turn is often associated with higher levels of moral 
reasoning. Another explanation may be social desirability is that in light of potentially negative 
personal responses, individuals will favorably bias their response in contrast to realities as a form 
of impression management. Therefore, the high correlation of moral recognition and other 
situational moral reasoning with relativism items such as “individually acceptable/not acceptable” 
may be an attempt to appear more ethical (or ethically consistent), as opposed to showing an 
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earnest moral inconsistency (e.g. “piracy is morally wrong, but I find it individually acceptable 
due to the benefits gained”). 
Overall, the findings indicate that individual dispositions towards general moral attitudes 
and behaviors are not predictive of particular ethical attitudes and behaviors across a broad array 
of ethical IT dilemmas. Furthermore, some authors have similarly confirmed that cognitive moral 
development (or dispositional moral judgments) is not as strongly predictive of ethical attitudes 
and behaviors as the ethical perspectives employed through the MES-10 or variants (or situational 
moral judgments) (Flory et al. 1993a; Flory et al. 1993b). In addition, only utilitarian and 
relativist situational moral judgments are predictive of ethical behavior. While these results are 
unexpected, they are not necessarily inconsistent with ethical theory. Utilitarian moral judgments 
are consequentialist by nature, and even though it is difficult to universally determine the amount 
of “utility” gain (or lost) by a particular moral action, one can readily apply utilitarian judgments 




DOMAIN THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
The findings of the first study suggest that when situational moral judgments are 
considered along-side individual, dispositional moral judgments, i.e. cognitive moral 
development, the situational overshadows any effects of an individual’s specific morality. 
However, although situational factors relating to ethical decision-making appear dominant, 
personal development may mold our perspectives of ethical behaviors, resulting in varied 
response to different ethical dilemmas. In other words, it is proposed that, based on an person-
situation interactionist model (Trevino 1986), the situation is not an entirely dominant and 
pervasive force in defining ethical IT decision-making and behavior; however, represents an 
critical lens through-which personal dispositional judgments are transformed into moral actions.  
Different types of ethical reasoning are incompatible since people unable to employ 
multiple, conflicting rationales in creating moral judgments (Gilligan 1982; Gilligan 1987; 
Kohlberg 1984). The conflict between ethical reasoning in the formation of moral judgments 
creates limited potential alternatives for moral judgment and action. This limitation, coupled with 
the complex milieu of rationales (Reidenbach and Robin 1988; Reidenbach and Robin 1990), 
factors (Ross and Robertson 2003), and referent groups (Victor and Cullen 1987; Victor and 
Cullen 1988), impels people to create heuristics for ethical decision-making, and hence the 
necessity of moral domain theory. Scenarios create situational influence on the moral reasoning 
and judgments of individuals making ethical IT decisions, and the sheer multitude of situational 
factors that influence ethical decision-making is staggering (Jones 1991; Ross and Robertson 
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2003). This situational multitude requires that individuals develop schema and heuristics to 
address moral and ethical problems. However, solid theoretical explanations on how we organize 
moral thought in light of these situational influences are few and far between (Ford and 
Richardson 1994; Trevino et al. 2006). One explanation of the contextuality and situationality of 
IT ethics lies in the domain theory of moral development (DTMD) (Turiel 1983; Turiel et al. 
1987), which theorizes that the manner that social domains of behavior and ethical attitudes 
develop in children and adolescence. Children and adolescents classify ethical dilemmas into 
different moral domains based on their behaviors in moral domains and the social consequences 
that result from those behaviors (Turiel 1983; Turiel et al. 1987). The classification developed by 
moral behaviors and resulting consequences establishes the manner and degree of moral 
development of people in adulthood. 
Domains of morality are categorizations of ethical decision-making patterns and 
heuristics, where a person develops standardized models or schema of reasoning for particular 
classes of ethical problems (Gattiker and Kelley 1999a; Turiel 1983; Turiel et al. 1987). When 
confronted with a moral problem people attribute particular domains of morality, and therefore 
particular moral reasoning patterns, to specific situations. Therefore, while the situation itself can 
be a significant driver of different moral judgments of IT scenarios, as developmental factors 
construct domains of morality these same developmental factors can have a strong influence on 
ethical IT decision making. Therefore, the second study will address the following question: Does 
the attribution of different domains of morality to an ethical dilemma influence the manner people 
make ethical decisions involving information technology? 
In order to address this research question, we first explore the underlying theory to the 
domain theory of moral development, and how it relates to ethical IT decision-making. Scenarios 
are developed create situational responses eliciting varying moral domains, and therefore, varying 
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ethical decision-making heuristics. In response to these domain-specific scenarios, this study is 
expected to expose not only different moral responses to ethical dilemmas, but fundamentally 
different thought processes when considering moral problems. 
Literature Review 
The moral judgments of people are shaped early on through the realization of social 
consequences from particular activities—through consequences people learn how to identify 
“right” and “wrong” behaviors, and therefore, make moral judgments as to whether such 
behaviors are indeed “right” and “wrong.” Throughout our development as a child, student, and 
even professional, we are exposed to ethical dilemmas, decisions, behaviors, and the social 
consequences of those decisions and behaviors within the context of the dilemma. The social 
consequences of our decisions and behaviors either reward or sanction our behavior, influencing 
our future behaviors and ultimately how we construct our system of ethics and decision-making 
behavior. 
The basis of the DTMD is developmental as it informs researchers as to how moral 
reasoning and particular moral judgments are created and reinforced through the development of 
children into adolescence and adulthood (Glassman and Zan 1995; Turiel 1983; Turiel et al. 
1987). Therefore, one may conclude that people establish different patterns of moral judgments 
regarding ethical dilemma, resulting in a fundamental reflection of a person’s moral reasoning 
and development. Over time each domain of morality becomes associated with a set of moral 
judgments and behaviors. Since a person has organized a wide array of ethical issues into 
different moral domains by adulthood, one can expect significantly different moral judgments 




DTMD states that people attribute an ethical dilemma to different domains of morality, 
which correspond to different sets of moral reasoning depending on the context and perceived 
consequences of the behavior. The DTMD proposes that people organize ethical dilemmas into 
three moral domains: (1) personal, (2) conventional, and (3) principled. The personal domain 
encompasses moral behavior that is primarily of individual concern. In other words, ethical 
dilemmas in the personal domain are a function of personal tastes, preferences and/or the 
psychological state of the individual. Behaviors classified in the personal domain do not bear 
consequences or sanctions in social contexts, hence the emphasis on an individual's personal 
tastes and preferences. In addition, consequences to others, the group or society are irrelevant 
since the outcome of that behavior does not have any social consequences and are not 
intrinsically harmful to the individual or to others. An example of an ethical dilemma in the 
personal domain is as follows: 
One of your friends is a technical whiz and has just developed a new data 
encryption device (i.e. similar to a phone scrambler, as the device helps to protect 
conversations from wiretapping) and related software. You friend quickly 
demonstrates how the device works by sending an encrypted message to you. 
You subsequent decoding efforts fail, illustrating that the encryption device does 
its job very well. You and your friend then proceed to install this device and 
software on both of your machines for use when communicating with each other 
(Gattiker and Kelley 1999a). 
The conventional domain includes behaviors that are not considered intrinsically harmful 
by the individual or society but carry social consequences. These behaviors are considered ethical 
or unethical depending on the social context of the behavior; therefore, due to their socially 
dependent nature these behaviors are not universally accepted among people. Such actions are 
what would often be considered “taboo” in a social context by one group and not 
another. Behaviors in the conventional domain reflect social norms and values are established 
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over time through consensus between individuals participating in the social context. An example 
of an ethical dilemma in the conventional domain is as follows: 
One of your friends is a real computer nut and has just written a new computer 
virus program. Your friend then proceeds to load the virus program into a BB or 
an electronic new-latter/listerver (EDL) (Gattiker and Kelley 1999a).14 
Many behaviors of employees within organizations would appear predominately 
attributed to the conventional domain, reflecting the norms and values consistent with the 
organizational culture. Alternatively, the conventional domain may reflect norms and values 
spanning multiple organizations, but relegated to a single professional sub-group, such as 
accountants or IT professionals. 
Finally, the principled domain includes behaviors that are considered intrinsically 
harmful, either perceived directly by the individual or inferred from direct perceptions (Turiel 
1983). The behavior is universally considered unethical since harm is an inherent consequence of 
the action (Haidt et al. 1993). Such behaviors are not simply a matter of personal taste or 
normative for a specific group as they have social consequences outside the individual or group. 
Consequences of unethical behaviors perceived in the principled domain are universally 
considered harmful to other individuals15; therefore, behaviors perceived within the moral domain 
are not dependent on social norms and values. An example of an ethical dilemma in the moral 
domain is as follows: 
Your friend has just received a new computer game through an EGL located 
abroad. The game is banned in this country because of its violent, sexual, and 
racist content. Your friend tests the game. Although he or she finds it somewhat 
                                                 
14 One must note the previous issue of a prior attribution, as the results of Gattiker and Kelley (1999) would 
suggest that this scenario, attributed to the conventional domain, would be more appropriately attributed to 
the forthcoming moral do main. 
15 Actions considered universally moral for the most part. Many relativist and skeptical moral philosophers, 
such as Fredrich Nietzsche (1966), would vehemently disagree that any action, even those cause undue 
harm, are intrinsically and universally wrong. 
 
93 
disgusting, your friends sends a copy to another friend abroad, where no 
regulation exists banning the game. Your friend does not keep a copy of the 
game (Gattiker and Kelley 1999a). 
Research Design and Hypothesis Development 
Turiel’s domain theory of moral development (Turiel 1983; Turiel et al. 1987) may be 
assess through a person-situation interactionist  perspective (Trevino 1986), where the 
individual’s cognitive development interacts with situational components, such as perceived 
consequences, relevant referent groups, or organizations environments. Essentially, a person’s 
cognitive moral development only accounts for a portion of the variations in moral reasoning, and 
may be drawn towards more ethical or unethical behaviors given the situation and context. 
Domain theory of moral development extends the theoretical explanation by framing moral 
development within a situational system of behaviors and consequences. Moral domain 
attribution frames the ethical dilemma, having situational and contextual factors, may cause moral 
judgments and behaviors to deviate significantly from ethical decision-making heuristics 
consistent with cognitive moral development. The situational moral reasoning espoused by the 
individual when faced with a particular ethical dilemma may depart significantly from their 
present level of cognitive moral development depending on which domain of morality the 
individual attributes the ethical dilemma. However, results from the previous study showed no 
evidence of an association between levels of cognitive moral development and ethical behavior 
intention when situational moral judgments were also considered. Therefore, cognitive moral 
development may not be a suitable manner to assess how moral reasoning changes in based upon 
either the situation or domain attribution. 
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Table 13. Proposed associations between domains of morality, dispositional and situational moral 
reasoning 
Domains of Morality 
Dispositional Moral Reasoning 
(Cognitive Moral Development) 
Situational 
Moral Reasoning 
 Moral Reasoning Stages Moral Reasoning Schema  
Personal Pre-conventional Personal Intent Egoist 
Conventional Conventional Maintaining Norms Utilitarian, Relativist 
Principled Post-Conventional Post-conventional Deontological, Justice 
The ethical dilemma scenarios are filtered by the domain of morality attributed by the 
individual upon reading and interpreting the scenario and its context. This interpretation elicits 
moral judgments and attitudes towards the ethical behavior consistent with the domain of 
morality attributed. Essentially, the domain of morality becomes a sufficiently strong predictor of 
an individual's moral judgments and attitudes towards an ethical IT behavior. Furthermore, a 
person may use different decision-making models for ethical IT dilemmas depending on initial 
perceptions of the context and consequences of potential actions. This study proposes that 
different attributions of domains of morality result in not only markedly different ethical IT 
behaviors, but also in different ethical decision-making models. Different ethical decision-making 
models have been assessed and compared in other studies within an information systems context. 
The present study, however, does not refute the findings of other IT decision-making 
studies on the basis of insufficient power (Banerjee et al. 1998; Leonard and Cronan 2001; 
Leonard et al. 2004), but theoretically on the basis that the domain of morality may invoke 
stronger (or weaker) moral recognition, attitudes and judgments mediating the effects of the 
situation. More specifically, ethical IT dilemmas attributed to the personal or conventional 
domains will be insufficient to elicit moral recognition, attitudes, and judgments strong enough to 
predict ethical IT behavior intention. However, ethical IT dilemmas attributed to the moral 
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domain will generate stronger moral recognition, attitudes and judgments sufficient to predict 
moral intent and ethical IT behavior. 
 
Figure 11. Research model for the effects of moral domain attribution on ethical decision-making 
Personal Domain 
The personal domain, which is based in individual preferences and limited consequences, 
corresponds with markedly different effects on ethical IT decision-making. Consistent with 
previous work combining ethical decision-making and domain theory (Gattiker and Kelley 
1999a), the importance of ethical dilemmas attributed to this domain are expected to decrease 
substantially (lower moral recognition), along with evaluations of the situation as “bad” or 
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“harmful” (lower moral attitudes), since the consequences of these behaviors do to not result in 
consequences are harmful socially or to others. In addition to decreases in the level of moral 
recognition and moral attitudes in the personal domain, it is also hypothesized that people will 
employ different ethical decision-making models, where the effects of moral recognition and 
attitude become non-significant or significantly decrease when compared with all scenarios 
considered. Therefore, the following effects of personal domain attribution on ethical 
decision-making are hypothesized: 
H19 Personal domain attribution will decrease levels of moral recognition. 
H20 Personal domain attribution will decrease the effects of moral 
recognition on ethical IT behavior intention. 
H21 Personal domain attribution will decrease levels of moral attitudes. 
H22 Personal domain attribution will decrease the effect of moral attitudes on 
ethical IT behavior intention. 
Situational moral reasoning should also change substantively in the personal domain; 
however, since no research has investigated the interaction between DTMD and situational moral 
reasoning we must develop hypotheses based upon conceptions of moral reasoning types and 
moral domain definitions.  As personal domain attribution is focused on an individual locus of 
analysis, moral judgments that conclude a particular behavior as intrinsically harmful to others 
(deontological and justice judgments) and that are rooted in social- or context-dependent 
considerations (utilitarian and relativist judgments) ought to have less influence on ethical IT 
behaviors (Reidenbach and Robin 1988; Reidenbach and Robin 1990; Robin et al. 1996). Egoist 
moral judgments, on the other hand, correspond with behaviors that are motivated by individual 
preferences and gain, and therefore should become more salient in the personal domain compared 
with others. Similar to ethical decision-making constructs, it is hypothesized that as levels of 
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situational moral reasoning increase and decrease due to domain attribution, so does the salience 
of these judgments in ethical decision-making, ultimately decreasing (for deontological, justice, 
utilitarian, and relativist judgments) and increase (for egoist judgments) the effects on ethical 
behavior intention. Therefore, the following is hypothesized: 
H23 Personal domain attribution will decrease levels of deontological moral 
judgments. 
H24 Personal domain attribution will decrease the effect of deontological 
moral judgments on ethical IT intention. 
H25 Personal domain attribution will decrease levels of utilitarian moral 
judgments. 
H26 Personal domain attribution will decrease the effect of utilitarian moral 
judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 
H27 Personal domain attribution will decrease levels of relativist moral 
judgments. 
H28 Personal domain attribution will decrease the effect of relativist moral 
judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 
H29 Personal domain attribution will increase levels of egoist moral 
judgments. 
H30 Personal domain attribution will increase the effect of egoist moral 
judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 
H31 Personal domain attribution will decrease levels of justice moral 
judgments. 
H32 Personal domain attribution will decrease the effect of justice moral 
judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 
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Table 14. Hypothesized effects of domain attribution on levels and effects of EDM constructs 
Construct / Domain Personal Conventional Principled 
Moral Recognition Decrease (H19 & H20) No Effect (H33 & H34) Increase (H47 & H48) 
Moral Attitude Decrease (H21 & H22) No Effect (H35 & H36) Increase (H49 & H50) 
Moral Judgments 
(Dispositional) 
Decrease No Effect Increase 
Moral Judgments (Situational)    
Deontological Decrease (H23 & H24) Decrease (H37 & H38) Increase (H51 & H52) 
Utilitarian Decrease (H25 & H26) Increase (H39 & H40) No Effect (H53 & H54) 
Relativist Decrease (H27 & H28) Increase (H41 & H42) No Effect (H55 & H6) 
Egoist Increase (H29 & H30) No Effect (H43 & H44) Decrease (H57 & H58) 
Justice Decrease (H31 & H32) Decrease (H45 & H46) Increase (H59 & H60 
Conventional Domain 
The conventional domain, on the other hand, is somewhat more complex. Since the 
conventional domain is associated with moral judgments and consequences rooted in a social 
context, a marked increase in corresponding unethical perceptions and ethical decision-making 
constructs is expected. Similar to the attribution of the personal domain having effects on levels 
of key ethical decision-making constructs and their respective relationships with dependent 
variables, particularly ethical behavior intention, we continue the trend investigating the effects of 
conventional domain attribution. In the conventional domain, moral attitudes, judgments and 
behaviors are driven by an expectation of social consequences from defined referent groups, 
neither considered matters of individual taste (personal domain) or broad condemnation 
(principled domain). The importance of a situation (moral recognition) along with the manner that 
we evaluate the behavior’s moral character (moral attitude) may vary from organizational context 
to context as group norms and authorities change. However, since conventional domain 
attribution is compared to a decision-making model combining a plethora of ethical issues and 
corresponding contexts, it is expected that the influence of social context will be similarly 
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important to the “base model” and thusly show no significant differences in terms of moral 
recognition and attitudes. Therefore, the following results are hypothesized: 
H33 Conventional domain attribution will have no influence on levels of 
moral recognition. 
H34 Conventional domain attribution will have no influence on the effects of 
moral recognition on ethical IT behavior intention. 
H35 Conventional domain attribution will decrease levels of moral attitudes.  
H36 Conventional domain attribution will have no influence on the effect of 
moral attitudes on ethical IT behavior intention. 
Due to the socially dependent nature of ethical dilemmas attributed to the conventional 
domain, it is theorized that individuals draw from different moral reasoning, as conceived through 
situational moral judgments, in order to address ethical dilemmas. Socially- and 
context-dependent judgments (particularly utilitarian and relativist) become the dominant lines of 
reasoning (Reidenbach and Robin 1988; Reidenbach and Robin 1990; Robin et al. 1996). Other 
forms of moral reasoning (deontological, egoist, and justice) may vary from social context to 
context, but the manner a respondent’s social context influence ethical decision-making is beyond 
the scope of this study. Deontological and justice judgments are expected to decrease in 
magnitude and effect on ethical IT behavior intention, since each concern broad, principled 
stances on moral issues. Finally, egoist judgments are expected remain unchanged, both in 
magnitude and effect, since moral attitude in the conventional domain are often driven by self-
preservation and social maintenance within a referent group in avoidance of social consequences; 




H37 Conventional domain attribution will decrease levels of deontological 
moral judgments. 
H38 Conventional domain attribution will decrease the effect of deontological 
moral judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 
H39 Conventional domain attribution will increase levels of utilitarian moral 
judgments. 
H40 Conventional domain attribution will increase the effect of utilitarian 
moral judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 
H41 Conventional domain attribution will increase levels of relativist moral 
judgments. 
H42 Conventional domain attribution will increase the effect of relativist 
moral judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 
H43 Conventional domain attribution will have no influence on levels of 
egoist moral judgments. 
H44 Conventional domain attribution will have no influence on the effect of 
egoist moral judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 
H45 Conventional domain attribution will decrease levels of justice moral 
judgments. 
H46 Conventional domain attribution will decrease the effect of justice moral 
judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 
Principled Domain 
Finally, we must consider the effects of principled domain attribution on levels of key 
ethical decision-making constructs and their respective relationships with dependent variables. 
Since the principled domain is based on broadly acceptable ethical standards and are attributed to 
behaviors that are intrinsically harmful to others. Therefore, principled domain attribution should 
increase perceptions that the ethical dilemma is important or critical (moral recognition), and 
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emotive evaluations that the action is bad or harmful (moral attitudes) (Gattiker and Kelley 
1999a).  
H47 Principled domain attribution will increase levels of moral recognition. 
H48 Principled domain attribution will increase the effects of moral 
recognition on ethical IT behavior intention. 
H49 Principled domain attribution will increase levels of moral attitudes. 
H50 Principled domain attribution will increase the effect of moral attitudes 
on ethical IT behavior intention. 
Furthermore, particular situational moral reasoning is expected to become more salient 
when the ethical dilemma is attributed to the principled domain. Both deontological and justice 
moral judgments are concerned with moral correctness ideally independent of social context or 
situational factors, or the behavior is right or wrong by its own merits, in and of itself 
(Reidenbach and Robin 1988; Reidenbach and Robin 1990; Robin et al. 1996). Since utilitarian 
and relativist moral judgments maintain significant contextual and social dimensions, and egoist 
moral judgments emphasize individual gain over moral rightness, these moral reasoning 
heuristics are expected to become less salient in the principled domain. On the other hand, 
deontological and justice moral judgments are expected to become more salient, increasing in 
both magnitude and effect on ethical behavior intention. Therefore, the following are 
hypothesized: 
H51 Principled domain attribution will increase levels of deontological moral 
judgments. 
H52 Principled domain attribution will increase the effect of deontological 
moral judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 




H54 Principled domain attribution will have no influence on the effect of 
utilitarian moral judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 
H55 Principled domain attribution will have no effect on levels of relativist 
moral judgments. 
H56 Principled domain attribution will have no influence on the effect of 
relativist moral judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 
H57 Principled domain attribution will decrease levels of egoist moral 
judgments. 
H58 Principled domain attribution will decrease the effect of egoist moral 
judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 
H59 Principled domain attribution will increase levels of justice moral 
judgments. 
H60 Principled domain attribution will increase the effect of justice moral 
judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. 
Methodology 
Much of the methodology discussion revolves around proper vignette selection and 
domain attribution to confirm the manipulation effect of different domains of morality on ethical 
decision-making processes and outcomes. Details on the overall method and measurements used 
for other ethical decision-making constructs may be found in the previous chapter. 
Vignettes and Moral Domains 
Gattiker and Kelley (1999a) are the first to offer ethical IT dilemmas developed toward 
domains of morality; however, the authors  did not account for the unique development of 
individuals by attributing a priori three ethical scenarios according to the personal, conventional, 
and principled domains (Gattiker and Kelley 1999a). From this a priori attribution of scenarios to 
domains of morality researchers find significantly different results than originally expected. For 
example, a virus scenario was attributed to the conventional domain, while an illegal game was 
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attributed to the principled domain; however, the results of the study associated with stronger 
perceptions of unethical and immoral judgments were associated with the virus scenario. These 
inconsistent results suggest a gulf between an individual’s attribution and the a priori attribution 
of scenarios by the principle researchers. In addition, these scenarios were highly technical even 
at the time of publication—referring the listserves and bulletin boards—representing technology 
and terminology that have largely been replaced. Therefore, validated scenarios for the purpose of 
this study are rare and must be adapted from more accessible and relevant scenarios, in addition 
to being validated to proper domain attribution. 
Domains of morality may be operationalized in the following manner. Three scenarios 
are validated with regards to the moral recognition, moral attitudes and ethical behavior intentions 
formed in order to operationalize domains of morality. Each of the three scenarios have been 
selected or written to elicit targeted domain attribution similar to Gattiker and Kelley (1999a). 
While these vignettes themselves are assumed to be sufficient to engender proper domain 
attribution; however, as evidenced by the conventional-principled domain flip in Gattiker and 
Kelley (1999a) one cannot safety make that assumption. In order to avoid a similar problem of a 
priori attribution of moral domains while applying the domain theory of moral development, a 
manipulation check was performed. The manipulation check consists of two tests that confirm the 
attribution of each scenario to particular domains of morality. 
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Table 15. Average weighted probability of attributing scenario to domains of morality 
Scenario Personal Conventional Principled 
Phishing 0.42 0.39 0.03 
Software Piracy 0.31 0.61 0.20 
Hacking 0.16 0.36 0.62 
The first manipulation instructs respondents to attribute domains of morality to each 
scenario directly. A sample of faculty, graduate and undergraduate students completed an 
instrument consisting of three ethical scenarios. The survey first defines the domain theory of 
moral development, each domain of morality, and provides an example of how a scenario may be 
attributed to a domain of morality.  Then, respondents review each of the three scenarios, and (1) 
rank order domains of morality that the respondents would most likely attribute to the scenario, 
and (2) rate the confidence of this rank order of domain attribution. The confidence rating is then 
used to weight the ranking of each scenario. In order to assess the probability that a respondent 
will attribute the scenario to a particular moral domain, the rank is converted into a probability 
(1.0 for highest ranking, 0.5 for second, and 0.0 for lowest ranking), and then this probability is 
weighted against the confidence rating that has also been converted into a probability. The 
highest confidence rating of 1 would weigh the probability completely; the second highest 
confidence rating of 2 would decrease the weight to 0.8; the third highest would decrease the 
weight to 0.6; and so forth. The weighted probabilities are then averaged for each scenario, and 
the weighted average probabilities are shown in Table 15. The weighted average probabilities for 
the phishing scenario show some conflict between attribution toward the personal and 
conventional domains; however, it is clear this scenario is unlikely to be attributed to the 
principled domain. The attribution of the software piracy scenario suggests that respondents are 
more likely to attribute the scenario to the conventional domain, although the personal and 
principled domains cannot be discounted. These results suggest that the personal domain requires 
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significant modification, which had been made prior to the second manipulation check to follow, 
and the software piracy scenario should likely be attributed to the conventional domain, but 
further confirmation is necessary. 
Table 16. Comparison of means of each scenario and attributed domain of morality 
Scenario Domain Moral Recognition 1 Moral Attitude 2 Behavior Intention 3 
   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Phishing Personal 3.500 1.506 3.086 0.930 2.155 0.825 
Software Piracy Conventional 2.874 1.487 3.086 0.930 2.514 0.776 
Hacking Principled 2.762 1.418 3.640 0.991 2.645 0.730 
(1) Lower values of moral recognition represent a perception the action is a critical and important issue  
(2) Higher values of moral attitude represent a perception the action is wrong or bad 
(3) Higher values of behavior intention represent the likelihood and intention to behavior differently (more ethically) 
The second manipulation check uses data from the pilot study to compare key ethical 
decision-making constructs (moral recognition, moral attitude, and ethical behavior intention) of 
each scenario. Based on previous research (Gattiker and Kelley 1999a; Turiel 1983; Turiel et al. 
1987), domains of morality (personal, conventional, and principled) ought to be associated with 
increasingly higher levels of moral recognition and attitudes, typically towards the 
unpleasant/immoral anchors of corresponding measures. Therefore, the vignettes would be 
considered adequate of proper moral domain attribution if personal, conventional, and moral 
domains have significantly different moral recognition and attitudes, and the severity of moral 
recognition and attitudes are lowest in the personal domain vignette, and increase through the 
conventional and principled domain vignettes. The mean scores of moral attitude and ethical 
behavior intention for the personal domain should be significantly lower (perceived as less wrong 
or bad) than the conventional and moral domains. Alternatively, the mean scores of moral 
recognition should be higher for the personal domain and lower for the conventional and moral 
domains, as lower scores of moral recognition correspond to perceptions of greater ethical 
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importance. The results for the mean score comparison may be found in Table 17, where the 
largest expected difference between scenarios (phishing—hacking) is first, followed by the two 
smaller expected differences (phishing—software piracy, software piracy—hacking). 
Table 17. Pair-wise comparison of ethical decision-making constructs for manipulation check 
Pair-wise Comparison Mean (x1 – x2) SD T-Stat P-Value 4 
Moral Recognition 1     
Phishing Hacking 0.738 1.706 5.119 0.000 
Phishing Software Piracy 0.626 1.875 3.952 0.000 
Software Piracy Hacking 0.112 1.810 0.731 0.466 
Moral Attitude 2     
Phishing Hacking -0.555 0.999 -6.569 0.000 
Phishing Software Piracy -0.043 1.119 -0.453 0.651 
Software Piracy Hacking -0.512 1.159 -5.225 0.000 
Behavior Intention 3     
Phishing Hacking -0.490 0.820 -4.910 0.000 
Phishing Software Piracy -0.360 1.029 -2.513 0.013 
Software Piracy Hacking -0.131 0.854 -2.149 0.033 
(1) Lower values of moral recognition represent a perception the action is a critical and important issue  
(2) Higher values of moral attitude represent a perception the action is wrong or bad 
(3) Higher values of behavior intention represent the likelihood and intention to behave similarly (perceived as more 
ethical) 
(4) * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
First, levels of moral recognition must be compared. Lower values of the moral 
recognition scale are associated with greater perception of ethical importance (e.g. “highly 
critical” or “of great importance), whereas higher values of moral recognition are interpreted as 
“not critical” and “unimportant.” When comparing levels of moral recognition between scenarios, 
there is substantial evidence supporting significant differences between the phishing (personal) 
scenario with the piracy (conventional) (Δx̄ = 0.626, p < 0.001) and hacking (principled) scenario 
(Δx̄ = 0.738, p < 0.001); however, no difference between the software piracy and hacking 
scenarios (Δx̄ = 0.112, p = 0.466). Therefore the results suggest that the hacking and piracy 
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scenarios are perceived as the most “critical” and “important” issues, whereas the phishing 
scenario is clearly the least of the three. 
Unlike moral recognition, lower values of moral attitudes are associated with positive 
ethical emotions (e.g. “good” and “helpful”) whereas higher values are associated with negative 
values (e.g. “bad’ and “harmful”). When comparing levels of moral attitude, substantial evidence 
is found supporting stronger perceptions of unethical moral attitude of the hacking scenario than 
the phishing (Δx̄ = −0.555, < 0.001) and piracy scenarios (Δx̄ = −0.512, p < 0.001); however, 
there is no moral attitude difference between the phishing and software piracy scenarios (Δx̄ = 
−0.430, p = 0.651). Therefore, these results suggest that the hacking scenario is clearly perceived 
as more “bad” and “harmful” than the phishing and software piracy scenarios. The phishing and 
piracy scenarios, however, show no evidence of differences in moral attitude, demonstrating a 
potential misattribution between the phishing and piracy scenarios, at the very least for moral 
attitudes. Despite the lack of evidence supporting differences between the phishing and piracy 
scenarios, there is broad evidence that the variation of moral attitudes is consistent with the a 
priori domain attribution, but further results of moral attitudes between these two scenarios may 
be suspect. 
Finally, scenario differences for the dependent variable, ethical IT behavior intention, are 
compared. Similar to moral attitudes, lower values of ethical IT behavior intention are associated 
with an intention to behave similarly (i.e. behave “ethically”), while higher values are associated 
with intentions to behave differently (i.e. behave “unethically”). The results show substantial 
evidence of a difference between the phishing and hacking scenarios (Δx̄ = −0.490, p < 0.001). 
Furthermore, there is evidence supporting a significant difference between the phishing and 
piracy scenarios (Δx̄ = −0.360, p < 0.05) and the piracy and hacking scenarios (Δx̄ = −0.131, p < 
0.05). The results not only suggest that there is significant difference in the perception of the three 
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scenarios, but also that the phishing scenario is perceived as the most ethical, followed by the 
piracy and then hacking scenarios, which is consistent with the suggested a priori attribution. 
Table 18. Comparison of decision outcomes for each scenario for manipulation check 
Decision Frequency Percentage 
Phishing   
Should sign up for the prize offer 48 34.5% 
Can't decide 27 19.4% 
Should not sign up for the prize offer 64 46.0% 
Software Piracy Decision   
Should download the software 30 21.6% 
Can't decide 29 20.9% 
Should not download the software 80 57.6% 
Hacking Decision   
Should have modified the software 20 14.4% 
Can't decide 27 19.4% 
Should not have modified the software 92 66.2% 
In addition to investigating differences between EDM and behavior intention constructs, 
it is important to examine differences in decision outcomes for each scenario. These decision 
outcomes represent whether the actor in the scenario should or should not engage in the behavior 
given the context of the scenario. Respondents may also indicate whether they are unsure. Table 
18 outlines the decision options for each scenario, and the frequency and relative percentage for 
each decision option. The hacking (principled) scenario clearly results in the intended perceptions 
based on the decision outcomes, since the overwhelming majority decides the actor should not 
engage in the behavior. The comparison of decision outcomes shows significant differences 
between all three scenarios; however, there are some issues of concern. Respondents indicated 
that the actor should more than likely engage in the behavior considered in the phishing scenario 
than the piracy scenario (Δx̄ = −0.236, p = 0.013, and much more likely still compared with the 
hacking scenario (Δx̄ = −0.407, p < 0.000). Furthermore, respondents indicated that the actor 
 
109 
should more than likely engage in the phishing scam scenario than the hacking scenario (Δx̄ = 
−0.171, p = 0.033), which is consistent with the a priori attribution. 
Table 19. Pair-wise comparison of decision outcomes for manipulation check 
Pair-wise Comparison Mean SD T-Stat P-Value 2 
Decision Outcomes 1     
Phishing Hacking −0.407 0.981 −4.910 0.000 
Phishing Software Piracy −0.236 1.110 −2.513 0.013 
Software Piracy Hacking −0.171 0.944 −2.149 0.033 
(1) Lower values of decision outcomes are associated with a higher probability that the actor should 
engage in the action  
(2) * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
In conclusion, the results from the two manipulation checks reveal a clear attribution of 
the scenarios to particular domains of morality based on the moral recognition, attitudes, and 
ethical behavior intention responses, confirming the a priori attribution tested by the second 
manipulation check. In some instances there was not sufficient evidence of clear differences 
between the scenarios, particularly regarding moral recognition with the piracy and hacking 
scenarios, and moral attitudes between the phishing and piracy scenarios. Nevertheless, there is 
no evidence that the student sample misattributed the scenarios to particular domains of morality, 
further confirming the a priori attribution and the results of the first manipulation check. 
Analysis and Results 
As with the research model and hypothesis development in the previous section, the 
analysis and results are organized by moral domain. New structural models are created for each 
domain to isolate the domain-specific effects. The magnitude of the constructs are compared 
using pair-wise comparison to address differences in the overall level of ethical decision-making 
constructs per-domain. However, this study claims that not only do levels of ethical decision-
making constructs change based upon attribution of domains of morality, but also the patterns and 
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heuristics of ethical decision-making. In other words, the relationship between moral attitude, 
judgment and reasoning components on ethical IT behavior intention will change with domain 
attribution. In order to address this, the base model in study 1 is compared against domain-
specific, or domain models, particularly (a) whether there is a chance in the significance level of 
the path between two constructs, and (b) whether a change in the magnitude of the path 
coefficient is significant or not. Path coefficients between groups were compared based on Chin’s 
(2004) multi-group analysis technique. Structural differences in ethical decision-making 
heuristics due to domain-specific effects are considered supported if either one of the conditions 
is achieved. Any significant differences in the magnitude or significance of path coefficients 
between the base and domain models are considered first separately from the hypotheses 
developed in the previous section. The addition of statistically comparing path coefficients builds 
on other studies that have compared differences in structural models of ethical decision-making 
(Haines et al. 2008; Moores and Chang 2006) by increasing the validity of any differences in path 
coefficients. 
Personal Domain 
In this section the findings related to the scenario attributed to the personal domain, the 
phishing scenario, are considered as they impact the magnitude and effects of ethical 
decision-making constructs. The personal domain or morality consists of ethical dilemmas that 
are broadly of individual concern. Judgments consists of matters of personal taste and 
preferences, while consequences are relegated to the individual, and do not bear any direct social 
or societal consequences. The structural model is assessed by isolating the responses to the 
personal domain scenario in order to assess the effects of personal domain attribution. 
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Table 20. Pair-wise comparison of base and personal domain (phishing) moral reasoning constructs 
Construct/Domain x ̄ (Base) x ̄ (Personal) Δx ̄(xp − xb) SD T-Stat P-Value 
Moral Recognition 3.703 3.778 0.075 0.850 1.592 0.112 
Moral Attitude 3.535 3.368 −0.168 0.630 −4.771 0.000 
Moral Judgments (S)       
Deontological 3.800 3.168 −0.632 0.689 −16.429 0.000 
Utilitarian 3.835 3.729 −0.106 0.727 −2.612 0.009 
Relativist 3.666 3.315 −0.351 0.724 −8.680 0.000 
Egoist 3.429 3.246 −0.183 0.613 −5.338 0.000 
Justice 3.747 3.251 −0.496 0.720 −12.329 0.000 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Hypothesis H19 states that personal domain attribution will decrease the magnitude of 
moral recognition when compared with the base model. Based on Table 20, we find no evidence 
supporting hypothesis H19 (Δx̄ = 0. 075, p = 0.112), suggesting respondents consider scenarios 
attributed to the personal domain no less critical than other ethical IT dilemmas. Hypothesis H21 
states that personal domain attribution will decrease the magnitude of moral attitude. The results 
show substantial evidence supporting this ascertain (Δx̄ = −0.168, p < 0.001), suggesting that 
personal domain attribution is consistent with “good” and “helpful” perceptions compared with 
other ethical IT dilemmas. The results show mixed effects regarding magnitude differences of 
situational moral reasoning. Hypothesis H23 states that personal domain attribution will decrease 
levels of both deontological and justice moral judgments. The results show substantial evidence 
for a sharp decrease in both deontological (Δx̄ = −0.632, p < 0.001) and justice moral judgments 
(Δx̄ = −0.496, p < 0.001); therefore, hypothesis H23 is supported. Hypothesis H25 states that 
personal domain attribution will decrease levels of utilitarian and relativism moral judgments. 
The results show substantial evidence that personal domain attribution decreases utilitarian 
(Δx̄ = −0.106, p < 0.01) moral judgments supporting hypothesis H25. 
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Hypothesis H27 states that personal domain attribution will decrease levels of relativist 
moral judgments. The results show substantial evidence that personal domain attribution 
decreases relativist (Δx̄ = −0.351, p < 0.001) moral judgments. Therefore, hypothesis H27 is 
supported. Finally, hypothesis H29 states that egoist moral judgments increase due to personal 
domain attribution. The results show no evidence that egoist moral judgments increase due to 
personal domain attribution (Δx̄ = −0.183, p < 0.001); therefore, hypothesis H29 is not 
supported.16 Hypothesis H31 states that personal domain attribution will decrease levels justice 
moral judgments. The results show substantial evidence for a sharp decrease in justice moral 
judgments (Δx̄ = −0.496, p < 0.001); therefore, hypothesis H31 is supported. 
Table 21. Comparison of path coefficients and significance between base and personal (phishing) domain 
model 
Construct Base Personal Personal − Base 
 β T Sig β T Sig Δβ T Sig 
Moral Recognition 0.131 3.507 0.001 0.102 1.694 1 0.091 −0.028 −0.387 0.699 
Moral Attitude 0.123 3.958 0.000 0.003 0.073 2 0.942 −0.119 −1.993 3 0.046 
Moral Judgments (D) −0.021 0.626 0.532 0.012 0.191 0.849 0.033 0.481 0.630 
Moral Judgments (S)          
Deontological 0.031 0.570 0.569 −0.003 0.027 0.979 −0.034 −0.309 0.758 
Utilitarian 0.248 5.389 0.000 0.369 4.334 0.000 0.121 1.289 0.198 
Relativist 0.346 7.233 0.000 0.255 3.394 0.001 −0.091 −0.974 0.330 
Egoist −0.053 1.319 0.188 −0.095 1.625 0.105 −0.042 −0.546 0.585 
Justice 0.078 1.593 0.112 0.075 0.795 0.427 −0.004 −0.038 0.970 
           
Adjusted R2 0.495   0.348      
Δ R2    −0.147      
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Based on Table 29, the results indicate that the effects of moral awareness, or the 
perception an ethical dilemma is important or critical, on ethical IT behavior intention (β = 0.102, 
                                                 
16 All findings that deal with the egoist moral judgments construct should be highly suspect due to 
significant reliability problems of the egoism moral judgments measure. 
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p = 0.091) becomes non-significant in the personal domain in comparison to the base model (β = 
0.131, p < 0.001). This suggests that the perception of an ethical dilemma as important or critical 
is no longer a predictor of an individual’s intentions when faced with a similar ethical dilemma. 
Similarly, the effects of moral attitudes on ethical behavior intention become non-significant 
under personal domain attribution (β = 0.123, p < 0.001) versus the base model (β = 0.003, p = 
0.942). This suggests that emotive evaluations of ethical dilemmas as good or bad have no 
influence on behavioral intentions in the personal domain. In addition, as to be expected with 
such a large swing in path coefficient (βpersonal = 0.003; βbase = 0.123) and significance 
(ppersonal = 0.942; βbase < 0.001), the results shows a large and significant difference in path 
coefficients between the two models (Δβ = −0.119, p < 0.05), but since the effects of moral 
attitudes on ethical IT behavior intention in non-significant, a significant change in path 
coefficients provides little actionable findings. 
Hypothesis H20 states that personal domain attribution will decrease the effects of moral 
recognition on ethical IT behavior intention. Although the results show no evidence of a decrease 
in the effects of moral recognition on ethical IT behavior intention (Δβ = −0.075, p = 0.112), the 
effect of moral recognition does become non-significant in the personal domain model 
(β = 0.102, p = 0.091) when compared to the base model (β = 0.131, p < 0.001). Therefore, 
hypothesis H20 is supported. Hypothesis H22 states that personal domain attribution will 
decrease the effects of moral attitudes on ethical IT behavior intention. The findings indicate no 
evidence that moral attitudes are less predictive of ethical IT behavior intention (Δβ = −0.028, 
p = 0.699); however, the effect of moral attitudes does become non-significant in the personal 
domain model (β = 0.002, p = 0.924) when compared to the base model (β = 0.123, p < 0.001). 
Therefore, hypothesis H22 is supported. 
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Hypothesis H24 states that personal domain attribution will decrease the effects of 
deontological and justice moral judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. The results show no 
evidence of either a decrease in the effects of deontological (Δβ = −0.034, p = 0.758) or justice 
(Δβ = −0.004, p = 0.970) moral judgments; and furthermore, there is no change in significance of 
either effect in the personal domain model. Therefore, hypothesis H24 is not supported. 
Hypothesis H26 states that personal domain attribution will decrease the effects of utilitarian 
moral judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. The results show no evidence of either a 
change in significance, or a significant decrease in the effects of utilitarian moral judgments 
(Δβ = 0.121, p = 0.198). Therefore, hypothesis H26 is not supported. Hypothesis H28 states that 
personal domain attribution will decrease the effects of relativist moral judgments on ethical IT 
behavior intention. The results show no evidence of neither a change in significance, nor a 
significant decrease of relativist (Δβ = −0.091, p = 0.330) moral judgments. Therefore, 
hypothesis H28 is not supported. Hypothesis H30 states that personal domain attribution will 
increase the effects of egoist moral judgments on ethical IT behavior intention. The results, 
however, show no evidence that the effect of egoist moral judgments neither changes in 
significance nor decreases significantly (Δβ = −0.042, p = 0.585). Hypothesis H32 states that 
personal domain attribution will decrease the effects of justice moral judgments on ethical IT 
behavior intention. The results show no evidence of a decrease of the effects of justice moral 
judgments (Δβ = −0.004, p = 0.970); and furthermore, there is no change in significance of the 
effect in the personal domain model. Therefore, hypothesis H32 is not supported. 
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Table 22. Summary of hypotheses for personal (phishing) domain 
Hypothesis Δx ̄/ Δβ P-Value Supported? 
H1 Recognition  < 0. 075 0.112  Yes 
H2 Recognition - Intention  < −0.028 0.699  Yes 
H3 Attitude  < −0.168 0.001 *** Yes 
H4 Attitude - Intention   < −0.119 0.046 * Yes 
H5 Deontological  < −0.632 0.001 *** Yes 
H6 Deontological - Intention  < −0.034 0.758  No 
H7 Utilitarian  < −0.106 0.009 ** Yes 
H8 Utilitarian - Intention  < 0.121 0.198  No 
H9 Relativist  < −0.351 0.001 *** Yes 
H10 Relativist - Intention  < −0.091 0.330  No 
H11 Egoist  > −0.183 0.001 *** No 
H12 Egoist - Intention  > −0.042 0.585  No 
H13 Justice  < −0.496 0.001 *** Yes 
H14 Justice - Intention  < −0.004 0.970  No 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
The structural model for the personal domain offers much less explanatory power (Adj. 
R2 = 0.348, ΔR2 = -0.147 or -14.7%) of ethical behavior intention below the base model. The 
decrease due to personal domain-specific effects is startling to say the least. This suggests that the 
situations attributed to the personal domain offers different patterns of moral attitudes and 
judgments compared with other scenarios; however, these ethical decision-making patters are less 
consistent with ethical IT behavior intentions. One explanation of this phenomenon may be that 
situations attributed to the personal domain are often localized to the individual, both in terms of 
judging the correctness of an action, as well as evaluating the consequences of the action. In other 
words, the situation may possess little or no moral character than situations attributed to other 
moral domains. 
A few important considerations are required when understanding and interpreting the 
explanatory power (assessed through adjusted r-squared values) of multiple regression models. 
First, due to the decrease in degrees of freedom from the base model (n = 963) to the domain-
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specific models (n = 321), all adjusted r-squared and delta r-squared values are biased toward 
the base model. In other words, any situation-specific explanatory differences in r-squared values 
by comparing structural models are conservative. Second, the two models cannot be compared 
statistically using f-test due to several reasons. The base model and the domain-specific models 
have significantly different degrees of freedom, as previously described, due to the reduction in 
the number of scenarios considered in the structural model. In addition, comparing the 
explanatory significance of multiple regression models requires a full and reduced model with 
different numbers of independent variables being tested, where the full model contains at least 
one additional independent variable. In conclusion, although the delta r-squared values are 
conservative due to smaller degrees of freedom in the domain-specific models, drawing strong 
conclusions from the differences in explanatory power through adjusted r-squared comparisons is 
suspect. 
Conventional Domain 
In the following section the results related to the conventional domain, the piracy 
scenario, are considered, and the respective hypotheses are evaluated based upon the results. The 
ethical dilemmas attributed to the conventional domain are largely matters of group concern, and 
bear social consequences to the actor; therefore, these behaviors move beyond individual 
evaluation but remain highly contextual based on the social environment and referent group. 
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Table 23. Pair-wise comparison of base and conventional (piracy) domain moral reasoning constructs 
Construct/Domain x ̄ (Base) X̄  (Conventional) Δx ̄(xc – xb) SD T-Stat P-Value 
Moral Recognition 3.703 3.395 −0.308 0.728 −7.582 0.000 
Moral Attitude 3.535 3.319 −0.216 0.580 −6.680 0.000 
Moral Judgments (S)       
Deontological 3.800 3.852 0.052 0.646 1.439 0.151 
Utilitarian 3.835 3.645 −0.190 0.580 −5.865 0.000 
Relativist 3.666 3.509 −0.157 0.675 −4.168 0.000 
Egoist 3.429 3.396 −0.033 0.566 −1.044 0.297 
Justice 3.747 3.666 −0.081 0.684 −2.121 0.035 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Hypothesis H33 states that conventional domain attribution will have no effect on the 
magnitude of moral recognition when compared with the base model. Based on Table 18, we find 
substantial evidence of a large decrease in levels of moral recognition (Δx̄ = −0. 308, p < 0.001); 
therefore, hypothesis H33 is not supported. Hypothesis H35 states that conventional domain 
attribution will have no effect on the magnitude of moral attitudes, for which we also find 
substantial evidence of a large decrease in levels of moral attitudes (Δx̄ = −0.216, p < 0.001). 
Therefore, hypothesis H35 is not supported. 
Regarding the differences in situational moral reasoning, we find mixed domain effects 
on the magnitude. Hypothesis H37 states that conventional domain attribution will decrease 
levels of deontological moral judgments. There is no evidence that deontological moral 
judgments do not decrease significantly Due to conventional domain attribution (Δx̄ = 0.052, 
p = 0.151); therefore, hypothesis H37 is unsupported. Hypothesis H39, on the other hand, states 
that conventional domain attribution will increase levels of utilitarian moral judgments. The 
results show no evidence that conventional domain attribution increases utilitarian judgments; 
however, the results do demonstration substantial evidence that utilitarian (Δx̄ = −0.190, 
p < 0.001) judgments decrease. Therefore, hypothesis H39 is not supported. Hypothesis H41 
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states that conventional domain attribution will increase levels of relativist moral judgments. The 
results show no evidence that conventional domain attribution increases relativist judgments; 
however, the results do demonstration substantial evidence that relativist (Δx̄ = −0.157, 
p < 0.001) judgments decrease. Therefore, hypothesis H41 is not supported. This would suggest 
that relativism and utilitarian judgments in the conventional domain are lower than the base 
model, which may imply that either (a) conventional domain attribution is closer to principled 
domain attribution than personal or (b) utilitarian and relativist judgments are more highly 
associated with personal domain attribution. Hypothesis H43 states that egoist moral judgments 
will neither increase nor decrease due to conventional domain attribution. The results show no 
evidence of an increase of decrease in egoist moral judgments due to conventional domain 
attribution (Δx̄ = −0.033, p = 0.297); therefore, hypothesis H43 is supported. Finally, hypothesis 
H45 states that conventional domain attribution will decrease levels of justice moral judgments. 
Due to conventional domain attribution, justice moral judgments (Δx̄ = −0.081, p < 0.05) levels 
do decrease significantly; therefore, hypothesis H45 is supported. 
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Table 24. Comparison of path coefficients and significance between base and conventional (piracy) domain 
models 
Construct Base Conventional Conventional − Base 
 β T Sig β T Sig Δβ T Sig 
Moral Recognition 0.131 3.507 0.001 0.316 6.291 0.000 0.185 2.622 1 0.009 
Moral Attitude 0.123 3.958 0.000 0.123 1.992 0.047 0.001 0.008 0.994 
Moral Judgments (D) −0.021 0.626 0.532 0.091 1.463 0.144 0.111 1.640 2 0.101 
Moral Judgments (S)          
Deontological 0.031 0.570 0.569 0.165 2.362 0.019 0.134 1.323 0.186 
Utilitarian 0.248 5.389 0.000 0.132 1.614 3 0.108 −0.116 −1.342 0.180 
Relativist 0.346 7.233 0.000 0.421 6.635 0.000 0.075 0.840 0.401 
Egoist −0.053 1.319 0.188 0.006 0.108 0.914 0.058 0.743 0.458 
Justice 0.078 1.593 0.112 −0.008 0.140 0.889 −0.087 −0.930 0.352 
           
Adjusted R2 0.495   0.546      
ΔR2    0.050      
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
The effects of moral recognition on ethical IT behavior intention shows strong evidence 
of being stronger (Δβ = 0.185, p < 0.01) in the conventional domain (β = 0.316, p < 0.001) than 
in the base model (β = 0.131, p < 0.001). Based on Table 29, the results suggest that moral 
recognition, or the perception that a moral behavior is perceived as important or critical, becomes 
more important in ethical IT decision-making when attributed to the conventional domain. 
Interestingly, although there is substantial evidence that utilitarian moral reasoning is crucial in 
ethical IT decision-making in the base model (β = 0.248, p < 0.001), there is no evidence that 
utilitarian moral reasoning contributes to ethical IT behavior intention (β = 0.132, p = 0.108). 
However, despite the chance in significance of utilitarian moral reasoning under conventional 
domain attribution, there is no evidence of a significant difference in magnitude between the two 
models (Δβ = −0.116, p = 0.180), although the difference itself is negative. 
Thus far we have not considered effects with significance levels at or below an alpha 
level of 0.10, although this is common in other ethical IT decision-making literature (Banerjee et 
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al. 1998; Banerjee and Jones 1996; Leonard and Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 2004). However, 
due to the dismal effects of cognitive moral development on ethical IT behavior intention in both 
the base and domain-specific models, we will suspend statistical rigor in order to entertain the 
differences in cognitive moral development due to domain-specific effects. Although neither path 
coefficient shows evidence of influencing ethical IT behavior intention (βbase = −0.021, pbase = 
0.532, βconventional = 0.091, pconventional = 0.144), please note that in the personal domain there is 
some evidence that the path coefficient increased significantly in the personal domain model (Δβ 
= 0.111, p = 0.11). Contrary to expectations that the effect of cognitive moral development 
would decrease in the personal domain, we find some evidence that the effect increases, which 
may be due to the concentration of cognitive moral development levels towards personal intent 
and conventional schemas. 
Hypothesis H34 states that conventional domain attribution will have no influence on the 
effects of moral recognition on ethical IT decision-making compared to the base model. The 
results show strong evidence of a significant increase in the effects of moral recognition (Δβ = 
0.185, p < 0.01); therefore, hypothesis H34 is not supported. Hypothesis H36 states that 
conventional domain attribution will also have no influence on the effects of moral attitudes on 
ethical IT decision-making. There is substantial evidence supporting this hypothesis (Δβ = 0.001, 
p = 0.994). Hypothesis H38 states that conventional domain attribution will decrease the effects 
of deontological and justice moral judgments. The results show no support for this assertion as 
the effects of deontological moral judgments neither increase nor decrease in the conventional 
domain (Δβ = 0.184, p = 0.186). In addition, this construct does not become significant when 
compared with the base model. Therefore, hypothesis H38 is unsupported. Hypothesis H40 states 
that conventional domain attribution will increase the effects utilitarian moral judgments. The 
results show no evidence that conventional domain attribution has any effect on utilitarian moral 
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judgments (Δβ = −0.116, p = 0.180). Although this is surprising given initial predictions, this is 
unsurprising when the significant decrease in the magnitude of this construct (see Table 18). 
Hypothesis H42 states that conventional domain attribution will increase the effects relativist 
moral judgments. The results show no evidence that conventional domain attribution has any 
effect on relativist (moral judgments Δβ = 0.075, p = 0.401). Although this is surprising given 
initial predictions, this is unsurprising when the significant decrease in magnitude of this 
construct (see Table 23). Hypothesis H44 states that conventional domain attribution will have no 
influence on the effect of egoist moral judgments. The results show evidence for this ascertain as 
there is no significant increase or decrease in the effects of egoist moral judgments on ethical IT 
behavior intention (Δβ = 0.058, p = 0.401); therefore, hypothesis H44 is supported. Hypothesis 
H46 states that conventional domain attribution will decrease the effects justice moral judgments 
on ethical IT behavior intention. The results show no evidence to support for this assertion as the 
effects of justice moral judgments showed neither increased nor decreased in the conventional 
domain (Δβ = −0.087, p = 0.352). In addition, the construct did not become significant when 
compared with the base model. Therefore, hypothesis H46 is unsupported. 
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Table 25. Summary of hypotheses for conventional (piracy) domain 
Hypothesis  Δx ̄ / Δβ P-Value Supported? 
H15 Recognition  = −0.308 0.000 *** No 
H16 Recognition - Intention  = 0.185 0.009 *** No 
H17 Attitude  = −0.216 0.000 *** No 
H18 Attitude - Intention  = 0.001 0.994  Yes 
H19 Deontological  < 0.052 0.151 * No 
H20 Deontological - Intention < 0.134 0.186  No 
H21 Utilitarian > −0.190 0.000 *** No 
H22 Utilitarian - Intention  > −0.116 0.180  No 
H23 Relativist  > −0.157 0.000 *** No 
H24 Relativist - Intention  >  0.075 0.401  No 
H25 Egoist  = −0.033 0.297  Yes 
H26 Egoist - Intention  = 0.058 0.458  Yes 
H27 Justice  < −0.081 0.035 * Yes 
H28 Justice - Intention  < −0.087 0.352  No 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
The structural model for the conventional domain offers some additional explanatory 
power (Adj. R2 = 0.546, ΔR2 = 0.050 or 5%) of ethical behavior intention over and above the base 
model. Given the base model already maintains a high-level of explanatory power for cognitive 
models, the increase due to conventional domain-specific effects is modest. Nevertheless, this 
suggests that the situations attributed to the conventional domain elicit different patterns of moral 
attitudes and judgments that are more consistent with ethical IT behavior intentions. 
Principled Domain 
In the following section the results related to the principled domain, the hacking scenario, 
are considered, and the respective hypotheses are evaluated based upon the results. The ethical 
dilemmas attributed to the principled domain are largely considered intrinsically harmful 
independent of social context or referent group. Although these behaviors may result in personal 
or social benefits for the actor, these benefits are often at the expense of others. 
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Table 26. Pair-wise comparison of base and principled (hacking) domain moral reasoning constructs 
Construct/Domain x ̄ (Base) x ̄ (Principled) Δx ̄(xh – xb) SD T-Stat P-Value 
Moral Recognition 3.006 3.935 0.232 0.761 5.471 0.000 
Moral Attitude 3.535 3.920 0.384 0.614 11.213 0.000 
Moral Judgments (S)       
Deontological 3.800 4.380 0.580 0.631 16.470 0.000 
Utilitarian 3.835 4.131 0.296 0.644 8.234 0.000 
Relativist 3.666 4.174 0.508 0.671 13.555 0.000 
Egoist 3.429 3.644 0.215 0.576 6.705 0.000 
Justice 3.747 4.323 0.577 0.649 15.912 0.000 
Ethical Behavior Intention 3.988 4.359 0.371 0.712 9.339 0.000 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Hypothesis H47 states that the levels of moral recognition will increase in the principled 
domain in comparison to all domains considered, and the results show substantial evidence 
supporting this ascertain (Δx̄ = 0.232, p < 0.001); therefore, hypothesis H47 is supported. 
Hypothesis H49 states that the levels of moral attitudes will increase in the principled domain. 
The results indicate substantial evidence supporting a strong increase in levels of moral attitudes 
(Δx̄ = 0.384, p < 0.001). Therefore, hypothesis H49 is supported. Hypothesis H51 states that 
levels of deontological judgments will increase in the principled domain. The findings show 
substantial evidence that deontological moral judgments increase significantly. Therefore, 
hypothesis H51 is supported (Δx̄ = 0.580, p < 0.001). Hypothesis H53 states that principled 
domain attribution will have no effect on levels of utilitarian moral judgments. The results show 
strong evidence of an increase in utilitarian moral judgments in the principled domain 
(Δx̄ = 0.296, p < 0.001). Therefore, hypothesis H53 is unsupported. Hypothesis H55 states that 
principled domain attribution will have no effect on levels of relativist moral judgments. The 
results show strong evidence of an increase in the effects of relativist moral judgments in the 
principled domain (Δx̄ = 0.508, p < 0.001). Therefore, hypothesis H55 is unsupported.  These 
results suggest that utilitarian and relativist moral judgments may not be as clearly related to the 
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conventional domain as initially predicted, but rather principled domain attribution results in an 
increase in moral judgments in general. Hypothesis H57 states that principled domain attribution 
will decrease the levels of egoist moral judgments. However, the results show strong evidence of 
an increase in egoist judgments (Δx̄ = 0.215, p < 0.001), rather than a decrease as initially 
predicted. Similar with utilitarian and relativist moral judgments, this may suggest that domain 
attribution may not result in particular moral judgments, but rather a broader increase or decrease 
in moral judgments. Hypothesis H59 states that justice moral judgments will increase in the 
principled domain. The findings show substantial evidence that justice moral judgments increase 
significantly (Δx̄ = 0.577, p < 0.001). Therefore, hypothesis H59is supported. 
Table 27. Comparison of path coefficients and significance between base and principled (hacking) domain 
models 
Construct Base Hacking Hacking - Base 
 β T Sig β T Sig Δβ T Sig 
Moral Recognition 0.131 3.507 0.001 0.351 7.063 0.000 0.221 3.131 1 0.002 
Moral Attitude 0.123 3.958 0.000 0.102 1.590 2 0.113 −0.021 −0.318 0.751 
Moral Judgments (D) −0.021 0.626 0.532 0.035 0.576 0.565 0.056 0.858 0.391 
Moral Judgments (S)          
Deontological 0.031 0.570 0.569 0.252 2.670 3 0.008 0.221 2.019 4 0.044 
Utilitarian 0.248 5.389 0.000 0.146 1.844 5 0.066 −0.102 −1.111 0.267 
Relativist 0.346 7.233 0.000 0.336 4.126 0.000 −0.010 −0.109 0.913 
Egoist −0.053 1.319 0.188 0.003 0.037 0.970 0.056 0.668 0.504 
Justice 0.078 1.593 0.112 −0.029 0.315 0.753 −0.107 −1.070 0.285 
           
Adjusted R2 0.495   0.548      
Δ R2    0.053      
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Interestingly, although moral recognition remains a significant indicator of ethical IT 
behavior intention in the base model (β = 0.131, p < 0.01) as well as the principled model (β = 
0.351, p < 0.001), we have a significantly stronger beta coefficient (Δβ = 0.221, p < 0.01). This 
finding suggests that the perception of the situation as important or critical becomes more salient 
 
125 
in ethical decision-making in situations attributed to the principled moral domain. Surprisingly, 
although there is no evidence that the path coefficient between moral attitudes and ethical IT 
behavior intention, the path loses significance in the principled domain model (pbase < 0.000, 
pprincipled = 0.113). This suggests that moral attitudes are no longer an indicator of ethical IT 
behavior intention, likely in favor of other ethical decision-making factors becoming more salient, 
such as moral recognition and deontological moral reasoning. 
Deontological moral reasoning in the base model (βbase = 0.031, p = 0.569) and other 
domain-specific models was irrelevant in determining ethical IT decision-making. However, in 
the principled domain deontological moral reasoning becomes a salient factor (βprincipled = 0.252, p 
< 0.01). First, the path coefficient becomes significant in the principled domain model (pbase = 
0.569, pprincipled < 0.01). Second, there is some evidence that the path coefficient of deontological 
moral reasoning is greater in the principled domain model than the base model (Δβ = 0.221, p < 
0.05). This suggests that for moral behaviors that are perceived as “universally” unacceptable via 
principled domain attribution, people rely on different moral reasoning heuristics employing 
deontological moral reasoning in favor of other ethical decision-making patterns, possibly moral 
attitudes. Although the difference between path coefficients effects of utilitarian moral reasoning 
is not significantly different (Δβ = −0.102, p = 0.267), the effect of utilitarian moral reasoning 
does lose significance in the principled domain model (pbase < 0.000, pprincipled = 0.066), which 
suggests that there is no relation between utilitarian moral reasoning and ethical IT behavior 
intention in situations attributed to the moral domain. 
Hypothesis H48 predicts that the effect of moral recognition on ethical IT behavior 
intention increases in the principled domain. The results show strong evidence that moral 
recognition does indeed influence ethical IT behavior intention more when the scenario is 
attributed to the principled domain (Δβ = 0.221, p < 0.01); therefore, hypothesis H48 is 
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supported. This suggests that when a person attributes a scenario to the principled domain, the 
perception that a dilemma is critical or important is even more consistent with ethical intention. 
Hypothesis H50 states that the effects of moral attitudes on ethical IT behavior intention increases 
in the principled domain. The results, however, show no evidence of increased effects due to 
moral attitudes in the principled domain (Δβ = −0.021, p = 0.391); therefore, hypothesis H50 is 
not supported. Hypothesis H52 states that the effects of deontological moral judgments will 
increase in the principled domain. The results show evidence of an increase in the effects of 
deontological moral judgments (Δβ = 0.221, p < 0.05). Therefore, hypothesis H52 is supported. 
Hypothesis H54 states that the effects of utilitarian moral judgments will no significantly change 
in the principled domain. The results show no evidence that the effect of utilitarian moral 
judgments increases or decreases (Δβ = −0.102, p = 0.267), although the non-significant 
coefficient is moderately negative. Therefore, hypothesis H54 is supported. Hypothesis H56 
states that the effects relativist moral judgments will not change in the principled domain. The 
results show no evidence that the effect of moral judgments increases or decreases relativist (Δβ 
= −0.010, p = 0.913). Therefore, hypothesis H56 is supported. Hypothesis H58 states that the 
effects of egoist moral judgments will decrease in the principled domain. The results show no 
evidence of this ascertain (Δβ = 0.056, p = 0.514); therefore, hypothesis H58 is unsupported. 
Hypothesis H60 states that the effects justice moral judgments will increase in the principled 
domain. The results show no evidence of an increase in the effects of justice moral judgments (Δβ 
= −0.107, p = 0.285). Interestingly, although the change in path coefficient is not statistically 
significant, the coefficient or justice moral judgment is clearly negative. In addition, justice moral 




Table 28. Summary of hypotheses for principled (hacking) domain model 
Hypothesis Δx ̄ / Δβ P-Value Supported? 
H29 Recognition  > 0.232 0.000 *** Yes 
H30 Recognition - Intention  > 0.221 0.002 *** Yes 
H31 Attitude  > 0.384 0.000 *** Yes 
H32 Attitude - Intention  > −0.021 0.751  No 
H33 Deontological  > 0.580 0.000  *** Yes 
H34 Deontological - Intention  > 0.221 0.044 *** Yes 
H35 Utilitarian  = 0.296 0.000 *** No 
H36 Utilitarian - Intention  = −0.102  0.267  Yes 
H37 Relativist  = 0.508 0.000 *** No 
H38 Relativist - Intention  = −0.102 0.913  Yes 
H39 Egoist  < 0.215 0.000 *** No 
H40 Egoist - Intention  < 0.056 0.504  No 
H41 Justice  > 0.577 0.000 *** Yes 
H42 Justice - Intention  > −0.107 0.285  No 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
The structural model for the principled domain offers some additional explanatory power 
(Adj. R2 = 0.548, ΔR2 = 0.053 or 5.3%) of ethical behavior intention over and above the base 
model, strikingly similar to the conventional domain model. Given the base model already 
maintains a high-level of explanatory power for cognitive models, the increase due to principled 
domain-specific effects is modest. Nevertheless, this suggests that the situations attributed to the 
principled domain elicit different patterns of moral attitudes and judgments that are more 
consistent with ethical IT behavior intentions. This difference is striking when compared with the 
personal domain model, but the similarity with the conventional domain model is surprising. This 
may suggest that despite the significant structural differences between the conventional and 
principled models, both are highly explanatory of ethical IT behavior intention, only drawing 
upon different decision-making heuristics. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
Moral recognition showed varied results across the three domains of morality. In the 
personal domain, moral recognition was no longer a salient factor in determining ethical behavior 
intention. This suggests first that moral recognition is no longer a salient factor once the scenario 
moves from a normative morality to a personal morality—regardless of whether the issue is 
critical or not, people may engage in personally perceived unethical behaviors. In the 
conventional domain, moral recognition was significantly diminished both in terms of magnitude 
and effect size. Although this ran contrary to initial predictions, this is not necessarily inconsistent 
with domain theory, and may be rooted as an artifact of the analysis. Since the phishing and 
software piracy scenarios may be perceived as of lesser ethical importance than the principled 
domain, the staggeringly stronger perceptions of ethical importance, such as the hacking scenario 
portrayed in the principle domain, may have drowned out the perceptions of less critical 
importance in the other two scenarios. Nevertheless, although moral recognition remains a salient 
factor in determining ethical IT behavior intention, the results suggest those scenarios attributed 
to the conventional domain are perceived as much less important, and the moral importance of the 
scenario is less salient a factor. Principled domain attribution, however, results in both much 
stronger perceptions of ethical importance and a corresponding increase in salience on ethical IT 
behavior intention, suggesting that as ethical IT dilemmas have clear, harmful consequences to 
others, perceptions of ethical importance become more consistent with ethical IT intentions than 
with other domains of morality. 
Moral attitudes did increase and decrease in magnitude due to moral domain attribution 
consistent with initial predictions. However, despite initial predictions, little evidence was found 
that domain attribution influences the manner that moral attitudes behave in ethical 
decision-making. The influence of moral attitudes, or emotive evaluations of good and bad, did 
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not decrease in the personal domain and increase in the principled domain as expected, but 
remained constant. However, there is no evidence that moral attitudes are an important factor in 
the principled domain, and much weaker evidence in the conventional domain. Moral attitudes, 
however, has been consistently shown to have weak or inconsistent effects on ethical behavior 
intention in other studies (Banerjee et al. 1998; Leonard and Cronan 2001), and the relationship 
between moral attitudes and domain attribution continues this story. 
The relationship between moral domain attribution and these two “core” ethical 
decision-making constructs requires further investigation. A fascinating separation was found 
between moral recognition and moral attitudes with situational moral reasoning. In a single 
scenario, software piracy (conventional) for example, a single respondent may identify this as a 
non-critical issue (low moral recognition) that is ‘good’ or ‘pleasant’ (high moral attitude) but 
nevertheless consider the action morally questionable (low deontological reasoning) and unfair 
(low justice reasoning). Interestingly the opposite was found true for the phishing (personal) 
scenario, where moral recognition, attitude, and behavior intention tended toward more unethical 
side, while the situational moral reasoning tended toward more ethical responses. 
Domain theory of moral development has many caveats, as it suggests that through our 
moral development during our childhood and adolescence resulting in defined patterns of ethical 
decision-making. Situational moral reasoning (McMahon and Harvey 2007; Reidenbach and 
Robin 1988; Reidenbach and Robin 1990) may help unravel some of these patterns of ethical 
decision-making contained within domains of morality, in an IT-context at the very least. 
However, the findings are not as staggering as originally predicted. When all scenarios are 
considered, only two dimensions of situational moral reasoning were salient: utilitarian and 
relativist. Domain attribution was expected to result in significantly different ethical 
decision-making models, particularly in terms of situational moral reasoning. For example, in the 
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personal domain egoist moral judgments were expected to become a salient factor, while 
deontological and justice judgments were expected to become salient in the principled domain. At 
the same time the findings of the analysis are expected, unexpected, underwhelming and 
surprising. 
When all scenarios were considered in the base model, deontological judgments were 
inconsequential in determining ethical IT behavior intention. In both the personal and 
conventional domain, deontological judgments are also inconsequential, although the levels of 
deontological judgments do chance significantly in the personal domain. However, in the 
principled domain deontological judgments become a salient decision-making factor, indicating 
some of the first evidence that people use different moral reasoning strategies depending on the 
scenario at hand, and how that scenario is attributed to domains of morality. Moral reasoning 
based on notion of justice, however, was not a salient factor in any of the domains, although there 
are some minor differences in the conventional domain and major differences in the principled 
domain. Utilitarian and relativist moral judgments, the two highly salient forms of moral 
reasoning, remain salient ethical decision-making factors in each domain. However, the use of 
utilitarian and relativist moral judgments did not follow initial predictions, which were that 
personal and principled domain attribution would decrease the use of utilitarian and relativist 
judgments, whereas conventional attribution would increase the use of utilitarian and relativist 
judgments. Instead, utilitarian moral reasoning was significantly lower and the lowest in the 
conventional domain and second in the personal domain, while substantially increase in the 
principled domain. On one hand, given utilitarian judgments are centered on weighing actors and 
consequences in maximizing good, may suggest such reasoning would be more consistent with 
principled domain attribution. On the other hand, other forms of moral judgments, specifically 
deontological and principled, ought to have been more salient in the principled domain. Similarly, 
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relativist judgments, expected to increase in the conventional domain and decrease in others, 
show similar patterns, decreasing in both the personal and conventional domain, and increasing 
substantially in the principled domain. This reveals the surprising finding about domain 
attribution that will be echoed shortly—that domain attribution increase or decreases the use of 
all moral judgments, and this increase overshadows particular changes in moral judgments. 
The relationship between personal domain attribution and situational moral judgments, 
particularly egoism, sheds additional light on how domain attribution may influence ethical 
decision-making. Although the egoism construct may be considered highly suspect due to poor 
reliability. The decrease in egoist moral judgments (perceptions of selfishness) and no increase in 
the effects of egoist judgments in the personal domain appear to run contrary. However, personal 
domain attribution may not manifest itself in an absence of particular moral judgments 
(deontological, justice, etc.) and a stronger presence of other moral judgments (egoist, in 
particular), but may manifest itself in an absence of moral character altogether. In other words, 
personal domain attribution does not reflect morality of personal intent (Rest et al. 2000a; Rest et 
al. 2000b), but rather a domain of morality centered around the immediate individual; and 
therefore not perceived by outside observers as necessarily egoistic or selfish since the 
consequences of the action are also relegated to the individual. Furthermore, this is consistent 
with the previous findings from deontological, utilitarian and relativist judgments: that moral 
domain attribution influences the use of all moral judgments, more so than particular moral 
judgments. 
Implications for Theory and Practice 
The study has found many interesting results in applying the domain theory of moral 
development to ethical IT decision-making and behavior. The study contributes two different 
manipulation checks to ensure proper domain attribution of scenarios prior to conducting a full 
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study. The first manipulation check seeks direct attribution by individuals varying based upon 
confidence of the attribution, while the second manipulation check extends some assumptions 
used by Gattiker and Kelley (1995; 1999a). In addition, this study reveals many interesting 
findings about ethical IT decision-making, and how domain theory of moral development plays a 
role. On one hand, we find some evidence that people do indeed engage in broad segmenting of 
ethical IT decision-making patterns in different moral domains, as evidenced by varied increases 
and decrease in moral recognition, attitudes, and situational moral reasoning. However, of 
particular contribution is that domain attribution seems to be consistent with a broad 
magnification of perceptions of ethical importance, emotive evaluations, and various moral 
judgments, while in some highly specialized instances (deontological judgment in the personal 
and principled domain, for example) do we find particular moral judgments becoming more and 
less salient. Nevertheless, consistent with domain theory of moral development, this study reveals 
that people engage in markedly different ethical decisions-making patterns depending on the 
ethical IT dilemma in question, but the questions remains: what role does information technology 
play in fashioning our ethical decision-making, and how can we understand this role? 
Limitations 
Several limitations may be identified in this study. First, ethical decision-making is a 
complex endeavor where many rationales (Reidenbach and Robin 1988; Reidenbach and Robin 
1990) and factors (Ross and Robertson 2003) contribute to our ethical or unethical intentions. 
Since the effects of different psychological states and normative influences are often small and 
disparate, many ethical decision-making studies in IT ethics have used large sample sizes in order 
to find these effects (Banerjee et al. 1998; Leonard and Cronan 2001). Investigating how moral 
domain attribution interacts with ethical decision-making models continues this trend of 
uncovering complex decision-making patterns in IT ethics. Albeit many of the results of domain 
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attribution, particular for situational moral reasoning, are not only exploratory but unexpected, 
expanding the study to incorporate a more robust factorial vignette design and include a larger, 
more varied set of scenarios may help bolster the current findings, or uncover new revelations of 
domain attribution in situational IT ethics. Second, since no previous work has combined 
situational moral reasoning with moral domain theory in this context, some exploratory 
predictions has to be made regarding the nature of domain attribution and its effects on ethical 
decision-making. For example, since the conventional domain is rooted in and highly dependent 
on the immediate social context and normative landscape surrounding the ethical dilemma, an 
assumption is clearly made that the specific social context will be underscored by a general 
importance of context, for example, though relativist judgments. 
Some of these results may also be explained by the limitations in the vignettes or 
vignette-style studies. The vignettes are sensitive to several potentially confounding factors. 
When dealing with perceptions, attributes and judgments about moral action, people draw from a 
multitude of different experiences and values to form a moral judgment or decision, and it may be 
difficult to isolate that vignette, or particular aspects of the vignette (such as the action, 
responsible party, or information technology used) to the resulting responses. First, since each of 
the vignettes is concerned about the actions of a “friend” or “co-worker” there is an impersonal, 
anonymous element that may depress moral attributes and judgments that lead to ethical behavior 
intentions. Nevertheless, given the variance between vignettes and the strong attributes and 
judgments in the universal vignette depicting the hacking scenario, it appears there was not a 
pervasive problem of desensitization due to the anonymity of the actor. Second, another 
limitation of vignette studies concerns the disconnect between the attitudes and judgments elicited 
by the individual in response to the vignette, and the expected attitudes and judgments. However, 
these issues are addressed in the manipulation check for domain attribution in this chapter. Third, 
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vignettes studies are sensitive to not only individual experiences and values, but also temporal 
changes in those experiences on page. Many vignettes become more or less salient to the 





MORAL DIMENSIONS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
Introduction 
To continue dismantling the nondescript situational specificity of IT ethics, we have 
considered first how situational moral reasoning may diverge from dispositional moral reasoning, 
and how entrenched moral reasoning patterns (moral domains as developed from experiences), 
we have neglected a most important dimension of the situation: the technology itself. In addition 
to study IT artifacts, we must consider beliefs, values, norms, and attitudes of the artifacts (Reich 
and Benbasat 2000), including moral attitudes and judgments. IT creates new dynamics in ethical 
decision-making, introducing new ethical problems and reconsidering how we address old ethical 
problems (Johnson 2004; Maner 1996). Rarely, however, is the technology itself considered 
outside the context of the situation, with exception of highly focused studies on a single domain 
of IT ethics (e.g. software piracy) (Moores and Chang 2006). In fact, the vast majority of IT 
ethics research either investigates personal responses to (1) a broad set of ethical IT situations but 
with no theoretical differentiation (Banerjee et al. 1998; Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard and 
Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 2004) or (2) a small set of highly topical (e.g. software piracy) and 
theoretically differentiated situations (Moores and Chang 2006). Nevertheless, neither stream of 
research may generalize beyond situation specific information technologies situated within an 
ethical issue. Therefore, it is proposed that the properties and characteristics of information 
technology are perceived within an ethical IT dilemma or situation, and these properties and 
characteristics may be extrapolated and generalized into a set of dimensions for information 
technology ethics that are salient in ethical decision-making. Therefore, the following study 
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addresses two research questions: first, how do dimensions of IT ethics influence ethical IT 
decision-making? And, second, does the presence of different information technology artifacts 
vary the importance and salience of each dimension of IT ethics? These questions are addressed 
through the properties of the IT artifact and the actions afforded by the properties of the IT 
artifact. 
Although information technologies are quite different in their qualities and description, 
they are excruciatingly similar in that they all shape our possible actions, behaviors, 
consequences and outcomes in the same manner. Furthermore, simply relying on an IT artifact’s 
properties and characteristics ignores the importance of individual perceptions and motivations 
within the immediate context and environment of the ethical IT dilemma. Therefore, to address 
how IT artifact properties and characteristics are perceived and acted upon, this study  draws 
upon the theory of affordances (Gibson 1979; Heft 1989; Wells 2002) to explain how properties 
of information technology are acted upon towards some action, which may be perceived as 
ethical or unethical. Affordance theory holds that properties of the environment or object 
perceived by an animal or person convey actionable information as to potential behaviors (Gibson 
1979). Many affordances in human action are functional in that the potential behaviors are 
performed through affordances support some purpose or goal (Markus and Silver 2008), and 
through objects and tools a different set of functional affordances support other behaviors and 
action (Dennett 1996). Therefore, this study proposes that information technology artifacts, being 
objects and tools with unique properties and characteristics, create different sets of functional 
affordances. These affordances provide humans with the potential for ethical or unethical actions 
(Narvaez and Lapsley 2005), and furthermore, that these “moral affordances” of information 
technology are constrained not merely by the properties of the object, but the moral perspectives 
and discourse in information technology. Therefore, first, how are dimensions of information 
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technology ethics related to moral affordances? Furthermore, the perception of different 
affordances by humans may influence how moral judgments and attitudes are formed, and by 
extension influence ethical IT decisions, intentions and behaviors. Therefore, second, do moral 
affordance dimensions capture situational effects of information technology on ethical decision-
making and behaviors? 
Literature Review 
Revisiting Situational Factors of Ethical Decision-Making 
Just as situational factors derived from the ethical dilemma and moral context may 
influence ethical decision-making processes, so may the moral affordances of information 
technology perceived by the actor. However, one must avoid problems of technological 
determinism in regards to the moral status and properties of an artifact (De George 2003; De 
George 2006), instead accounting for the interaction between artifact and user within a context in 
use for a particular purpose (Markus and Silver 2008). Nevertheless, the physical properties of an 
artifact must play a role in shaping possible moral actions, and these physical properties may have 
both direct-technological and indirect-technological situational effects on moral actions (Ross and 
Robertson 2003). However, to conceive of a information technology driven situational effect 
removes, in part, the importance of the human actor in the ethical or unethical behavior. The 
matter of IT ethics does not merely concern the situationality of technology, the context of the 
dilemma, and how IT is (or is not) interwoven, but the potentiality for ethical (or unethical) action 
afforded by the technology within the context and dilemma in the relationship between actor and 
environment. How can we best capture the properties of information technology that are salient 
in ethical IT decision-making? To address this issue, the theory of affordances (Gibson 1977; 
Gibson 1979; Heft 1989; Stoffregen 2003) is applied to not only to information technology but 
also moral perceptions and actions. 
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The theory of affordances originates from ecological psychology, particularly Gibson’s 
work on visual perceptions (Gibson 1979). An affordance refers to the actionable properties 
between the world and an actor underscoring the relationship between world and actor in 
actionable behaviors (Gibson 1977; Gibson 1979). Affordances can be conceived as 
“opportunities for action… properties of the animal-environment system that determine what can 
be done” (Stoffregen 2003), or in other words “acts or behaviors that are afforded or permitted by 
an object, place, or event” (Michaels and Carello 1981). Tools, providing access to additional 
un-­‐‑perceived or un-­‐‑actionable affordances, often mediate the affordances conferred by the world 
to the actor. The affordances that we perceive are properties of neither the actor nor the 
environment, but properties of the relationship between them (Neisser and Fivush 1994). 
Objects nevertheless retain these properties even though the individual does not directly 
perceive them. Instead, the properties of the object provide information cues as to the potential set 
of actions, or affordances, offered by the object in the environment (Michaels and Carello 1981). 
The real properties of objects are necessary for affordances be perceived by the actor; however, 
these real properties are not the affordances themselves (Heft 2003). Low-level physical 
descriptions of objects can be viewed as impoverished descriptions as they do not take into 
account the relationship between the human or animal, and the object or environment, and by 
focusing on possible actions through affordances instead of merely physical properties 
researchers have a more robust language to describe the granular contributions of objects toward 
completing specific activities and goals (Markus and Silver 2008). Furthermore, just as the object 
and environment are crucial considerations in describing affordances, so is the animal or human 
actor that engages with the object. Different specifies or people may lack the perceptual or 
cognitive ability to take advantage of real affordances, or particular species or people may lack 
the physical capabilities (Michaels and Carello 1981). Furthermore, affordances are considered to 
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be emergent properties of the animal-environment, or person-object relationship (Stoffregen 
2003); and how this person-object relationship is situated within a particular context and 
environment (Chemero et al. 2003). 
One extension of affordance theory and specific type of affordance is functional 
affordances, which may be defined as “… the possibilities for goal-oriented action afforded to 
specified user groups by technical objects” (Markus and Silver 2008). A person in possession of a 
tool is capable of different actions than a person without the tool (Dennett 1996). As with all 
affordances, functional affordances are considered with potential uses of an object or tool by the 
actor toward a specific goal or purpose. The object the manner an actor relates to or perceives the 
object determines the affordances available, but the actor may not recognize all of the available 
actions the world affords. Functional affordances may therefore be both real and perceived, and 
as such affordance theory is often employed in human computer interaction (HCI) research to 
explore how an artifacts interface design moderates an actor’s perception of affordances (Norman 
1988; Norman 1990). Real affordances are those for which the objects properties afford some 
actor whoever the potential for an action; however, sine affordances are highly dependent on the 
actor in the situation; real affordances represent a way of talking about the entire range of 
potential actions across actors. However, as previously mentioned, particular actors may not 
perceive all of the real affordances offered by the properties of an object or tool. Therefore, 
perceived affordances, on the other hand, refer to the affordance perceived only by a particular 
actor, either consciously or subconsciously. Regardless of how actors perceive affordances of 
tools, particularly information technology, the potentiality of action afforded by the tool to the 
user is determined by the possible physical consequences; however, the social and moral facets of 
the transformed action are rarely considered. Therefore, in the following section the concept of 




The relevance and significance of moral affordances depend on the individual situated 
within an environment, context and referent group. Affordances can be extended from 
emphasizing the physical consequences of potential action to the social consequences, and by 
further extension to the moral judgment of the physical and social consequences. Just as physical 
properties are perceived in a physical environment, so are moral properties be perceived in a 
moral environment (Mason 1987; Neisser and Fivush 1994).  In other words, the moral properties 
of an object or environment create perceived moral affordances to an actor within a moral 
environment. The moral environment is formulated by “all traditions, institution, practices, 
settings, and roles of the society or group…” (Mason 1987); however, as information technology 
artifacts act as objects within an environment, a moral environment, and the IT artifact possess 
different properties, moral properties, objects and tools including information technology artifacts 
generate perceived moral affordances to an actor within an environment. Therefore, the moral 
affordances and associated ethical behaviors are necessarily situated within the immediate moral 
environment of an actor; however, to limit the scope of the study to a manageable microcosm of 
the moral environment we focus on the information technology artifact/object itself. Moral 
affordances themselves are ways to “discern possibilities” of either enhancing the lives of 
ourselves and others (performing ethical behaviors that result in good or positive) or evoking 
suffering on ourselves and others (performing unethical behaviors that result in bad or negative 
consequences) (Mason 1987). Since information technology creates new affordances extending 
the domain of possible actions,  
Moving Beyond Technological Determinism 
Many information systems researchers have argued that technology, specifically 
information technology, necessarily contains a moral status, or in other words morality in use of 
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technology is deterministic (Chatterjee et al. 2009; De George 2003; De George 2006; Floridi 
1999). Some authors have argued that information technology necessarily maintains a moral 
status, and the manner information technology is designed has a direct impact on said moral 
status (De George 2003; De George 2006), while other have more conservatively demonstrated 
how ethical considerations may be incorporated into the design of information technology 
artifacts as ethical “features” in support of some deontological ethical viewpoints (Chatterjee et 
al. 2009). However, this embeddedness of morality in information technology assumes there is a 
set of properties that are objectively determine physical, social, and moral consequences in the 
world, regardless of user and context. As such, whether morality and how morality becomes 
embedded in the tool is a matter of dispute.  
On one hand, the existence of a tool transfers some of the morality of the action out of the 
hands of the individual or group, and the embedded morality becomes a part of the object and the 
world by changing the manner we relate to it. In essence, the object created carries affordances 
that directly affect moral action, and since the affordances are based upon the consequence of 
using the tool morality is thusly transferred and embedded in the object. One the other hand, 
affordances can be perceived as not merely properties of the object and the world, nor purely 
subjective perceptions, but as relationships between the actor and the world extended or 
constrained by the tool (Heft 1989; Heft 2001). Just as objects and tools within the environment 
afford an actor or user of the tool different capabilities, so is information technology situated in 
the relationship between the actor and environment, thus providing affordances, including 
physical, social and moral. Technology, specifically information technology, and the manner by 
which it is designed shape the affordances available to the user in the context or environment 
(Markus and Silver 2008). Affordances, however, are not perceived in a vacuum of environment-
technology-user triad, but are situated in a complex context full of motivations and purposes, 
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actors and stakeholders, institutions and authorities, etc. Furthermore, information technology, as 
a new tool that is constantly evolving, affords new activities and behaviors previously unavailable 
or impractical for the user (Dennett 1996). For example, information technology has provided for 
our ability to reproduce data and information easily, using physical media such as floppy disks 
and CD-ROMs, along with digital, networked media, particularly the Internet. 
Few studies have explored the manner information technology artifacts influence ethical 
decision-making beyond exploring “scenario types,” either focusing on particular issues such as 
software piracy (Moores and Chang 2006; Peace et al. 2003), or a broad set of ethical issues 
(Banerjee et al. 1998; Gattiker and Kelley 1999a; Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard and 
Cronan 2001; Leonard et al. 2004). The latter set of studies, although empirically based, apply no 
theory ad hoc in justifying the scenarios selected as a representative set of ethical IT dilemmas, 
nor is theory applied post hoc in explaining differences between scenario types. Therefore, a 
significant gap exists in the IS/IT ethics research regarding how different scenario types influence 
ethical decision-making, but more specifically and importantly, how the information technology 
artifact shapes individuals’ perceptions, attitudes and intentions regarding this ethical IT 
dilemmas. The remainder of this section will explore several studies (Conger et al. 1995; Johnson 
2004; Mason 1986) that begin to investigate different dimensions of ethical IT dilemmas, and 
characteristic of information technology that are salient in those ethical IT dilemmas as they 
influence ethical decision-making.   
Mason (1986) identifies four major ethical issues that will arise in the “information age”: 
privacy, accuracy, property and access (or PAPA for short). Ethical issues of privacy concern the 
amount of control a person ought to have over personal information on the Internet, whether it is 
right, or even good, to have complete control, or only some control. Accuracy is an important 
issue, since information can be disseminated quickly with little trace of its origin (an issue 
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increased many fold with the popularization of the Internet), and governments and companies rely 
on large databases and automated decision-making to streamline business processes. Inaccurate 
information can traverse the Internet in seconds, and automated decision-making based on 
inaccurate information causes substantive real-world consequences. Intellectual property has 
increasingly become more of an issue, again exacerbated by the Internet, as the duplication and 
modification of information becomes cheaper and easier. Individuals have difficulty claiming 
damage since the duplication of digital information has little cost, and the ease by which others 
can duplicate and disseminate intellectual property removes many boundaries to action. The final 
issue involves access, specially addressing questions involving either who has access to what 
information (questions of security), or the accessibility of information due to individual 
circumstances (questions of disability and digital divides). 
Conger (1995) extended the work of Mason (Mason 1986) by conducting an extensive 
factor analysis of many ethical IT statements and IT professionals perceptions of these 
statements. The ethical IT statements were categorized into five dimensions, and within each 
dimensions, multiple sub-dimensions. The dimensions included ownership, access, motivation, 
responsibility, and privacy (see Table 29). Ownership concerns several factors that relate the 
presence and maintenance of intellectual property, how information as property is managed and 
used by the owner and others alike, etc. Access refers to moral considerations relating to who may 
read, modify, and delete information, to what extent these users have these rights, and what roles 
these users have. Privacy refers to moral considerations relating to a person’s ability to protect 
and control personal information using information technology. Motivation and responsibility are 
common factors in any ethical dilemma; however, Conger (1995) argues that the findings indicate 
that IT may alter how the motivations of moral actors are perceived by others, and whether the 
actor is responsible for the consequences by using IT. Regardless, although motivation and 
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responsibility are transformed by the presence of an IT artifact, these factors are not included in 
the dimensions of moral affordances, and issue discussed in greater detail in the following 
section. 
In the advent and proliferation of Internet technologies, the manner people communicated 
changed drastically as more and more people have begun to rely on online communication. 
Therefore, Johnson (2004) explores the moral and ethical implications of the ubiquity of online 
communication in personal and business interactions. Johnson focuses on how information 
technology specifically employed for online communication has fundamentally changed the 
manner that we communication, and by extension, raise new ethical issues and considerations 
previously unconsidered in offline interactions. Three dimensions by which online 
communication creates new ethical issues are identified: scope, anonymity and reproducibility. 
Scope refers to new ethical issues relating to the rate and breadth that information can be 
communicated to a vast number of people quickly, which may be construed as two distinct 
aspects: speed and reach. Speed refers to the rate that information can be communicated to others, 
while reach refers to the breadth of the communication, or the number of people who can 
simultaneously receive the same information. Anonymity refers to new ethical issues relating to 
how online communication provides users the ability to communicate with little or no identifiable 
information. Reproducibility refers to new ethical issues relating to the ability of information 
technology to duplicate new information with little effort and cost. 
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Table 29. Relevant IS/IT studies identifying dimensions of ethical IT issues 
Dimension Type Source Study Type Dimensions Identified 


















Based on these aforementioned dimensions of information technology ethics, this study 
argues and develops that these dimensions of information technology ethics reflect moral 
affordances of information technology. Specifically, the physical properties and the manner IT is 
designed defines the moral properties by which a human actor may engage in moral actions using 
the IT artifact. The presence of these moral properties and subsequent perception of moral 
affordances defines the realm of potential moral actions afforded to the user. Furthermore, this 
“realm of potential moral actions” may be constructed based on this set of moral affordance 
dimensions for information technology. The following section expands on this argument  
Refining Moral Affordances of Information Technology 
Based on the literature review of dimensions of ethical IT issues and moral affordances, 
set of seven moral affordance dimensions for information technology is developed (see Table 30). 
These dimensions combine the research of multiple authors using multiple methods of analysis 
(Conger et al. 1995; Johnson 2004; Mason 1986). Each of the moral affordance dimensions are 
discussed in greater detail in the following sections. 
 
146 
Table 30. Definitions and sources with moral affordance dimensions 
Moral Affordance Source Definition 
Ownership (Conger et al. 1995; Mason 1986) 
Rights to and control of information technology and 
intellectual property 
Access (Conger et al. 1995; Mason 1986) Control availability of information technology and information 
Anonymity (Johnson 2004) Create isolation from others and act without identifiable information 
Privacy (Conger et al. 1995; Mason 1986) Control personal information and the dissemination thereof 
Speed (Scope) (Johnson 2004) Quickly disseminate information between two points 
Reach (Scope) (Johnson 2004) Broadly disseminate information between multiple simultaneous points 
Reproducibility (Johnson 2004) Duplicate information without any loss of quality 
Why Are These Affordances? 
Affordances are perceived opportunities or actions that an actor perceives in the 
environment or using a tool to complete a specific task. Affordances are not inherent properties or 
qualities of the information technology, but arise from the interaction between the actor, the 
environment, and the technology (Markus and Silver 2008). Moral actions and behaviors are 
purposeful, and ethics is a resultant of the judgments of the consequences of moral actions and 
behaviors as “good” or “bad.” Information technology, as a tool, often helps us achieve the 
purpose of moral action faster, better, or with fewer errors. Conversely, information technology 
may create new ethical problems and issues (Groniak-Koakawska 1996; Maner 1996). The 
interaction between the human users and the information technology towards purposeful action 
that has moral character and is judged ethically forms the basis of the concept of moral 
affordances. The affordances provided by the technology and technology in use often carry a 
moral component in some situations and contexts; for example, a fast, open campus network 
affords student the opportunity to easily shared copyrighted material including software and 
media. The physical properties and the manner IT is designed defines the moral properties by 
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which a human actor may engage in moral actions using the IT artifact. The presence of these 
moral properties and subsequent perception of moral affordances defines the realm of potential 
moral actions afforded to the user. Furthermore, this “realm of potential moral actions” may be 
constructed based on this set of moral affordance dimensions for information technology. 
Furthermore, since human actions are necessarily purposeful—humans motivated to achieve a 
goal through some means—and because these actions are purposeful the qualities of the 
technology perceived by the individual (affordances) are necessarily judged ethically.  
Ownership 
Ownership is defined as the presence and maintenance of intellectual property, and how 
information as property is managed and used by the owner and others alike, etc. (Conger et al. 
1995). The ownership of information technology as an artifact also plays an important role in 
shaping moral actions. On one hand, IT artifacts are considered common goods for common 
consumption (e.g. municipal or state broadband, Internet infrastructures, organizational networks 
and infrastructures, etc.). On the other hand, the ownership of IT artifacts may be highly 
individualistic, particularly with the increase ubiquity of personal and laptop computers and smart 
phones. The social and moral structure surrounding the ownership of an IT artifact may determine 
the perceived moral affordances of actors, particularly the extent to which these IT artifacts are 
viewed as common or shared resources. Second, ownership of information as intellectual 
property also may determine the moral affordances perceived by the user, and the manner the IT 
artifact is designed may promote or subvert these conceptions. Traditionally, IT artifacts have 
possessed few safeguards to protect intellectual property rights; however, more recent 
technologies have started introducing clear right-based access controls for the consumption and 
modification of information, in some cases for the express purpose of enforcing intellectual 
property rights. However, other technologies are expressly developed to subvert intellectual 
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property rights (particular some peer-to-peer downloading programs), often in support of a 
common good or a principle of sharing information.  
Access 
Access is defined as moral considerations relating to who may read, modify, and delete 
information, to what extent these users have these rights, and what roles these users have (Conger 
et al. 1995). Although the concept of access to information is relatively simple, the moral 
implications of access are quite complex as are the manner access affordances change moral 
action. Access affordances may first be viewed in an emancipator light, where access to 
information provides a social good. In other words, people with greater access to actionable 
information are likely to make better and more meaningful decisions, improving their lives and 
the lives of others, and therefore, providing such access through information technology 
represents a moral position and ethical behavior. Second, access affordances may also be viewed 
in a negative light, first based on unintended access to sensitive information and second based on 
access to harmful or misleading information. When we consider explicit unethical behaviors 
online, at least as they relate to moral affordances, information technology allows for 
unprecedented access to information that is otherwise private and inaccessible. While 
simultaneously providing access to intended users, information technology must prevent and 
constrain access to sensitive information from those who would use such information for identity 
theft or other unethical (and often illegal) behaviors. Finally, for those who would engage in 
unethical behaviors that are harmful to others, access affordances of information technology may 




Privacy is defined as a person’s ability to protect and control personal information using 
information technology (Conger et al. 1995). Information technology represents a double-edge 
sword in terms of protecting personal information and upholding privacy rights. On one hand, 
through entirely digital communication that affords significant anonymity, personal privacy is 
maintained by reducing the amount of identifiable information available to other users. On the 
other hand, information technology provides a platform that personal information may be easily 
transferred from party to party with few repercussions. Privacy issues are likely to be more of a 
concern due to the lack of privacy afforded by information technology than the presence due to 
the low level of privacy afforded by information technology in light of the anonymity afforded. 
Issues of privacy may also relate to other ethical issues of information technology, particularly 
access, ownership and anonymity. The ability for third parties to have access to personal 
information and for other parties to have the right to transform personal information to third 
parties are important considerations in ethical privacy issues. The manner ownership of 
information is morally and legally defined also plays an important role in a person’s privacy 
expectations when dealing with information technology. Other affordances may exacerbate the 
problem, such as scope or reproducibility. Finally, the ability to maintain anonymity in personal 
and professional transactions online is crucial for protecting one’s privacy. 
Anonymity 
Another issue in IT ethics stems from the anonymous, remote, immaterial, and virtual 
characteristics of interacting with other people using information technologies (Floridi 1999); 
hereafter simply termed anonymity. Anonymity is conceived of as the ability for people to engage 
in behaviors (both online and offline) without identifiable personal information being attributable 
to their action (Johnson 2004). Information technology makes achieving an anonymous state 
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much easier compared with achieving the same goals outside of online communication. 
Anonymity offline requires significant effort (and isolation), whereas on-line anonymity is a 
“natural state” too many people and for many behaviors. In essence, effort must be made to 
create an identity online rather than hide it. Anonymity leads to problems of integrity of data and 
information, specifically  Data can be “taken, altered, and then distributed” with little to no trace 
(Johnson 2004). Only those with experience with (and access to) detailed information contained 
in network logs can trace and identify other on-line individuals who choose not to identify 
themselves. Trust in the integrity of the information and the information source is therefore 
important, but difficult to foster in an on-line environment. 
Scope (Speed and Reach) 
Johnson (2004) conceives of scope as “power,” or the ability of information technology 
to quickly and broadly dissemination information, and thusly have a greater impact on others in a 
shorter period of time than traditional communication methods. Scope shall be conceived as a 
formative construct comprised of two components afforded by the online communication 
technology: speed and reach. Speed is the rate by which information is transferred from one 
person or system to one or more person(s) or system(s). From a technical perspective, speed may 
be directly related to the processing power and bandwidth of computer technology, whose 
constant evolution affords more and more information of greater complexity, such as audio and 
video information, to be much more accessible in a timely manner. Reach is the degree of 
interconnectedness between individuals through communication channels, such that as the 
amount of interconnectedness increases, so does the ability of an individual to “reach” many 
others by merely publically publishing some information via these online communication 
channels Naturally, the breadth of people exposed to information and other media increases 
substantially as the popularity and centralization these communication channels increase. 
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However, even decentralized communication mediums that are hugely popular can have great 
reach, particularly with the rise of social networking and social media (Parameswaran and 
Whinston 2007). 
Ethical issues derived from the speed and reach of online communication specifically 
regards the power afforded through the rate and breadth of information sharing and transfer. No 
longer are information channels centralized and top-down, controlled by central institutions and 
“authorities” such as news media outlets and government agencies. Online communication in 
most countries has provided a platform for bottom-up communications by individual actors, 
including consumers, activists, etc., to quickly disseminate information to a wide-variety of 
information consumers across the globe. The sheer scope and power afforded by online 
communication is staggering, as well as its benefits. But this power also has some negative 
influences, allowing viruses and worms to spread with infectious ease. Furthermore, scope may 
influence other moral affordances as well, such as ownership and reproducibility. As information 
technology provides greater speed, and more people are connected through common channels, 
such as social networking and other media, intellectual property and personal information can be 
disseminated quickly to a wide variety of other users. Often once information is “released” into 
online communication networks, it is impossible to retrieve. This impossibility of irretrievability 
is due to the scope and power afforded by online communication. 
Reproducibility 
The ability that information technology affords users to readily duplicate data and 
information and disseminate to others without the loss of quality or value is a unique 
characteristic of online communication using information technology (Johnson 2004). Since 
reproduction of data and information occurs with no loss of value; therefore, there is little 
evidence that a copy has been made. This threatens many aspects of moral behavior raising 
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several ethical questions regarding private property, personal privacy, data integrity, etc. There 
have been many attempts to manage and curtail reproducibility affordances to protect traditional 
notions of property, privacy and integrity, including encryption, intellectual property rights, 
reputation systems, etc.; therefore, reproducibility is not an inherent or intrinsic quality of 
information technology networks and communication, simply a unique, ubiquitous quality of 
current information system designs. 
Reproducibility is an important ethical issue for information technology as it represents 
an affront to our traditional, normative concepts of private property and personal privacy. 
Property is defined by the scarcity of the property and the owner’s ability to exert control upon it. 
Information technology affords individuals the ability to easily reproduce information, i.e. 
intellectual property, with great ease and speed. This threatens the scarcity of intellectual property 
since the information becomes readily available for those with sufficient hardware and software 
to consume the information; furthermore, the potential of the integrity and credibility degradation 
increases through further reproduction of the information away from the source. In addition, 
Johnson (2004) points out in both reproducibility issues of property and privacy, it is the 
“irretrievability of action” when private and personal information becomes public available and 
reproduced at large. The “owner” of the private or personal information is often unable to exert 
control of such information once reproduced and disseminated by another actor, or group of 
actors. 
The concept of reproducibility relates to other dimensions of ethical decision-making, 
including scope, anonymity, and ownership. Reproducibility relates to scope a dialectic manner. 
On one hand, the ability to easily reproduce data quickly disseminates information across 
networks, allowing information to be easily available to a vast number of users. However, due to 
the same ease of reproducing data, information no longer maintains a sense of permanence and 
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value as a scarce commodity. Due to anonymity, integrity of data is threatened by the ease in 
which data in reproduced. Since information technology often affords people communicating 
online varying degrees of anonymity, data and information reproduced and disseminated by these 
actors has decreased legitimacy from the source’s uncertainty. Finally, reproducibility has a 
negative effect on the ownership of data and notions of intellectual property. As data and 
information may be reproduced, often under the veil of anonymity and thusly without knowing 
the owner, there is little assurance about the origin and integrity of the information consumed. 
A Few Absent Dimensions 
This study is primarily concerned with the underlying dimensions of the information 
technology, or unique phenomenon of information technology, that drives the differences in 
perceptions, actions, and responses for ethical IT dilemmas. Therefore, some issues previously 
identified as important ethical IT dimensions may not have any application to exploring the moral 
affordances and ethical behaviors influenced directly by qualities and relationships with qualities 
of information technology. Nevertheless, the information technology artifact itself may have 
secondary influence on these dimensions of an ethical IT issue. The two dimensions of note are 
(1) responsibility and (2) motivation. Responsibility is defined as a sense of personal, group or 
organizational obligation to perform (or not perform) a particular moral, computer related action 
(Conger et al. 1995). Although the information technology my change who is deemed responsible 
for the moral consequences, responsibility represents a dimension of the ethical issue itself, and 
not of the technology contained within the ethical issue. Motivation is defined as the rationale for 
performing an ethical or unethical computer related action in consideration of who suffers or who 
benefits as a consequence of the moral action (Conger et al. 1995). Similarly, although 
information technology may play a role in the motivation of the actor to behave unethically, the 
motivation is rooted outside of the information and information technology. For example, since 
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information technology often affords additional anonymity in many settings, my motivation to 




Moral Affordances and Ethical IT Decision-Making 
 
Figure 12. Research model for the effects of moral affordances of information technology 
Many authors have considered in depth how information technology influences the nature 
of ethical theory and principles (Groniak-Koakawska 1996; Johnson 2004; Maner 1996), and also 
how technology and the manner technology is design permits or constrains moral behaviors (De 
George 2003; De George 2006); however, none of these works engaged in empirical studies 
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investigating the effects of information technology and the moral behaviors the technologies 
afford on ethical IT decision-making and intentions. Ultimately, then, the research design is 
largely exploratory for several reasons. The concept of moral affordances, much less dimensions 
of information technology ethics, has not been explored in previous literature as to how they 
impact ethical IT decision-making, intentions and behaviors. Due to the exploratory nature of the 
study, several broad propositions are explored in the research design, methodology and analysis. 
First and foremost, the exploration of situational ethics focuses on the disparities between 
ethical decision-making, intentions, and behaviors as the immediate situation and context 
changes, while the individual’s dispositions remain relatively constant. This study extends the 
notion of situational ethics, but focuses primarily on the properties and affordances of the 
information technology situated in the context as perceived by the individual. The information 
technology artifact, and the moral affordances perceived by the actor, is theorized to change 
across various contexts, situations, and artifacts in several ways. First, the individual’s perception 
of the affordances provided by the IT artifact, through framing and sense making processes, will 
likely shape the set of possible moral actions and consequences. This situational factor can be 
viewed as a person-affordance relationship, where the salient factors are perceived directly 
between the person and the artifact’s affordances. Second, the artifact-in-context may be an 
important salient situational influence, wherein the affordances of the artifact perceived by the 
individual and other moral attitudes and judgments change not due to the technology and context 
necessarily, but how these related to the specific set of moral actions in the ethical dilemma. This 
third relationship may be viewed as a person-affordance-context relationship. Finally, the 
artifact-in-dilemma may hold important situational effects on how moral affordances are 
perceived. Exploring these specific relationships between people, technology and moral actions 
rooted within a context and dilemma, however, is beyond the scope of the study. Clearly the 
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relationships between people and the moral affordances provided may evolve considerably as the 
context and dilemma change. Ultimately, this study simply proposes the following relationship 
between moral affordances and ethical dilemmas: 
Proposition 1 – The salience of moral affordance dimensions will vary significantly 
between ethical IT dilemmas. 
Beyond the varying salience of moral affordances based on the situational effects of context and 
ethical dilemma, this study posits that moral affordances will also have a direct effect on 
processes of situational ethical IT decision-making as explored in previous literature and chapters 
within this dissertation. Current models of situational ethical decision-making do not 
systematically address the technology artifact itself and its influence on ethical decision-making 
and ethical IT behavior.  Not only will the salience of moral affordances change significantly 
from situation-to-situation, but this change in salience through perceived moral affordances will 
directly impact the ethical decisions and intentions of people in those situations. Specifically, this 
study is exploring the direct effects of the salience of moral affordances on ethical IT decisions 
and behavior intentions; thusly proposing the following: 
Proposition 2 – Moral affordances has a direct effect on ethical IT decisions and ethical 
IT behavior intentions. 
Finally, similar to the hypothesized effects of domains of morality as explored in the previous 
chapters, moral affordances are expected to significantly change the structure of ethical IT 
decision-making heuristics (such as the relative effects of moral attitudes, judgments, etc.), and 
how these heuristics influence ethical IT decisions and intentions. As shown in the previous 
chapter and other literature (Banerjee et al. 1998; Moores and Chang 2006), the ethical dilemma 
may have significant influence on ethical decision-making processes, where particular moral 
constructs become more or less salient depending on the ethical dilemma and context. Just as 
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situational factors derived from the ethical dilemma and moral context may influence ethical 
decision-making processes, so may the moral affordances of information technology perceived by 
the actor. Therefore, the following is proposed: 
Proposition 3 – Moral affordances influence the manner and structure of ethical IT 
decision-making. 
The aforementioned propositions are assessed using a methodology that builds upon previous 
work from the proceeding chapters and is developed in the following section. Furthermore, the 
analysis and results sections follow closely these three propositions, exploring how the results of 
the exploratory study either supports or denies the assertions of these three propositions. 
Methodology 
Vignettes and Survey Design 
Each vignette is designed to elicit a broad array of varying information and technology 
factors related to the aforementioned moral affordance dimensions. Due to the exploratory nature 
of the moral affordance research, and the possible confounding effects of other situational factors 
such as motivation, responsibility, and moral intensity, specific relationships between salient 
information and technology factors prevalent in the scenarios and moral affordance dimensions 
are avoided. Furthermore, the intention of the ethical IT dilemmas is not to elicit specific moral 
affordances of information technology, but to engender a wide spectrum of varying moral 
affordances. 
The phishing ethical dilemma illustrates a phishing scam where a website requests a 
small amount of personal information for a chance to win a prize offer. The respondent has little 
information about what the website will do with the information (whether to sell it to third-party 
advertisers, or aid in identify theft), and whether the company or individual hosting the website 
will follow through with completing the prize offer. One dilemma with the phishing scenario is 
 
159 
that the actor (your friend) is not responsible for the unethical action, but instead is the direct 
victim of potential unethical actions by the company or individual receiving the personal 
information. The phishing dilemma introduces several issues relating to ethical IT issues and 
technological factors. First and foremost, since the phishing scam is intended to elicit personal 
information concerns about promoting privacy to protect personal information, and anonymity to 
protect identities on the web. Furthermore, the degree of availability of this phishing website to 
online users may increase the salience of concerns about access (likelihood that users have access 
to the website) and reach (the number of users affected by the phishing scam). Since this phishing 
scam is implemented online, the nature of online communication is intended to afford additional 
moral issues and problems not present when the information technology is absent. 
The software piracy ethical dilemma illustrates a student downloading some statistical 
software for which there is a heavily discounted student version available. The cost associated 
with the statistical software is intended to be reasonably in reach of even a student’s budget, but 
often the availability and ease by which individuals can download comparable software for no 
charge makes even small costs uneconomical. The software piracy scenario is expected to be 
salient with several moral affordance dimension, and different moral affordances than those 
salient in the phishing scenario. Ownership is expected to be particularly salient since all piracy 
issues are fundamentally issues of intellectual property. Individuals a broad sense of intellectual 
property and property right enforcement are likely to find ownership a particularly salient 
dimension in the software piracy scenario. Access and speed affordances are also likely to be 
more salient to most individuals as the ability to download pirated software is premised on first 
the availability of the software online, and the speed by which the software may be downloaded 
and obtained. Reproducibility affordances may also play a role in shaping software piracy 
intentions and decisions and in shaping the role ownership and intellectual property perspectives. 
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The ability of information technology to duplicate data and information (including software) is a 
necessary condition (a physical and moral affordance) to pirating software. 
Finally, the hacking ethical dilemma illustrates a programmer at a bank who has access to 
crucial systems software, and users this access to modify the bank software to avoid a mere bank 
fee. The ethical implications for the access to the bank system software are vast, and the potential 
for unethical behavior is great. Therefore, moral affordances of information technology relating to 
the availability of the bank system software to the programming (i.e. access) ought to be 
particular salient to respondents. Also, issues of ownership ought to play a particular role, both in 
terms of ownership of the system (as an artifact) and the software (as intellectual property). Given 
that the bank likely formally owns both the systems and software, the legal ownership is without 
questions, but nevertheless, if the programmer is authorized access based upon his role as a 
systems programmer, we may conclude that there is an implicit ownership of the software and the 
software developed by the system. 
Measure Development 
The measure of salient moral affordance dimensions was developed based upon existing 
literature identifying important dimensions of information systems and information technology 
ethics (Conger et al. 1995; Johnson 2004; Mason 1986; Mason 1995). Two studies are 
particularly important in developing a measure of the moral affordances of information 
technology: Conger’s (1995) factorial study identifying five dimensions (three used) of 
information technology ethics, and Johnson’s (2004) three unique dimensions of computer and 
on-line communication that have salient effects on information technology ethics. As previously 
mentioned, Conger and others (1995) developed five dimensions of information technology ethics 
using an extensive factor analysis in order to confirm Mason’s (Mason 1986; Mason 1995) 
identification of important IT ethics issues. The five dimensions identified through the factor 
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analysis were: ownership, access, responsibility, motivation, and privacy. Of these five, only 
three are used (ownership, access, and privacy) since responsibility and motivation are specific to 
the scenario-itself, applicable to scenarios irrelevant of the information technology employed; and 
therefore, have little relation to the information technology used in the scenario. Johnson (2004) 
further explicates several dimensions and future issues of information technology for on-line 
communication, including anonymity, scope (speed and reach), and reproducibility. Three items 
each measure the three dimensions, with the exception of scope that contains four items, two for 
both speed and reach. Questions were developed to elicit the relative important of each moral 
affordance, including deontological and consequential implications of each of the moral 
affordances. For example, the speed and reach dimensions contains questions relating to, while 
the privacy dimension contains questions relating to whether the action in the scenario threatens 
personal privacy or other’s access to personal information. Table 31 outlines the finalized set of 
measurement items developed to assess the moral affordance dimensions. 
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Table 31. List of moral affordance constructs and measurement items 
Item Construct Measurement Item 
TD_01 Who owns [the technology] is important in this situation. 
TD_02 Who created the [technology] changed my opinion about this situation. 
TD_03 
Ownership 
I would be less likely to [behavior similarly] if ownership was enforced. 
TD_04 The ease the [technology] can be accessed is important in this situation. 
TD_05 [This behavior] would be less likely if the [technology] was not easily available. 
TD_06 
Access 
Fewer people would be affected if the [technology] was more difficult to access. 
TD_07 Protecting personal privacy is important in this situation. 
TD_08 Privacy risks changed my opinion about [this behavior]. 
TD_09 
Privacy 
I would be less likely to [behavior similarly] if my privacy was at risk. 
TD_10 It is important to maintain anonymity in this situation. 
TD_11 This situation would be much worse if I could not remain anonymous. 
TD_12 
Anonymity 
I would be less likely to [behave similarly] if I cannot remain anonymous. 
TD_13 The speed information is sent and received is important in this situation. 
TD_14 
Speed 
The faster information is transferred, the worse the situation becomes. 




Many more people are affected in this situation because of information 
technology. 
TD_17 Copying data and information is important to [this behavior]. 




I would be less likely to [behave similarly] if it was more difficult to duplicate. 
Analysis and Results 
The analysis and results are organized as follows. First, the reliability, convergent 
validity and discriminant validity is assessed to determine whether the measurement items 
developed to assess the moral affordance dimensions load consistently on predicted latent 
constructs, and that the latent constructs. Second, the relative importance (means, standard 
deviations) is compared between moral affordance constructs, as well as between ethical IT 
scenarios using pair wise comparisons. Third and finally, once the validity of the measurement 
moral is established and the ethical IT scenarios show unique differences regarding moral 
affordance dimensions, the effects of the moral affordance dimensions on ethical IT behavior and 
 
163 
ethical IT decisions is evaluated in isolation, and then the effects are evaluated in light of the 
ethical decision-making model from previous chapters. The comparisons of structural models are 
developed in order to address questions of whether aspects of the information technology 
contribute to our ethical IT behavior intention and ethical IT decisions. 
Measurement Model and Validity Assessment 
The second step in assessing the reliability and validity of the measurement model is 
performing a confirmatory factory analysis (CFA) on the 19 items developed for the seven moral 
affordance dimensions (Brown 2006; Campbell and Fiske 1959). In conducting a confirmatory 
factory analysis, each of the indicator items is associated with the latent constructs representing 
the corresponding moral affordance dimension. A CFA is crucial in determining suitable 
convergent and discriminant validity, particularly for newly developed items for theoretically 
established phenomena. First, convergent validity in partial least squares modeling is determined 
by assessing the significance of the indicator’s measurement loading on the corresponding latent 
construct. The latent construct has maintained convergent validity if the p-value of the 
corresponding t-statistic for each associated indicator is less than 0.50 (Gefen and Straub 2005). 
Table 32 outlines each indicator, the corresponding latent construct, and the loading mean, 
standard deviation, t-statistics and p-value. The loading of each indicator is highly significant and 
satisfies the aforementioned criteria of a significance level less than 0.50; therefore, the criteria 
for convergent validity are satisfied. 
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Table 32. Indicator loadings, standard deviation, t-statistic, and p-value per latent construct 
Indicator Construct Loading SD T-Stat(a) P-Value(b) 
TD_01 0.794 0.018 43.142 0.001 ** 
TD_02 0.773 0.020 38.431 0.001 ** 
TD_03 
Ownership 
0.780 0.017 44.886 0.000 *** 
TD_04 0.758 0.020 38.831 0.001 ** 
TD_05 0.864 0.011 75.724 0.000 *** 
TD_06 
Access 
0.818 0.019 43.888 0.001 ** 
TD_07 0.780 0.020 38.655 0.001 ** 
TD_08 0.893 0.008 107.568 0.000 *** 
TD_09 
Privacy 
0.853 0.012 72.225 0.000 *** 
TD_10 0.862 0.013 65.944 0.000 *** 
TD_11 0.888 0.011 80.756 0.000 *** 
TD_12 
Anonymity 
0.854 0.013 65.194 0.000 *** 
TD_13 0.897 0.011 81.088 0.008 ** 
TD_14 
Speed 
0.896 0.010 87.619 0.007 ** 
TD_15 0.887 0.014 65.593 0.010 * 
TD_16 
Reach 
0.919 0.008 115.867 0.005 ** 
TD_17 0.773 0.023 33.290 0.001 ** 
TD_18 0.822 0.015 55.408 0.000 *** 
TD_19 
Reproducibility 
0.739 0.023 31.816 0.001 ** 
 (a) df = 962; (b) * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 Discriminant validity in partial least squares modeling is achieved through two criteria 
(Gefen and Straub 2005; Gefen et al. 2000). First, measurement items, or indicators, should load 
heavily (greater than 0.7) on the associated latent construct, while having loadings on other 
construct at least one order of magnitude lower than the same loading on the associated latent 
construct (Gefen and Straub 2005). For example,  if an indicator loads on the associated latent 
construct with 0.83, then the indicator should not load on other latent constructs greater than 0.73, 
and preferably below 0.5 (Gefen et al. 2000). Table 33 shows each of the 19 indicators developed 
and their loadings on each of the seven moral affordance dimensions, where the associated latent 
construct is emphasized in bold. Although some indicators have moderate loads on unassociated 
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constructs (for example, the loading of TD_01 on the privacy dimension is 0.51), these moderate 
cross loadings are at least one order of magnitude lower than indicators loading on the associated 
latent construct (in the same example, the loading of TD_01 on the ownership dimension is 
0.794). Therefore, the measurement items developed to assess the moral affordance dimensions 
pass the first criteria for discriminant validity. 
Table 33. Cross-loadings of indicators on latent constructs of moral affordance dimensions 
Indicators  Ownership Access Privacy Anonymity Speed Reach Reproducibility 
TD_01 0.794 0.131 0.510 0.176 0.108 0.120 0.236 
TD_02 0.773 0.105 0.402 0.188 0.129 0.035 0.288 
TD_03 0.780 0.390 0.381 0.309 0.218 0.175 0.385 
TD_04 0.261 0.758 0.176 0.235 0.339 0.171 0.277 
TD_05 0.212 0.864 0.143 0.261 0.258 0.245 0.303 
TD_06 0.228 0.818 0.188 0.225 0.236 0.293 0.295 
TD_07 0.408 0.160 0.780 0.277 0.181 0.170 0.257 
TD_08 0.513 0.140 0.893 0.400 0.192 0.162 0.334 
TD_09 0.458 0.221 0.853 0.549 0.124 0.191 0.340 
TD_10 0.282 0.212 0.482 0.862 0.232 0.169 0.314 
TD_11 0.199 0.263 0.382 0.888 0.256 0.225 0.303 
TD_12 0.286 0.293 0.423 0.854 0.261 0.201 0.351 
TD_13 0.158 0.323 0.162 0.295 0.897 0.180 0.342 
TD_14 0.201 0.288 0.186 0.221 0.896 0.257 0.345 
TD_15 0.105 0.256 0.134 0.195 0.234 0.887 0.278 
TD_16 0.160 0.270 0.232 0.216 0.208 0.919 0.360 
TD_17 0.307 0.267 0.246 0.240 0.270 0.345 0.773 
TD_18 0.391 0.209 0.428 0.305 0.319 0.252 0.822 
TD_19 0.214 0.377 0.171 0.327 0.306 0.241 0.739 
The second criteria to achieve discriminant validity apart from the confirmatory factor 
analysis presented previously are based on comparison the variance explained by each latent 
construct to that construct’s cross-correlations with each other construct. If the amount of 
variance explained is greater significantly greater than any cross-correlation of the latent 
construct with other constructs, then the latent construct contributes a significant amount of 
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information to the structural model, more so than other constructs. However, if the variance 
explained is equal or less than the cross-correlations with other latent constructs, the latent 
construct does not contribute a significant amount of unique information to the structural model. 
The square root of variance explained (SAVE) should be both much larger than the cross-
correlations with other constructs (Chin 1998), or the variance explain (AVE) should be larger 
than the cross-correlations (Gefen et al. 2000). Generally, if the AVE is larger than the cross-
correlations, the SAVE will also be significant greater (Gefen et al. 2000). Second, the AVE 
should exceed a threshold of 0.5 (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Based on the cross-correlations 
between latent constructs and the AVE of latent constructs along the diagonal in Table 34, the 
latent constructs fulfill both of the criteria for the second test of discriminant validity. The AVE 
for each latent construct is greater than 0.5, and the AVE of each latent construct is greater than 
the cross correlations with other constructs, fulfilling the more stringent standard (Gefen et al. 
2000). 
Table 34. Latent construct means, standard deviations, cross-correlations and variance explained 
Latent Construct a Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ownership 2.617 1.230 0.612       
Access 2.387 1.167 0.287 0.663      
Privacy 2.172 1.186 0.547 0.207 0.843     
Anonymity 2.330 1.104 0.296 0.296 0.495 0.868    
Speed 3.137 1.142 0.201 0.341 0.194 0.288 0.896   
Reach 2.276 1.011 0.149 0.291 0.206 0.228 0.244 0.903  
Reproducibility 2.690 1.058 0.396 0.359 0.371 0.373 0.384 0.356 0.779 
(a) Lower values represent a greater salience of the moral affordance dimension 
To further explore the reliability and validity of the measurement model, the Cronbach’s 
alpha for each scenario is calculated, and then compared to the base or combined model. The 
comparison is shown in Table 35. Some changes in reliability are expected and tolerated, but 
large swings or systematically higher or lower reliability may be problematic. Overall, the 
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reliability within each scenario is stable when compared to the combined measurement model; 
however, some isolated anomalies and systematic variations are present. The most significant 
anomaly is the reliability of the ownership dimension within the phishing scenario 
(Δα = −0.404). One explanation of such as significant anomaly is that ownership rights of 
personal information are a highly disputed topic, and individual’s positions on information and 
intellectual property ownership varies significantly. Furthermore, a few other dimensions show 
significant decreases in reliability, particular access, speed, and reproducibility, while other 
dimensions also show marginal decreases, such as privacy and reach. As demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, the phishing scenario in particular lacked a “moral character” where all 
responses to ethical decision-making constructs and relationships between constructs of interests 
were much lower or absent, respectively, when compared with the other two scenarios. This 
absence of moral character in the phishing scenario may explain the systematic decrease in 
reliability, resulting in undue variation in the importance of specific moral affordances since 
respondents had little moral investment in the issues or outcome outlined in the scenario. 
Conversely, the piracy and hacking scenarios show little signs of a systematic increase or 
decrease in the reliability of each moral affordance dimension. A few moral affordance construct 
show moderate increases of reliability in the piracy (speed and reproducibility) and hacking 
(ownership and reach) scenarios, but increase are generally expected when comparing the 
combined reliabilities across all scenarios to scenario-specific reliability as differences in 
situation-specific variations are removed. 
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Table 35. Moral affordance dimension reliability per scenario 
Latent Construct a Base Phishing Piracy Hacking 
 α α Δα α Δα α Δα 
Ownership 0.688 0.284 -0.404 0.651 -0.037 0.762 0.074 
Access 0.744 0.653 -0.091 0.794 0.05 0.760 0.016 
Privacy 0.796 0.754 -0.042 0.686 -0.11 0.726 -0.07 
Anonymity 0.836 0.833 -0.003 0.822 -0.014 0.849 0.013 
Reach 0.755 0.729 -0.026 0.708 -0.047 0.818 0.063 
Speed 0.775 0.707 -0.068 0.851 0.076 0.754 -0.021 
Reproducibility 0.676 0.582 -0.068 0.655 0.076 0.790 -0.021 
Assessment of Means and Scenario Differences 
First, before comparing mean responses between constructs and between scenarios, some 
spot comparisons based on Table 36 are warranted. Lower values are associated with greater 
salience of particular moral affordance. For the phishing scenario, we find that the most salient 
moral affordance dimensions are privacy (x̄ = 1.387, SD = 0.682), ownership (x̄ = 2.095, 
SD = 0.953), and anonymity (x̄ = 2.191, SD = 1.051). Ethical issues of information phishing are 
wrought with privacy concerns from users, and questions of ownership of personal information is 
frequently debated and tested online; therefore, these salient moral affordance dimensions for the 
phishing scenario appear reasonable. For the software piracy scenario, the most important 
dimensions are speed (x̄ = 2.095, SD = 0.954), access (x̄ = 2.291, SD = 1.153), and anonymity 
(x̄ = 2.294, SD = 1.046). Based on these more salient dimensions, one may infer that respondents 
are more concerned with the ease, efficacy and safety of downloading software than the important 
issues surrounding software piracy. Speed and access in terms of software piracy are intimately 
related to a person’s ability to quickly and effectively procure software using “illicit” means. 
Furthermore, others would correlate anonymity in this context with people’s concerns of 
discovery, either in one’s referent group who may frown on such behavior, but more likely to 
avoid discovery from “authorities.” This is further corroborated since ownership and 
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reproducibility dimensions are not important for the software piracy scenario. Ownership may not 
be an important dimension for respondents as intellectual property rights is a highly debated 
ethical issue, and variations in availability and cost have significant effects on ethical behaviors 
regarding piracy (Moores and Chang 2006). Reproducibility may not be comparatively important 
either, not because the ability for information technology to duplicate information is not 
necessary, but that the ability is not important since most consumer IT devices are not 
constrained by significant hardware limitations. Finally, for the hacking scenario, the access 
(x̄ = 2.305, SD = 1.196), speed (x̄ = 2.454, SD = 1.077), and anonymity (x̄ = 2.506, SD = 1.181) 
dimensions are the most salient moral affordances. Again, similar to software piracy, it appears 
users are focused on the efficacy by which the unethical IT behavior can be performed by using 
the information technology (as demonstrated by the important of access and speed), and also on 
risk avoidance when performing the unethical IT behavior (as demonstrated by the important of 
anonymity). However, unlike software piracy, key issues that ought to be salient for hacking 




Table 36. Means and standard deviations of moral affordance domains 
Moral Affordance a Base Phishing Piracy  Hacking  
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Ownership 2.617 1.230 2.095 0.953 2.619 1.195 3.138 1.232 
Access 2.387 1.167 2.564 1.130 2.291 1.153 2.305 1.196 
Privacy 2.172 1.186 1.387 0.682 2.487 1.118 2.642 1.235 
Anonymity 2.330 1.104 2.191 1.051 2.294 1.046 2.506 1.181 
Speed 3.137 1.142 3.325 1.125 3.058 1.114 3.028 1.162 
Reach 2.276 1.011 2.280 0.963 2.095 0.954 2.454 1.077 
Reproducibility 2.690 1.058 2.658 1.000 2.513 1.034 2.898 1.057 
(a) Lower values represent a greater salience of the moral affordance dimension 
Each of the scenarios employs different information technology and ethical IT dilemmas, 
intended to elicit markedly different responses to moral affordance dimensions. Therefore, we 
should find significant differences between each of the scenarios across many of the moral 
affordance constructs if the measurement items created to capture these moral affordance 
constructs. Table 37 outlines the comparison of the composite score for each construct between 
pairs of scenarios. 
In regards to the importance of 2.ownership issues in ethical dilemmas, the phishing 
scenario was significantly more salient than either the software piracy (Δx̄ = −0.524, p < 0.000) 
or hacking (Δx̄ = −1.043, p < 0.000) scenario, and furthermore that ownership is similarly more 
salient in the software piracy scenario than the hacking scenario (Δx̄ = −0.519, p < 0.000). These 
findings are similar to the previous ad hoc means comparison, and corroborate that ownership of 
personal information is a crucial consideration for people faced with a phishing dilemma. 
Furthermore, at least in comparison to the hacking scenario, ownership was also an important 
issue in the software piracy scenario. Access was least important for the phishing scenario when 
compared with either the software piracy (Δx̄ = 0.273, p < 0.000) or hacking scenarios 
(Δx̄ = 0.259, p < 0.000). However, access was equally important in both the software piracy and 
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hacking scenarios, showing no significant different in salience (Δx̄ = −0.014, p > 0.05). Access 
was one of the most important dimensions from the ad hoc means comparison in both the 
software piracy and hacking scenarios. Privacy was greatly and significantly more salient in the 
phishing scenario than either the piracy (Δx̄ = −1.255, p < 0.000) or hacking scenarios 
(Δx̄ = −1.100, p < 0.000), while the software piracy and hacking scenarios showed a much 
smaller but significant difference toward the software piracy scenario (Δx̄ = −0.155, p < 0.01). 
Therefore, privacy seems to be a very important dimension in ethical decision-making for the 
phishing scenario, but less so in the other scenarios. 
The relative important of anonymity between scenarios is much less extreme and clear 
than in other moral affordance dimensions previously addressed. Anonymity is moderately less 
salient in the hacking scenario than either the phishing (Δx̄ = −0.316, p < 0.000) or software 
piracy (Δx̄ = −0.212, p < 0.000) scenarios. However, there is no significant difference between 
the phishing and software piracy scenarios in terms of anonymity (Δx̄ = −0.103, p > 0.05). 
Interestingly, anonymity was one of the more important moral affordance dimensions for the 
hacking scenario. However, anonymity was also ranked among the more salient dimensions for 
the other scenarios, and the difference between the hacking scenario and other scenario although 
significant is moderate. Speed was regarded as less important in the phishing scenarios than either 
the software piracy (Δx̄ = −0.297, p < 0.000) or hacking (Δx̄ = −0.266, p < 0.000) scenario; 
however, there are no differences in salience between the piracy and hacking scenario (Δx̄ = 0.03, 
p > 0.05).  
Regarding the salience of reach between ethical IT dilemmas, significant differences are 
found between them. Reach, as the number of possible people influenced by an unethical action 
online, was much more salient in the phishing scenario than in the hacking scenario 
(Δx̄ = −0.530, p < 0.001), but less salient in the software piracy scenario (Δx̄ = 0.185, p < 0.01). 
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By extension, reach was much more salient in the software piracy scenario than in the hacking 
scenario (Δx̄ = −0.715, p < 0.001). Respondents were likely focusing on the expansive effects 
that online phishing scams and rampant software piracy have on the number of potential users 
affected, whereas the hacking scenario only marginally benefits the actor, and negatively affects 
the bank. 
In terms of the affordance of reproducing data and information, the differences between 
scenarios remain large and significant. Reproducibility was significantly more salient in the 
phishing scenario than the hacking scenario (Δx̄ = −0.240, p < 0.001), but not the software piracy 
scenario (Δx̄ = 0.145, p < 0.01). Furthermore and by extension, reproducibility affordances in the 
software piracy scenario were much more salient than in the hacking scenario (Δx̄ = −0.386, 
p < 0.001). Reproducing data is of critical concern in phishing scam, and of critical importance in 
the software piracy scenario. However, the hacking scenario, being only a slight modification 
with no data duplication, only potential data integrity and access issue, was unsurprisingly the 
lowest of the three scenarios. 
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Table 37. Pair-wise comparison of moral affordance dimensions 
Pair-wise Comparison 
Mean (x1 – x2) 
a SD T-Stat b P-Value c 
Ownership      
Phishing Hacking −1.043 1.151 −16.231 0.000 *** 
Phishing Software Piracy −0.524 1.036 −9.059 0.000 *** 
Software Piracy Hacking −0.519 1.076 −8.646 0.000 *** 
Access      
Phishing Hacking 0.259 1.142 4.064 0.000 *** 
Phishing Software Piracy 0.273 1.099 4.458 0.000 *** 
Software Piracy Hacking −0.014 1.017 −0.252 0.802  
Privacy      
Phishing Hacking −1.255 1.065 −21.104 0.000 *** 
Phishing Software Piracy −1.100 0.948 −20.787 0.000 *** 
Software Piracy Hacking −0.155 0.914 −3.039 0.003 ** 
Anonymity      
Phishing Hacking −0.316 1.251 −4.520 0.000 *** 
Phishing Software Piracy −0.103 1.089 −1.700 0.090  
Software Piracy Hacking −0.212 0.933 −4.078 0.000 *** 
Speed      
Phishing Hacking 0.297 1.143 4.651 0.000 *** 
Phishing Software Piracy 0.266 1.064 4.484 0.000 *** 
Software Piracy Hacking 0.030 0.993 0.548 0.584  
Reach      
Phishing Hacking −0.530 1.113 −8.536 0.000 *** 
Phishing Software Piracy 0.185 0.965 3.427 0.001 ** 
Software Piracy Hacking −0.715 1.061 −12.072 0.000 *** 
Reproducibility      
Phishing Hacking −0.240 0.943 −4.566 0.000 *** 
Phishing Software Piracy 0.145 0.948 2.742 0.006 ** 
Software Piracy Hacking −0.386 0.938 −7.363 0.000 *** 
(a) Lower values represent greater moral affordance salience; (b) df = 320; (c) * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Effects of Moral Affordance Dimensions 
Table 38 shows the effects of moral affordance constructs on ethical IT behavior 
intention and ethical IT decisions. Regarding ethical IT behavior intentions, or the likelihood that 
the respondent would perform similarly in the same context, only one dimension has a consistent 
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effect when all ethical IT scenarios are considered: ownership. Ownership has a moderate, 
positive effect on ethical IT behavior decision, suggesting that in general those who consider 
issues of ownership an important factor in forming an ethical decision, . The fact that other moral 
affordance dimensions are not significant has several implications. First, it may suggest that the 
salience of moral affordance dimensions are indeed highly situational and contextual, as 
demonstrated previously in the pair wise comparison of mean responses of moral affordances. 
Second, these results may also suggest those moral affordances are not a salient decision-making 
factor in terms of ethical IT behavior intention, or the likelihood that a respondent would behave 
similarly in a similar situation and context. 




Ethical Behavior Intention (1) Ethical Decision (2) 
Construct β T P-Value (3) β T P-Value (3) 
Ownership 0.128 3.286 0.006 ** 0.164 5.362 0.000 *** 
Access 0.043 1.184 0.258  -0.161 5.250 0.000 *** 
Privacy 0.012 0.250 0.807  0.444 12.331 0.000 *** 
Anonymity 0.010 0.223 0.827  -0.038 1.290 0.220  
Speed 0.087 1.454 0.170  -0.177 4.762 0.000 *** 
Reach -0.098 2.023 0.064  -0.001 0.031 0.976  
Reproducibility -0.089 1.068 0.305  0.139 1.333 0.205  
(1) R2 = 0.038; (2) R2 = 0.368; (3) * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Table 39 shows the effects of moral affordance constructs on ethical IT behavior 
intention and ethical IT decisions for the phishing scenario. Regarding ethical IT behavior 
intentions, or the likelihood that the respondent would perform similarly in the same context, both 
privacy (β = −0.227, p < 0.000) and anonymity (β = −0.313, p < 0.000) have moderate to strong 
negative effects on intent, respectively. These results suggest that as concerns of privacy and 
anonymity become more salient, respondents are less likely to engage in similar behaviors. 
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Ethical decisions appear to coincide with ethical intentions for both the privacy and anonymity 
constructs; however, access becomes an important factor in forming decisions about how the 
actor in the scenario should behave. This effect is moderately positive (β = 0.239, p < 0.05) and 
suggests that concerns about access to information and technology increases the propensity that 
the actor should perform the behavior, that is, complete an obvious phishing scheme for a chance 
at a prize offer. Considering the wording of the measurement items along with the scenario 
description, it would appear that respondents from a technical standpoint—that having access to 
this phishing scam, and the victim of the phishing scam providing access to personal information, 
are important considerations and salient factors in this scenario. 




Ethical Behavior Intention 1 Ethical Decision 2 
Construct β T Sig 3 β T Sig 3 
Ownership -0.043 0.690 0.254  -0.052 0.685 0.255  
Access 0.131 1.566 0.076  0.239 2.615 0.014 * 
Privacy -0.227 3.456 0.004 ** -0.196 2.843 0.010 ** 
Anonymity -0.313 5.282 0.000 *** -0.261 4.686 0.001 *** 
Speed 0.024 0.322 0.378  -0.051 0.885 0.200  
Reach -0.010 0.186 0.428  -0.025 0.505 0.313  
Reproducibility -0.068 0.900 0.196  -0.050 0.786 0.226  
(1) R2 = 0.247; (2) R2 = 0.213; (3) * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Table 40 shows the effects of moral affordance constructs on ethical IT behavior 
intention and ethical IT decisions for the software piracy scenario. Regarding ethical IT behavior 
intentions, or the likelihood that the respondent would perform similarly in the same context, only 
the reach dimensions have a moderate, negative effect (β = −0.172, p < 0.01). These results 
suggest that as more people are affected by the consequences of the unethical action, in this 
downloading pirated software, than individuals are less likely to behave similarly. Furthermore, 
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reach also has a moderate, negative effect on ethical IT decisions (β = −0.216, p < 0.01), again 
suggesting that as the consequences of unethical actions become broader people believe that 
other’s in similar situations ought not engage in software piracy. 




Ethical Behavior Intention 1 Ethical Decision 2 
Construct β T Sig 3 β T Sig 3 
Ownership 0.165 0.867 0.204  0.075 0.668 0.260  
Access 0.097 1.443 0.092  0.073 1.002 0.171  
Privacy 0.057 0.902 0.195  0.055 0.861 0.206  
Anonymity 0.086 1.205 0.129  0.059 0.873 0.203  
Speed 0.196 1.004 0.171  0.214 1.178 0.135  
Reach -0.172 3.199 0.005 ** -0.216 3.867 0.002 ** 
Reproducibility -0.094 0.887 0.199  -0.094 0.866 0.204  
(1) R2 = 0.167; (2) R2 = 0.138; (3) * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Table 41 shows the effects of moral affordance constructs on ethical IT behavior 
intention and ethical IT decisions for the hacking scenario. Regarding ethical IT behavior 
intentions, or the likelihood that the respondent would perform similarly in the same context, 
several moral affordance dimensions have a significant effect on both ethical IT behavior 
intention and decisions. Ownership has a moderate, positive effect on intention (β = 0.204, 
p < 0.01) and small, positive effect on decisions (β = 0.137, p < 0.05), suggesting that the 
salience of ownership is associated not only with an individual’s likelihood to behave similarity, 
but also that the actor ought to engage in the hacking behavior. These results are both interesting 
and promising, as respondents seem to see a parallel between the ownership of the system or 
banking software and whether the employee has rights to access the modify the software or not. 
Furthermore, anonymity also has a small, positive effect on both intention (β = 0.172, p < 0.05) 
and decisions (β = 0.12, p < 0.05). Again, these results suggest that as anonymity becomes a 
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more salient concern to the individual as the likelihood to behave similarly increases, which 
seems to fall in step with considerations of risk aversion and avoidance discussed previously. 
People may be more likely to make unethical decisions and engage in unethical behaviors when 
the information technology affords them certain protections (such as anonymity in this case) that 
help them reduce risk and avoid social or institutional consequences. Finally, reach has a small, 
negative effect on both ethical IT intentions (β = −0.159, p < 0.05) and decisions (β = −0.139, 
p < 0.05), suggesting that as fewer people are affected by the unethical action, the more likely the 
individual are to behave similarly or decide the actor should engage in the behavior. 




Ethical Behavior Intention 1 Ethical Decision 2 
Construct β T Sig 3 β T Sig 3 
Ownership 0.204 3.525 0.003 ** 0.137 2.203 0.028 * 
Access -0.054 0.776 0.229  -0.095 1.469 0.088  
Privacy -0.008 0.117 0.455  0.042 0.636 0.270  
Anonymity 0.172 2.807 0.010 * 0.120 2.231 0.026 * 
Speed 0.023 0.284 0.392  0.072 0.958 0.182  
Reach -0.159 2.248 0.026 * -0.139 2.086 0.033 * 
Reproducibility 0.109 1.571 0.075  0.048 0.756 0.234  
(1) R2 = 0.119; (2) R2 = 0.075; (3) * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Moral Affordances on Ethical Decision-Making Models 
While in isolation there appears to be clear effects of moral affordances as perceived by 
the respondent on ethical IT behavior intention and ethical IT decisions, when considered in light 
of the ethical decision-making model developed previously a different story is portrayed. In the 
following sections, we extend the ethical decision-making model to include the moral affordance 
dimensions on their combined effects on ethical IT behavior intention. The inclusive model is 
compared to the previously developed model sans moral affordance dimensions for both the 
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combined or base model, which includes all the scenarios, and for each individual scenario in 
isolation. 
The addition of the moral affordance dimensions also does not significantly change the 
original ethical decision-making constructs or their effects on ethical IT behavior intention. 
According to Table 42, only one of the seven moral affordance dimensions had any influence on 
ethical IT behavior attention across the three scenarios in question: anonymity. Anonymity had a 
small, negative, but significant effect (β = −0.085, p < 0.05) suggesting that the more anonymity 
is a concern, the less likely an individual will behave similarly in the action. However, the 
additional of the moral affordance dimensions account for a meager 1% additional variance in the 
combined model (ΔR2 = 0.01). Therefore, although specific dimensions seemed to contribute to 
ethical IT behavior intention in isolation, the effects are largely insignificant and meager when 
the broader ethical decision-making model is considered. By calculating the effect size using the 
f2 statistic, one must conclude that there is no effect of moral affordance dimensions when all 
scenarios are included in the model (f2 = 0.01). One possibility explanation for this finding is 
strong situational differences within the scenarios that change the salience of moral affordance 
dimensions, as shown previously in the means comparison and isolated effects on ethical IT 
decisions and behavior intentions. 
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Table 42. Model comparison of the effects of moral affordance dimensions on ethical IT behavior intention 
 Base Base + Affordance 
Construct β T P-Value β T P-Value 
Moral Recognition 0.131 3.507 0.001 ** 0.163 6.144 0.000 *** 
Moral Attitude 0.123 3.958 0.000 *** 0.115 3.715 0.002 ** 
Moral Judgments (D) −0.021 0.626 0.532  0.001 0.039 0.970  
Moral Judgments (S)         
Deontological 0.031 0.570 0.569  0.061 1.159 0.264  
Utilitarian 0.248 5.389 0.000 *** 0.241 5.385 0.000 *** 
Relativist 0.346 7.233 0.000 *** 0.288 6.188 0.000 *** 
Egoist −0.053 1.319 0.188  -0.029 0.811 0.430  
Justice 0.078 1.593 0.112  0.016 0.349 0.732  
          
Moral Affordances         
Ownership     -0.001 0.017 0.986  
Access     0.045 1.626 0.125  
Privacy     0.006 0.194 0.849  
Anonymity     -0.085 2.383 0.031 * 
Speed     0.057 1.216 0.243  
Reach     0.003 0.117 0.908  
Reproducibility     0.048 1.489 0.157  
         
Adjusted R2 0.495    0.505    
Δ R2     0.010      
f2     0.010    
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Since there are no substantive effects of moral affordances on ethical decision-making 
models when scenarios are combined, the situational effects of moral affordances on ethical IT 
decision-making is explored by comparing the scenario-specific reduced ethical decision-making 
model from the previous chapter to a full model including moral affordance dimensions.  The first 
model comparison (Table 43) investigates the effects of moral affordance dimensions on ethical 
decision-making in the phishing scenario. Two of the seven moral affordance dimensions had 
significant effects on ethical IT behavior intention: privacy and anonymity. Privacy has a 
moderate, negative effect on ethical IT behavior intention (β = −0.144, p < 0.05) suggesting that 
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as privacy issues become of greater concern in the scenario people are less likely to behave 
similarly. Furthermore, anonymity has a moderate, negative effect on ethical IT behavior 
intention (β = −0.222, p < 0.01) again suggesting that as anonymity become a greater concern, 
unethical IT behaviors are less likely. The ethical decision-making model undergoes some 
changes in the phishing scenario model that are absent in the combined or base model. When the 
moral affordance constructs are absent, moral recognition is not a significant predictor of ethical 
behavior intention. However, when the moral affordance constructs are added to the ethical 
decision-making model, moral recognition has a significant, moderate effect (β = 0.187, p < 
0.01) suggesting that once situational and technological factors, particularly privacy and 
anonymity affordances, are considered in the ethical decision-making process then perceptions 
that the situation is of critical importance align with ethical behavior intentions. When only the 
phishing scenario is considered, the additional of the moral affordance dimensions account for an 
additional 12% of variance explained (ΔR2 = 0.116), which has a moderate effect size on ethical 
IT intentions (f2 = 0.131). 
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Table 43. Model comparison of moral affordance dimensions on ethical IT intention for phishing scenario 
 Phishing Phishing + Affordance 
Construct β T Sig β T Sig 
Moral Recognition 0.102 1.694 0.091  0.187 3.637 0.002 ** 
Moral Attitude 0.003 0.073 0.942  0.023 0.492 0.630  
Moral Judgments (D) 0.012 0.191 0.849  0.042 0.354 0.177  
Moral Judgments (S)         
Deontological −0.003 0.027 0.979  -0.064 0.748 0.466  
Utilitarian 0.369 4.334 0.000 *** 0.328 4.456 0.000 *** 
Relativist 0.255 3.394 0.001 ** 0.210 2.934 0.010 * 
Egoist −0.095 1.625 0.105  0.000 0.006 0.995  
Justice 0.075 0.795 0.427  0.029 0.375 0.713  
          
Moral Affordances         
Ownership     0.022 0.453 0.657  
Access     0.025 0.373 0.715  
Privacy     -0.144 2.540 0.023 * 
Anonymity     -0.222 4.371 0.001 ** 
Speed     0.060 1.094 0.291  
Reach     0.052 1.032 0.318  
Reproducibility     -0.108 1.717 0.107  
         
Adjusted R2 0.348    0.464    
Δ R2     0.116      
f2     0.131    
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
The second model comparison (Table 44) investigates the effects of moral affordance 
dimensions on ethical decision-making in the phishing scenario. Surprisingly, none of the moral 
affordance dimensions have a direct, significant effect on ethical IT behavior intentions when 
including in the ethical decision-making model. While the ethical decision-making model remains 
largely consistent, moral attitude is no longer a significant effect on ethical IT behavior intention 
(β = 0.110, p = 0.051). However, in comparison to the power and significance from the original 
model (β = 0.123, p < 0.047), the change due to inclusion of moral affordance dimensions is 
weak. When only the software piracy scenario is considered, the additional of the moral 
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affordance dimensions account for only an additional 4.2% of variance explained (ΔR2 = 0.042), 
which has a weak effect size on ethical IT intentions (f2 = 0.043). This suggests that in the 
software piracy scenario, moral affordances contribute little in defining ethical behavior intention 
when considering the broader ethical IT decision-making model. 
Table 44. Model comparison of moral affordance dimensions on ethical IT intention for piracy scenario 
 Software Piracy Software Piracy + Affordance 
Construct β T P-Value β T P-Value 
Moral Recognition 0.316 6.291 0.000 *** 0.206 3.895 0.001 ** 
Moral Attitude 0.123 1.992 0.047 * 0.119 2.118 0.051  
Moral Judgments (D) 0.091 1.463 0.144  0.061 1.511 0.151  
Moral Judgments (S)         
Deontological 0.165 2.362 0.019 * 0.163 2.389 0.030 * 
Utilitarian 0.132 1.614 0.108  0.089 1.112 0.284  
Relativist 0.421 6.635 0.000 *** 0.353 5.530 0.000 *** 
Egoist 0.006 0.108 0.914  -0.010 0.209 0.838  
Justice −0.008 0.140 0.889  -0.008 0.137 0.893  
          
Moral Affordances         
Ownership     0.030 0.397 0.697  
Access     0.045 1.073 0.300  
Privacy     0.036 0.756 0.462  
Anonymity     -0.035 0.731 0.476  
Speed     0.043 0.648 0.527  
Reach     0.006 0.138 0.892  
Reproducibility     0.021 0.350 0.731  
         
Adjusted R2 0.546    0.588    
Δ R2     0.042      
f2     0.043    
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
The third and final model comparison (Table 45) investingates the effects of moral 
affordance dimensions on ethical decision-making in the phishing scenario. Only one of the seven 
moral affordance dimensions had any influence on ethical IT behavior intention for the hacking 
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scenario: ownership. Ownership had a small, positive effect on ethical IT behavior intention (β = 
0.119, p < 0.01) suggesting that the more issues of ownership are a concern the more likely the 
individual will behave similarly in the situation. Given the context of the scenario as a 
programmer modifying a bank’s software, this significant positive effect of ownership appears to 
have some face validity as the individuals who consider it important who particularly the 
programmer performing the modification are more likely to behave similarly. Although there is 
no information alluding that the programmer has sufficient ownership within the bank to be 
considered an “owner” of the software, some respondents may have made the assumption or 
connection, and based their assessment and judgment of the ethical IT dilemma on such 
conclusions.  Again, while the ethical decision-making model remains largely consistent, there 
was one significant, surprising change when moral affordances are considered. Moral awareness, 
or the perception that an ethical IT dilemma is an important and critical moral issue, which had a 
strong effect on ethical behavior intention (β = 0.351, p < 0.000), becomes non-significant when 
moral affordances are introduced in the model (β = 0.072, p > 0.05). Considering the moderate 
effect of ownership may displace the influence of moral awareness, these results may suggest that 
matters of ownership of the bank software are more important to individuals in similar situations 
than is the act in any of itself.  The additional of the moral affordance dimensions accounts for 
only an additional 2% of variance explained (ΔR2 = 0.02)—a weak effect on ethical IT intentions 
(f2 = 0.043)—for the hacking scenario. However, although moral affordances, particularly 
ownership, do not significantly effect and significantly explain ethical IT behavior intention in the 
hacking scenario, there are significant changes in the ethical decision-making model in the form 
of moral awareness becoming a non-significant predictor of ethical IT behavior intention. 
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Table 45. Model comparison of moral affordance dimensions on ethical IT intention for hacking scenario 
 Hacking Hacking + Affordance 
Construct β T P-Value β T P-Value 
Moral Recognition 0.351 7.063 0.000 *** 0.072 1.342 0.200  
Moral Attitude 0.102 1.590 0.113  0.115 1.697 0.110  
Moral Judgments (D) 0.035 0.576 0.565  0.032 0.756 0.462  
Moral Judgments (S)         
Deontological 0.252 2.670 0.008 ** 0.269 2.828 0.013 ** 
Utilitarian 0.146 1.844 0.066  0.110 1.490 0.157  
Relativist 0.336 4.126 0.000 *** 0.295 3.561 0.003 *** 
Egoist 0.003 0.037 0.970  -0.058 0.761 0.459  
Justice −0.029 0.315 0.753  0.009 0.098 0.923  
          
Moral Affordances         
Ownership     0.119 3.040 0.008 ** 
Access     0.025 0.555 0.587  
Privacy     0.028 0.538 0.599  
Anonymity     -0.004 0.097 0.924  
Speed     -0.023 0.420 0.681  
Reach     0.000 0.005 0.996  
Reproducibility     0.037 0.683 0.505  
         
Adjusted R2 0.548    0.568    
Δ R2     0.020      
f2     0.047    
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The first proposition posited that the salience of moral affordance dimensions would 
change significantly between ethical IT dilemmas due to the situational effects such as the 
characteristics of the dilemma or immediate context. All of the moral affordance dimensions 
varied between at least two of the three ethical IT dilemmas; and most of the moral affordance 
dimensions varied significantly between each of the ethical IT dilemma. These findings 
contribute significant evidence that situational effects of ethical IT dilemmas influence how 
people perceived information technology and the potential action it affords in a moral context. 
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However, not all moral affordance dimensions showed situational differences across all three 
scenarios. The inconsistent differentiation of moral affordance dimensions within the limited 
sample of three ethical IT dilemmas provides some evidence that while two scenarios may have 
similar perceived moral affordances across some dimensions, they may be perceived as starkly 
different across other dimensions. The second proposition posited that moral affordance 
dimensions would affect ethical IT decisions and behavior intentions, and that this influence 
would also change based upon situational effects. We find mixed support for the effects of salient 
moral affordance dimensions on ethical IT decisions and behavior intentions, and these moral 
affordance effects varied significantly from scenario to scenario, providing some support for 
proposition two. The salient moral affordance dimensions varied for each scenario on ethical 
decisions and behavior intentions, and the effects were consistent on ethical decisions and 
intentions (with some exception). In other words, if a moral affordance dimension was salient for 
ethical IT decisions, behavior intentions followed suit. In the phishing scenario, only ownership 
had significant effects on ethical IT behavior intentions, but access, privacy, and speed in addition 
had effects on ethical IT decisions. This also suggests that there is a gulf between what an actor 
would do and how an actor would judge a situation and ethical IT dilemma in terms of the moral 
affordances perceived from the information technology. However, in the software piracy scenario 
only reach was salient on both ethical IT decisions and behavior intentions. Finally, in the 
hacking scenario ownership, anonymity and reach were salient on both ethical decisions and 
intentions. Interestingly, these effects not only associate with the consequences of the action 
(reach) but also the legitimacy (ownership) and risk aversion of performing the action 
(anonymity), suggesting that ethical IT decisions may incorporate may more heuristics outside of 
deontological and consequentialist moral philosophies. 
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The third proposition posited that moral affordance dimensions would change the 
structure and manner of ethical IT decision-making, or, in other words, the inclusion of moral 
affordances would change the structural model developed in previous chapters. The results show 
little support for moral affordance dimensions in all scenarios, but significant support in the 
phishing scenario. It would appear that moral affordance dimensions do have some effect on the 
manner we make ethical IT dimensions; contributing to the conjecture that information 
technology fundamentally changes how we understand and process moral quandaries and 
dilemma. Specifically, while with the exception of the phishing scenario moral affordances are 
largely ineffective when the entire ethical decision-making model is considered, there are some 
significant changes in the ethical decision-making model when moral affordances are considered. 
For example, moral attitude becomes insignificant in the software piracy scenario while moral 
recognition, a common salient factor in all models, becomes insignificant in the hacking scenario. 
These results may suggest that the underlying reasons why we consider an ethical dilemma as 
“bad” or a “critical issue” is based more so on specific ethical concerns of the IT artifact. 
There are several plausible explanations for the greater contribution of moral affordance 
dimensions within the phishing scenario. First, we remove potentially conflicting effects caused 
by markedly different ethical scenarios and contexts since the situation specific effects are 
isolated. The previous chapter, in particular, shows that people engage in somewhat different 
ethical decision-making processes across a variety of scenarios, and this is corroborated by other 
ethical IT studies (Banerjee et al. 1998; Moores and Chang 2006). Second, the previous chapter 
also demonstrated that the phishing scenario in particular had much less moral intensity, or moral 
character, than the other scenarios. This lack of moral intensity was evidenced by a significant 
decrease in both the variance explained by the ethical decision-making model and a weaker or no 
significant effect of key constructs, particularly moral recognition and moral attitude. Other 
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specific moral considerations such as privacy and anonymity may play an important role when 
the moral dilemma is not clearly unethical. 
The lack of explained variance and small effect size of moral affordance dimensions 
coincides with the non-significant effects of the dimensions on ethical IT behavior intention, and 
these results taken together suggest that moral affordance dimensions of information technology 
have little influence on ethical IT decision-making for the software piracy scenario. Although 
these results lend little to investigating the different effects of moral affordances on situational IT 
ethics, and by extension the efficacy of moral affordances as developed in exploring and 
understanding technological effects on ethical IT decision-making, they do give credence to two 
important implications. As discussed at length in previous chapters, it is clear when comparing 
the strikingly different results from the phishing and piracy scenarios that situational effects have 
a strong influence on ethical intentions and decisions. If we consider the salience of moral 
affordance dimensions on ethical IT decision-making, we find that in the phishing scenario moral 
affordance dimensions are particularly salient and contributed significantly to the variance 
explained. However, in the software piracy scenario, suddenly all of the moral affordance are 
insignificant against ethical IT behavior intention contributing little to the explained variance 
when the entire EDM model is considered. First, this disparity implies that 
Implications for Theory 
The notion of information technology affordances have been introduced in some 
theoretical literature (Markus and Silver 2008), but affordance theory has not been applied to 
empirical research and analysis in the information systems field. Furthermore, this research 
extends affordances beyond physical consequences into the social and moral domains (Heft 1989; 
Heft 2001) theorizing that not only does information technology artifact afford potential for 
actions that result in physical consequences,  but also social and moral consequences that may be 
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evaluated and judged morally. Therefore, this study represents not only an early attempt to apply 
information technology affordances within an empirical IS study, but also a preliminary work 
introducing the notion of social and moral affordances to information systems. 
Each of the three propositions developed and tested previously carry significant 
implications for moral theory in information systems research. The results from this study suggest 
that the salience of moral affordance dimensions vary significantly between ethical IT dilemmas, 
contributing to the long history that situational factors have a strong influence on people’s 
perceptions (Trevino 1986; Trevino et al. 2006). However, when moral affordance dimensions 
were included in the broader ethical IT decision-making model developed in previous chapters 
their salience varied significantly between scenarios, and had some effect on changing the ethical 
IT decision-making model. When addressing the third proposition; however, this study shows 
little evidence that moral affordance dimensions affect the structure and manner of ethical 
decision-making in IT dilemmas. 
Limitations 
One major theoretical limitation of the research design is the assumption the salient 
affordances may be consciously perceived in forming ethical IT decisions and intentions, when in 
actuality such functional affordances, either real or perceived, are often acted upon 
subconsciously as part of a greater set of conscious activities toward a purpose or goal. Drawing 
from activity theory (Leont'ev 1978), the current formulation of moral affordances in information 
technology, as measured by this study, is situated within and between activity supported by 
motives and actions supported by goals, and not where affordances are broadly situated between 
actions and operations supported by conditions. Therefore, one limitation and confounding factor 
may stem from a poor theoretical level of analysis, where the salient factors of information 
technology that influence ethical decision-making explored rest not in the physical properties of 
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the artifact, nor the affordances perceived by the actor, but conscious actions and activities. 
Furthermore, one should not that the notion of goals in affordance theory and ecological model, 
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VIGNETTES FOR FINAL INSTRUMENT 
Phishing Scenario –Researcher Developed 
A friend has received an e-mail offering a chance to win $10,000, a flat-screen television, 
and or an iPod. The attractive image links to an off-site website. Your friend must answer several 
questions relating to new and upcoming products to qualify. In addition, the site requests a few 
small pieces of information from your friend, including first and last name, and e-mail address to 
notify potential prize winners. 
Software Piracy Scenario – Adapted (Moores and Chang 2006) 
A student downloads a copy of a statistical package required for a course from a popular 
Bittorrent website. The cost of a legal copy of the same statistical package is $499, but the 
company offers a student version for only $50, which most of the other students have purchased. 
The student admits that student version is not expensive, but downloads the software anyways 
since free is always cheaper. 
Unproductive Scenario – Adapted (Haines and Leonard 2007b; Leonard et al. 2004) 
A friend of yours works a small branch of a local bank as the primarily web developer of 
the on-line banking system. She recently realized that she had accidentally overdrawn her 
checking account. She made a small adjustment in the bank’s accounting system so that her 
account would not have an additional service charge assessed. As soon as she made a deposit that 





DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ETHICAL  
DECISION-MAKING CONSTRUCTS 
Item Description Lower (1) Higher (5) 





Moral Recognition 02  Highly significant issue Insignificant issue 
Moral Recognition 03  Issue is of great concern Issue is of little concern 
Moral Recognition 04  Critical issue Trivial issue 
Moral Attitude 01 Good Bad 
Moral Attitude 02 Helpful Hurtful 
Moral Attitude 03 
In terms of how you feel 
about the situation, how 
would you evaluate the 
[behavior]? Pleasant Unpleasant 
Deontological 01 Morally right Not morally right 
Deontological 02 
In terms of the reasons you 
believe the situation is 
ethical or unethical, how 
would you evaluate the 
[behavior]? 
Not a violation of fairness Violation of fairness 
Utilitarian 01 Tens to be good Tend to be bad 
Utilitarian 02 
In terms of the reasons you 
believe the situation is 
ethical or unethical, how 
would you evaluate the 
[behavior]? 
Leads to the greatest 
good 
Leads to the least good 
Relativism 01 Acceptable to my family Unacceptable to my 
family 
Relativism 02 
In terms of the reasons you 
believe the situation is 
ethical or unethical, how 
would you evaluate the 
[behavior]? 
Individually acceptable Individually unacceptable 
Egoism 01 Not selfish Selfish 
Egoism 02 
In terms of the reasons you 
believe the situation is 
ethical or unethical, how 
would you evaluate the 
[behavior]? 
Obligated to act 
otherwise 
Not obligated to act 
otherwise 
Justice 01 Fair Unfair 
Justice 02 
In terms of the reasons you 
believe the situation is 
ethical or unethical, how 
would you evaluate the 
[behavior]? 
Just Unjust 
Behavior Intention 01 Given the situation 
described, would [behave 
similarly]? 
Definitely Definitely Not 
Behavior Intention 02 In a similar situation, I 





 Combined 1 Phishing 2 Software Piracy 2 Hacking 2 
Item Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Moral Recognition 01 2.180 1.173 2.075 1.201 2.518 1.128 1.947 1.115 
Moral Recognition 02 2.197 1.147 2.154 1.173 2.456 1.086 1.981 1.132 
Moral Recognition 03 2.240 1.212 2.153 1.213 2.630 1.175 1.936 1.146 
Moral Recognition 04 2.401 1.222 2.400 1.290 2.716 1.142 2.087 1.150 
Moral Attitude 01 3.659 1.103 3.523 1.132 3.437 1.050 4.016 1.037 
Moral Attitude 02 3.366 1.049 3.153 1.034 3.207 0.975 3.738 1.039 
Moral Attitude 03 3.582 1.037 3.427 1.048 3.313 0.956 4.005 0.973 
Deontological 01 3.890 1.072 3.287 1.003 3.981 0.994 4.402 0.908 
Deontological 02 3.710 1.161 3.050 1.094 3.723 1.074 4.358 0.917 
Utilitarian 01 3.893 1.016 3.752 1.051 3.700 0.966 4.226 0.948 
Utilitarian 02 3.777 1.000 3.706 0.993 3.590 0.969 4.036 0.988 
Relativism 01 3.678 1.066 3.343 1.034 3.545 1.052 4.145 0.945 
Relativism 02 3.654 1.203 3.288 1.171 3.473 1.207 4.202 1.026 
Egoism 01 3.835 1.102 3.198 1.046 3.853 1.056 4.453 0.809 
Egoism 02 3.023 1.225 3.294 1.015 2.938 1.149 2.835 1.429 
Justice 01 3.727 1.092 3.231 1.037 3.609 1.038 4.343 0.890 
Justice 02 3.766 1.045 3.271 0.989 3.722 0.993 4.304 0.883 
Behavior Intention 01 3.968 1.157 4.028 1.075 3.564 1.254 4.313 1.004 
Behavior Intention 02 4.007 1.131 3.938 1.091 3.679 1.225 4.405 0.942 





DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR TECHNO-MORAL CONSTRUCTS 
Item Item Lower (1) Higher (5) 
Ownership 01 Who owns [the technology] is important 
in this situation. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Ownership 02 Who created the [technology] changed 
my opinion about this situation. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Ownership 03 I would be less likely to [behavior 
similarly] if ownership was enforced. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Access 01 The ease the [technology] can be 
accessed is important in this situation. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Access 02 [This behavior] would be less likely if the 
[technology] was not easily available. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Access 03 Fewer people would be affected if the 
[technology] was more difficult to 
access. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Privacy 01 Protecting personal privacy is important 
in this situation. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Privacy 02 Privacy risks changed my opinion about 
[this behavior]. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Privacy 03 I would be less likely to [behavior 
similarly] if my privacy was at risk. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Anonymity 01 It is important to maintain anonymity in 
this situation. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Anonymity 02 This situation would be much worse if I 
could not remain anonymous. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Anonymity 03 I would be less likely to [behave 
similarly] if I cannot remain anonymous. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Speed 01 The speed information is sent and 
received is important in this situation. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Speed 02 The faster information is transferred, the 
worse the situation becomes. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Reach 01 Fewer people would be affected if 
information technology was absent from 
this situation. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Reach 02 Many more people are affected in this 
situation because of information 
technology. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Reproducibility 01 Copying data and information is 
important to [this behavior]. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Reproducibility 02 The ability to duplicate data and 
information changed my opinion about 
the situation. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Reproducibility 03 I would be less likely to [behave 
similarly] if it was more difficult to 
duplicate. 




 Combined 1 Phishing 2 Software Piracy 2 Hacking 2 
Item Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Ownership 01 2.256 1.289 1.489 0.727 2.273 1.234 3.005 1.339 
Ownership 02 2.914 1.229 2.266 1.075 3.084 1.157 3.393 1.170 
Ownership 03 2.682 1.171 2.530 1.056 2.498 1.195 3.017 1.187 
Access 01 2.485 1.246 2.640 1.204 2.491 1.241 2.326 1.275 
Access 02 2.379 1.164 2.618 1.128 2.171 1.132 2.349 1.192 
Access 03 2.296 1.092 2.435 1.058 2.212 1.085 2.241 1.122 
Privacy 01 2.180 1.215 1.344 0.655 2.687 1.184 2.509 1.239 
Privacy 02 2.363 1.222 1.528 0.782 2.688 1.156 2.874 1.215 
Privacy 03 1.972 1.120 1.288 0.610 2.085 1.016 2.542 1.250 
Anonymity 01 2.364 1.091 2.123 0.996 2.336 1.045 2.634 1.166 
Anonymity 02 2.386 1.112 2.358 1.132 2.288 1.005 2.512 1.184 
Anonymity 03 2.240 1.109 2.090 1.024 2.257 1.089 2.372 1.194 
Speed 01 3.044 1.180 3.329 1.136 2.899 1.146 2.903 1.207 
Speed 02 3.231 1.105 3.321 1.114 3.218 1.082 3.153 1.117 
Reach 01 2.337 1.051 2.414 1.019 2.129 0.996 2.467 1.106 
Reach 02 2.215 0.971 2.145 0.907 2.061 0.913 2.441 1.047 
Reproducibility 
01 
2.465 1.006 2.464 0.917 2.163 0.957 2.768 1.049 
Reproducibility 
02 
2.759 1.030 2.417 0.991 2.806 0.997 3.053 1.003 
Reproducibility 
03 
2.845 1.139 3.092 1.093 2.569 1.148 2.874 1.119 






From: UNCG IRB 
 
Date: 10/28/2009  
 
RE: Notice of IRB Exemption 
Exemption Category: 2.Survey, interview, public observation  
Study #: 09-0366 
Study Title: Explaining Situation Ethics in Information Technology Within A Domain Theory 
Context 
 
This submission has been reviewed by the above IRB and was determined to be exempt from 
further review according to the regulatory category cited above under 45 CFR 46.101(b).  
 
Study Description:  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate factors contributing to the discrepancy between 
computer and non-computer related ethical dilemmas by proposing an individual's cognitive 
processes of ethical decision making change depending on the situation.  
 
 
Investigator’s Responsibilities  
 
Please be aware that any changes to your protocol must be reviewed by the IRB prior to being 
implemented.  The IRB will maintain records for this study for three years from the date of the 
original determination of exempt status. 
 




From: UNCG IRB 
 
Date: 2/12/2010 RE: Minor Contingencies to be addressed following IRB review. 
Submission Type: Modification 
Study #: 09-0366 
Study Title: Explaining Situation Ethics in Information Technology Within A Domain Theory 
Context 
 
This submission has been reviewed by the IRB. This is not an IRB approval. You may not 
implement the research activities described in your submission until you have received a memo 
indicating final IRBapproval. The IRB determined that this submission MAY BE APPROVED, 
pending stipulated changes and/or clarifications as detailed below:  
 
Study Specific Details: 
1. The changes to the consent form should tell participants exactly what identifiable 
information will be captured (email address).  Your narrative explains this, and your 
consent form should as well. 
 
 
Please address these contingencies in a revised submission, and provide a memo that includes a 
point-by-point response to the item(s) listed above. Any additional changes (including new 
materials) must also be listed and discussed in the memo. You will need to return 2 copies of all 
revised materials to theIRB, one in which all changes are underlined, highlighted, or have 
tracked changes and the other a “clean” copy with no underlining/highlighting.  Please 
reference the study number on all IRBcorrespondence.  Please note that the IRB must receive 
your response within 60 days of the date of this letter.  If a response is not received within 60 
days, the submission will be withdrawn. 
 
 




From: UNCG IRB 
 
Date: 2/16/2010  
 
RE: Notice of IRB Exemption 
Exemption Category:   
Study #: 09-0366 
Study Title: Explaining Situation Ethics in Information Technology Within A Domain Theory 
Context 
 
This submission has been reviewed by the above IRB and was determined to be exempt from 
further review according to the regulatory category cited above under 45 CFR 46.101(b).  
 
Study Description:  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate factors contributing to the discrepancy between 
computer and non-computer related ethical dilemmas by proposing an individual's cognitive 
processes of ethical decision making change depending on the situation.  
 
Study Specific Details:  
 
This modification, dated 2/9/10, addresses the following: 
1. Change in advertisement to increase incentives offered for participation that passes 
basic survey controls. 
2. Change in consent to notify respondents that email addresses will be captured due to 
stipulation that prize offers apply only to qualified responses. 
 
Investigator’s Responsibilities  
 
Please be aware that any changes to your protocol must be reviewed by the IRB prior to being 
implemented.  The IRB will maintain records for this study for three years from the date of the 
original determination of exempt status. 
 
CC:  Richard Schilhavy, Bryan School Of Busnss And Econ
 
